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PERSPECTIVES

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Highlights

PRIORITIES

VIETNAM -- LAOS

This issue of *Perspectives* has an article on the growing problems which are confronting Hanoi in the military sphere...manpower shortages, alienation of the Viet Cong guerrillas, sagging morale among the VC, and so on. The relationship between Hanoi's deteriorating military position in South Vietnam and its decision to greatly increase the intensity of its attack on Laos is far from clear.

There is no gainsaying the fact, however, that the forces leading the offensive in the Plaine des Jarres are North Vietnamese Army troops, not its Lao pawns, the Pathet Lao. And how will the Hanoi sympathizers handle this? If, as they say, the Vietnam war is merely a civil war in which the Americans are the aggressors, and if Hanoi is not expansionist, what are 50,000 NVA troops doing in Laos?

SHORT SUBJECTS

Lysenkoism: An Intimate View. *The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko*, by Zhores A. Medvedev, was published in New York and London in 1969, two years after it was completed. The book was a central issue -- as was the author -- in the toppling of Lysenko in 1964. Reviewer J. Bernstein, writing in the *New Yorker*, comments that the book reveals the anguish of Soviet scientists and is a masterful object lesson in the methods of a Communist dictatorship. Medvedev traces the demise of Mendelian genetics in the USSR, its replacement by Lysenko's pseudo-science while outstanding scientists who opposed Lysenko's and Stalin's views died in concentration camps, and, finally, the perilous campaign by educated scientists to depose Lysenko from the high position to which Khrushchev had elevated him.

We are attaching two reviews of the book plus the author's two prefaces (written in 1962 and 1967) and brief excerpts from Medvedev's discussion of the lingering influence of Lysenkoism in the USSR.

We are certain scientists, particularly geneticists and biologists, will be intrigued by this book. Other targets include Sovietologists, professors

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and teachers (especially historians), as well as writers, journalists, and political figures. Soviets and East Europeans, we feel, would also highly prize this book. We will send a copy to any Station or Base requesting it. Alternatively, the book can be ordered from the publisher, Columbia University Press. The Russian text was serialized in 1969 in the quarterly *Grani*, which can be obtained from Headquarters or by writing: Verlag Possev/ Frankfurt am Main/Federal Republic of Germany.

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China. Life for the peasant in Communist China generally sounds pretty miserable and not calculated to make outsiders envy the lot of any working man in "modern" China. On occasion the stories coming out of China are ludicrous -- almost unbelievable -- and therefore lend themselves to passing on in a less serious tone than we are wont to use in dealing with China. We commend to your attention the following homely tale -- a perfect illustration of light-hearted handling of the life led by some of the peasants in Communist China under the benevolent rule of Chairman Mao.

In mid January four Chinese peasants in Kweiyang Commune, 18 miles north of Hong Kong, were condemned to a total of 50 years of "labor reform" for showing disrespect for Chairman Mao. One of the guilty parties was a 30-year-old farmer, who drew ten years of "labor reform" (read: hard labor) for permitting his three-year-old son to tear up a picture of the Chairman; another farmer got 15 years for "allowing his wife to humiliate Chairman Mao by putting his picture under a hen roost"; the third peasant, who used rice paste instead of glue to mount the mandatory portrait of Mao, got 15 years because cockroaches, attracted by the rice, chewed up the Chairman's picture. The fourth peasant got ten years for making light of one of Mao's favorite slogans: "Fear no sacrifice, overcome all difficulties to achieve victory." The peasant's version: "Fear no drowning, overcome all difficulties to swim to Hong Kong!"

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More Cuban Meddling Foreseen in Latin American Countries. For those Latin American countries which have been weighing the advisability of re-admitting Cuba to the OAS and of establishing commercial relations with her, she has given a clear reminder that her policy of interference in her neighbor's internal affairs has not changed, and indeed, will soon be increasing. After almost three and a half years of inactivity, the Continental Organization of Latin American Students (OCLAE) held a consultative meeting in Havana in mid-December 1969. According to the communique of the meeting, which appeared in the 4 February issue of the official CP newspaper *Granma*, the functioning of OCLAE was "critically analyzed," and it was agreed that the organization must be made "more dynamic and effective and promote coordination

based on concrete actions...to be waged by the students in each country." In a clear call to revolutionary activity, the communique said that "experience...has taught us that outside set national student structures, true vanguards can emerge and be developed in university centers," and also that Latin American students should "close ranks...to develop actions that shake from their foundations the structure of...power existing in our countries." (See attached article.)

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Soviet Orthodoxy Claims Another Victim. Until last month, *Novy Mir* was the only Soviet literary journal that had devoted itself to publishing works of genuinely artistic merit -- many honestly and effectively picturing past and present weaknesses of the Soviet Union -- as distinguished from sheer propaganda novels and poetry, labored productions trying to live up to the simplistic Communist theory of "socialist realism." Aleksandr Tvardovsky, as chief editor, somehow had been able to resist the continuous and recently mounting attacks against him and his magazine by the large number of orthodox big wigs in the literary magazine business who speak for Brezhnev's regime. Despite warnings, Tvardovsky persisted in publishing genuine works of literature, but his was a losing battle. Recognizing the impossibility of maintaining his standards, he resigned his post on 14 February when the Secretariat of the Union of Writers succeeded in replacing his progressive assistant editors with orthodox hack writers and secret police representatives. (The attached news accounts provide full background.)

Thus, one more small candle in the Soviet Union has been extinguished under the weight of orthodoxy. Tvardovsky's replacement by a man with some reputation for liberalism, Vasily Kosolapov, is intended to obscure the fact that *Novy Mir*'s policy can hardly continue unchanged in view of the conservatism of his new assistant editors. Unrelieved stagnation seems most likely to pervade the literary field as it does so many other important areas of Soviet life.

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Another Sakharov, Another Letter. Word of a new Sakharov underground letter circulating in Moscow last month has caused quite a stir at [REDACTED]

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port of this new letter is its bold diagnosis of the Soviet Union's sick economy: "collective self-deception." Attached is a reprint of the letter's text as it appeared in *Time*, 23 February 1970. The Russian language text has also been received and copies can be had from Headquarters on request. See also commentary by Moscow correspondent Anthony Astrachan in *Press Comment* of 16 February and a *Newsweek* feature in *Press Comment* of 18 February. There is no doubt of the letter's authenticity and no matter whether the author be physicist Sakharov or another (FNU) Sakharov, his text is highly exploitable.

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Regime Angered by Journalist's Account of Conditions in Cuba. Attached is a series of five articles written by Pieter van Bennekom for *The News*, published in Mexico City. Entitled "The Communist Dream," the series is a lively, straight-forward account of present-day conditions in Cuba, including quick deportation of foreign newsmen. The propaganda potential of the articles is considerable, especially since the series provoked an angry official Cuban reply (also attached). The details herein should be useful in supplementing the information in the article, "Cuba as an Established Police State," also in this issue of *Perspectives*.

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Lenin's Grave is a Communist Plot.

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THE NEW YORKER
24 January 1970

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"The Rise and Fall of T.D. Lysenko"



IN all the history of science there is no record of anything to equal what happened to Russian biology in the thirty years between 1934 and 1964. During this time—a time in which biology was making extraordinary advances—the whole science of modern biology was suppressed in Russia and vigorous efforts were made to erase it from the Russian mind. Textbooks were altered, biologists who were courageous enough to continue to try to teach and do research in real biology were persecuted or imprisoned. There were severe crises in Russian agriculture—crises that might have been alleviated by the use of modern biological techniques, among them the cultivation of hybrid varieties of corn and wheat, if such techniques had not been forbidden. In their place, an entire pseudo-science was erected and forced upon the Russian people practically at gunpoint by a fanatic, illiterate charlatan, Trofim Denisovich Lysenko, who had the complete confidence of both Stalin and Khrushchev. (It is likely that one of the key elements in the downfall of Khrushchev was the failure of Russian agriculture, and one of the first acts of the regime that replaced him was the denunciation of Lysenko and his followers, who held most of the important posts in biology and agriculture.) Much has been written about Lysenko, mainly by Western observers, and now a book by a distinguished Russian biologist, Zhores A. Medvedev, "The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko" (Columbia; ten dollars), has appeared. (It has not been published in Russia.) In its controlled fury, it has all the literary qualities of an Orwellian polemic; in its revelations of the anguish of men and women whose only crime

was that they could not teach things they knew to be false, it often matches the great Russian novels; as an object lesson in the methods of dictatorships, it may be one of the definitive modern masterpieces.

Dr. Medvedev's book—the Doctor, now forty-four, was once the director of the Laboratory of Molecular Radiobiology at the Institute of Medical Radiology, in Obninsk—was translated by I. Michael Lerner, a professor of genetics and once chairman of the department at the University of California at Berkeley. In a fascinating foreword to his excellent translation, Lerner gives us the history of the book:

Although I know only a few personal facts, I should like to recount the history of my connection with this book. In 1961 I received a copy of a book, in Russian, by Y. M. Olenov, for review in *Science*. It dealt with population genetics and evolution, and its main purpose seemed to be to present the developments in these areas to the Soviet scientific community which, under Lysenko's regime, knew nothing of them. It was a good book: Engels was mentioned in it only once, and the whole tenor was not one of demagogic style (described so vividly by Medvedev) but rather that of an objective and scientific spirit. My review was entitled "The Blossoms of a Hundred Flowers of Soviet Genetics," echoing the statement of Chairman Mao. In response to my review, a postcard came to me from the Laboratory of Radiobiology in Obninsk (a hundred and ten kilometers from Moscow), informing me that I was talking through my hat—for every flower there are still a hundred weeds, it said. The writer of the card, Medvedev, turned out to be a young man of high intelligence, spirit, and courage, a Soviet patriot, and an active participant in the struggle against Lysenkoism described in this book...

Medvedev and I struck up a correspondence and, at the Mendelian celebration in Czechoslovakia in 1965... managed to meet each other. [The celebration was in honor of the hundredth anniversary of Gregor Mendel's discovery of the laws of heredity; Mendel, who did his work in the gardens of a monastery courtyard in Brno, was a spe-

cial target of Lysenko's propaganda, so Russian participation at this centennial was of particular importance.] He told me that he had been working since 1961 on a history of the whole sordid affair and showed me an outline of the book. I immediately volunteered to translate it when and if it was published in the U.S.S.R.

Subsequently Medvedev informed me that publication was to be delayed, because the powers that be had decreed that 1967, being the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution, was not a suitable time to bring out books critical of the Soviet regime.

In the fall of 1967 I was instrumental in bringing to the United States a delegation of four Soviet geneticists (this was after Lysenko's fall), and at that time I discussed with them fully, frankly, and without reservations the prospects for doing the translation. To my utter amazement, at least some of the Soviet visitors assumed that I already had the manuscript in my possession and, as I found out later, one of them denounced Medvedev and me on their return. I have no first-hand information about what happened after the denunciation, but I do know that Medvedev must have been put in a highly embarrassing position, having been falsely accused of planning to pull out of scientific "Dr. Zhivago" or a "Daniel-and-Sinbad" attempt to publish his manuscript abroad without official sanction. He wrote suggesting that I request a copy of the manuscript from the publishing house of the Soviet Academy, with a view to translating it into English, and that I point out the obvious advantages of an authorized translation... After several months of silence, I received a letter from the publishing house which indicated that the manuscript was not publishable in the U.S.S.R. and therefore I could not have a copy of it.

Meanwhile, through unofficial channels, I came into possession of a microfilm of the typescript. The author had circulated many copies of preliminary versions throughout the Soviet Union for the purpose of checking the accuracy of his account of the events described. The final Russian text, which provided the basis for the present translation, resulted from numerous revisions by the author, and has been approved by him as representing his current views. For obvious reasons, he did not see the translated, abridged, and edited manuscript before publication. It is hoped that he may one day see a copy of this book.

T. D. Lysenko, who had been experimenting with a project for planting peas as a cover for fields used as winter pastures, came to public notice in 1926. His experiments may or may not have had some value for agronomy, but at any rate they revealed some of the techniques that Lysenko was to make use of later in establishing his hold on Soviet science. Not contenting himself with the usual channels of scientific communication, he had managed to have himself made the feature of an article in *Pravda* entitled "The Fields in Winter." The author gave a graphic portrait:

If one is to judge a man by first impression, Lysenko gives one the feeling of a toothache; God give him health, he has a dejected mien. Stingy of words and insignificant of face is he; all one remembers is his sullen look creeping along the earth as if, at very least, he were ready to do someone in. Only once did this barefoot scientist let a smile pass, and that was at mention of Poltava cherry dumplings with sugar and sour cream.

By 1929, Lysenko was well on his way with the "research" that ended in the destruction of the study of modern genetics in the Soviet Union. It began simply. Lysenko and his colleagues experimented to see what would happen to the seed of winter wheat if it were exposed to the cold and then planted in the spring. The experiments led Lysenko to the statement that the direct transformation of spring wheat into winter wheat, and vice versa, was possible—the process of "vernalization." His idea, which can be traced back to the pre-Darwinian French biologist J. B. de Lamarck, was that the adaptability of certain strains of spring wheat to winter conditions, and other characteristics, could be directly inherited by the offspring. This theory of "inheritance of acquired characteristics," which ran counter to every notion of modern genetics, became Lysenko's cause, and its acceptance, again at gunpoint, was forced upon Soviet biology. The issue is clear-cut. According to present-day biology, and, for that matter, to the biology universally accepted in the nineteen-twenties, heredity is controlled by the genes. A gene is a complex molecule whose structure determines the characteristics of the off-

spring of a given species. Such molecules can be altered (the process of mutation)—for example, by exposure to radiation or chemicals—and mutation produces abrupt and generally uncontrollable changes in the hereditary pattern. Mostly, these changes are "destructive;" the altered species that result cannot adapt to their environment and die out. Some mutations are beneficial, in that the altered species more readily adapts to its environment than its predecessor did, and this is how biological species "evolve." But the fact that a parent acquires a certain characteristic during its lifetime does not mean that the offspring will inherit this characteristic. An animal may lose a limb, and a plant a leaf, but their descendants will be perfectly whole. To deny this, which in essence was what Lysenko was proposing, forces one to deny the whole of modern biology.

Sometimes a genius—an Einstein—can propose a theory that runs counter to all the accepted scientific dogma of his era and be right. This is a rare phenomenon. Mostly, the iconoclasts turn out to be cranks. However, early in the thirties, Lysenko convinced Stalin that his biology was the *only* one consistent with Marxist political ideology, and by 1935 Lysenko was calling scientists who did not accept his theories "saboteurs" and "enemies of the people." Medvedev notes that after a speech by Lysenko that ended with "a class enemy is always an enemy, whether he is a scientist or not," Stalin exclaimed "Bravo, Comrade Lysenko, bravo!" By 1936, there were two biologies in the Soviet Union—the state biology of Lysenko, and a truly scientific biology practiced by a decreasing number of Soviet scientists who were prepared to go to prison, or even die, for what they knew to be the truth. Medvedev's book is filled with the names of Soviet scientists who simply would not give in to Lysenko, whatever the consequences. The most moving part of his account deals with the great Soviet biologist Nikolay Ivanovich Vavilov. Vavilov, a specialist in plant pathology, had set himself the task of developing for Soviet agriculture disease-resistant species of cultivated plants, and to this end he began the

first broad study in the Soviet Union of applied plant genetics. Medvedev remarks:

It was to further this work that Vavilov, in the middle twenties, initiated his famous expeditions to all corners of the Soviet Union and later to all principal centers of world agriculture. Over a short period of time about two hundred expeditions were organized. Their members investigated the agriculture and plant resources of sixty-five countries and brought to the Soviet Union over a hundred and fifty thousand plant varieties, forms, and species—all of the plant-breeding wealth created by mankind in its centuries-old history.

Vavilov, the most outstanding Russian geneticist, was instantly attacked by Lysenko and his followers, and in 1939 one of them wrote, "It so happened that, together with foreign plants, bourgeois theories and pseudo-scientific trends [i.e., modern genetic theory] infiltrated [Vavilov's] institute." Indeed, by this time Lysenko was trying to force Vavilov's resignation. Vavilov could not be silenced, and after one particularly acrimonious debate with him Lysenko remarked, "I say now that some kind of measures must be taken. . . . We shall have to depend on others, take another line, a line of administrative subordination." The "others" were, of course, the Soviet secret police. In August of 1940, Vavilov, on an expedition in the western Ukraine, was arrested. Medvedev describes Vavilov's last hours of freedom:

Vavilov and his companions first went to Kiev. From there they went by car to Lvov and on to Chernovitsy. From there, in three overcrowded cars, Vavilov and a large group of local specialists proceeded toward the foothills to collect and study plants. One of the cars could not negotiate the difficult road and turned back. On the way the occupants met a light car containing men in civilian clothes: "Where did Vavilov's car go?" asked one of them. "We need him urgently." "The road further on is not good, return with us to Chernovitsy. Vavilov should be back by 6 or 7 p.m., and that would be the fastest way to find him." "No, we must find him right away; a telegram came from Moscow; he is being recalled immediately."

In the evening the other members of the expedition returned without Vavilov. He was taken so fast that his things were left in one of the cars. But late at night

three men in civilian clothes came to fetch them. One of the members of the expedition started sorting out the bags piled up in the corner of the room, looking for Vavilov's. When it was located it was found to contain a big sheaf of spelt, a half-wild local type of wheat collected by Vavilov. It was later discovered to be a brand-new species. Thus, on his last day of service to his country, August 6, 1940, Vavilov made his last botanical-geographic discovery. And although it was modest, it still cannot be dropped from the history of science. And few scientists reading of it in a Vavilov memorial volume published in 1960 could have guessed that the date of this find is a date that scientists throughout the world will always recall with bitterness and pain.

On July 9, 1941, after a brief "trial," Vavilov was convicted of "belonging to a rightist conspiracy, spying for England, leadership of the Labor Peasant Party, sabotage in agriculture, links with white emigrés," and so on. He was sentenced to death, but the wife of Beria, the police chief of Soviet Russia, was a student of plant breeding, and her professor, D. N. Pryanishnikov, persuaded her to persuade Beria to spare Vavilov. He was sent to prison, where, on January 26, 1943, he died of undernourishment. Medvedev reveals a significant fact about Soviet sensibilities:

At the end of 1942, Vavilov, who had mysteriously "disappeared" from the world science scene, was elected a foreign member of the Royal Society of London. When this information reached the N.K.V.D., the Vavilov file was urgently recalled for study. But it was too late. Life was slowly ebbing from a body exhausted by malnutrition, and it was impossible by then to save him. . . . This was the heaviest loss to Soviet science in the period of the personality cult.

Vavilov provided his own epitaph when he wrote, "We shall go to the pyre, we shall burn, but we shall not renounce our convictions."

During the war, the persecution of biologists temporarily abated. But by 1945 Lysenko had resumed his activities with renewed vigor. Now Medvedev himself finally became aware of what Lysenko was about:

Up to then, not really knowing genetics, I had viewed the controversy in genetics and Darwinism as a real scientific

debate in which, as it appeared to me, both sides deserved respect. [One of the more bizarre aspects of the affair was the treatment of Darwin. The followers of Lysenko conceived the notion that Darwin's work, which coincided, according to them, with the last flourishing of the capitalist society, represented the last bit of valid biology done in the West. Hence there ensued an all but incredible debate, as to which group of Soviet biologists were the real representatives of the true "Darwinism."] But watching the renewal of the discussion on Darwinism, I understood that the aim of Lysenko and his followers was anything but elucidation of scientific truth. . . . It soon became apparent that the position of Lysenko and his followers was weak, far-fetched, and based on few facts. It really bordered on utter falsification of science. It also became clear that neither Lysenko nor his supporters were possessed of sufficient erudition to carry on the debate at the level of serious science.

In fact, by 1948 it appeared that Lysenko might be on his way out. However, once again, he went to Stalin, and a campaign was soon under way to examine every biology text and even the contents of every course in biology to make sure that it contained no mention of modern genetics; a biologist could be dismissed from his post if he even published a finding that happened to agree with a similar finding of a scientist in the West. Medvedev attended one of Lysenko's public lectures:

An especially summoned brass band begins to play a triumphal march, under the sounds of which Lysenko proceeds through the hailing rows to the rostrum to begin his first lecture. Seeing gray-haired scientists in the front rows of the audience, Lysenko exclaims with exaltation: "Aha! You came to relearn?" I remember little of the content of the lecture—only the assertion that a horse is alive only in interaction with the environment; without interaction it is no longer a horse but a cadaver of a horse; that, when different birds are fed hairy caterpillars, cuckoos hatch from their eggs . . . etc. etc.

Whatever Stalin's death may have meant for other intellectual disciplines in the Soviet Union, it effected little change in the climate for biology. Khrushchev was a confirmed Lysenkoist, and until 1964, when he was deposed, true biology remained a forbidden, clandestine activity in the Soviet Union. It was only after 1964 that the

full extent of the methods of Lysenkoism were revealed. (It turned out that the "data" Lysenko had gathered to support his theories about the collective farms were largely false, and that farmers using his methods had suffered such enormous losses that a crisis in Soviet agriculture ensued.) A desperate effort began to "rehabilitate" Russian biology. New textbooks were needed, and whole research establishments were created almost overnight. The day before Khrushchev was deposed, the noted geneticist I. A. Rapoport received a call from a high official in Soviet agriculture, which he assumed was to announce his dismissal from his job but which turned out to be a command to prepare, within twenty-four hours, a popular article for a Soviet newspaper on the achievements of modern genetics. Medvedev reports:

Rapoport replied that he could not complete such a serious article so fast, and that in any case the newspaper, noted for its pogrom publications and Lysenko sympathies, would hardly be likely to publish it.

His caller informed Rapoport that he would receive all the secretarial help he needed and that the article would indeed be published. In thirty hours, Rapoport produced his article, and a week later it appeared, more or less as he had written it; what he had said in praise of Mendel was, however, deleted.

Medvedev does not really explain how men like Rapoport, or indeed him himself, were able to keep abreast of modern genetics during the Lysenko regime. One can only imagine the many acts of courage that this must have required. The damage Lysenkoism caused will be felt in Soviet science and agriculture for decades. Medvedev does indicate that Lysenkoism has been largely eliminated from Soviet biology, but the fate of Medvedev's book in the Soviet Union is one indication that the struggle for intellectual freedom in Russia is far from over, and there are other indications. Mr. Lerner has reported since the publication of the book, that a new scientific purge may be imminent. However, a Western reader of Medvedev's book should not

indulge in self-congratulation. Every country has its potential Lysenkos, entirely too willing to convert intellectual debates over controversial and difficult issues into denunciations of the "enemies of the people." We can only hope that if the need arises, we, too, can produce, in large numbers, people with the character, the intellectual honesty, and the moral courage of Medvedev to carry on the struggle for truth.

—JEREMY BERNSTEIN

WASHINGTON POST
10 August 1969

Tailoring biology to ideology

THE RISE AND FALL OF T. D. LYSENKO. By Zhores A. Medvedev. Translated by I. Michael Lerner. Columbia University Press. 284 pp. \$10.

By John Gagnon

"We shall go to the pyre, we shall burn, but we shall not renounce our convictions." These words of the Soviet biologist N. I. Vavilov were spoken in 1939 at the culmination of the first phase of the takeover of Soviet biology by T. D. Lysenko. They are the epigraph for a book — the first by a Soviet scientist — which records the social, economic, and scientific consequences of the ideological control of science. The words were a prediction, not only for Vavilov, who was arrested in 1940 and died in prison in early 1943, but for many others.

In part, this is a work of history, chronicling the effects of Lysenkoism on Soviet society and science. And, as is often true in Soviet histories written after the thaw, it revises the past as well as attesting to it. Writing it was an act of personal courage since the author Zhores Medvedev, a geneticist, and two-thirds of his book were central elements in what was first an underground and then a public campaign against the pseudo-scientific control of agronomy and biology by Lysenko and his followers.

As history, it covers in valuable detail the forty-year conflict between Mendelian genetics and neo-Lamarckian biology. The prominent involvement of biology in the language of class struggle began in the early 1930s, when neo-Mendelian genetics was in an early state of development. Lysenko at that time asserted that mechanisms of inheritance did not work through invisible genes, but that environmentally acquired attributes of organisms could be transmitted to the next generation. This false scientific doctrine was tuned in to the Soviet

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political situation. In the first place Lysenkoism agreed with the progressivist-utopian ideology of Communism; for it maintained that man and his environment could be changed not only through the slow process of selection and evolution, but through rapid intervention over pairs of generations. Secondly, Lysenkoism implied an immediate practical solution to the chronic crisis in Soviet agriculture. Finally, Lysenko's political supporters, Stalin and Khrushchev, found the skeptical ideology of free scientific inquiry too difficult to harness to a monolithic political system.

Medvedev shows that the adoption of the Lysenkoite positions on theoretical biology and agronomy did not occur overnight. First, the Mendelians engaged in polemics seeking justifications for their biology in political ideology. These biologists took their first defeat during the period of the purge trials in the Thirties. Many died, others went to prison, still others lost positions, but the total destruction of Mendelian genetics was partially halted by World War II. During the period 1946-47 Mendelians still held positions in the Soviet scientific establishment and it was then that Medvedev was trained by one of the remaining Mendelians. In August of 1948 Lysenko, with the direct aid of Stalin, moved to uproot Mendelian genetics entirely. Books were suppressed, personnel of scientific institutions dismissed and foreign contacts severed. Biologists either ceased doing genetics altogether or disappeared into the protection of physical science research organizations and worked on radiation genetics.

After the death of Stalin there was again criticism of Lysenko. Lysenkoism made its last major comeback when Khrushchev attempted to deal with the problems of Soviet agriculture. From 1959 to 1962 there was no public criticism of Lysenko.

It was during 1961-62 that the first two-thirds of this book was written and, with the relaxation of the censorship on manuscripts, versions were circulated to many of those personally involved as victims of Lysenkoism. The manuscript itself became the basis for an underground attack on Lysenko and his followers. At the same time, Khrushchev's control was weakening over the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and it seems likely that the circulation of the manuscript and the publication of an attack on

Lysenko were indirectly supported by Khrushchev's enemies. The battle finally broke out in the press, in the activities of the Academy of Sciences and in the Central Executive Committee of the party itself. After the staggering agricultural failures of 1963 and 1964, first Khrushchev and then Lysenko fell.

Over those forty years genetics, in any serious sense, nearly disappeared in the Soviet Union. Lamarckian theories of inheritance, a belief in the transmutation of species, and other biological notions of greater absurdity were propagandized and became the basis for the teaching of biology at all levels of Soviet education. Medvedev reports the systematic deleterious consequences of these theories for the practice of agriculture, animal breeding and medical genetics, and suggests persuasively that Lysenkoism helped produce some of the major problems in Soviet agriculture.

The depth and penetration of ideology into science and its profound negative consequences for both the science and the society have rarely been so well documented. Medvedev is a man worthy of his own description of those who fell like Vavilov, to the forces of Stalinism: noble, intellectual, honest and calm.

But this work is no more than a glimmer of that

freedom which science requires. The manuscript itself may have been circulated for ends other than the freedom of biologists. Medvedev himself, in opposing the class nature of the natural sciences, now including genetics, twice notes that the social sciences and humanistic studies are either proletarian or capitalist. Social science and the humanities must still obey the dictates of Soviet political ideology.

This is a book to be read by scientists, politicians and citizens alike both for the lessons for our society and for the chronicle of personal courage displayed by the author and those who went to the pyre and burned. Even though the current crisis in American science is somewhat different in kind, there are lessons here for us. The Oppenheimer affair and the recent failure to appoint a director of the National Science Foundation because he opposed the anti-ballistic missile are signs that all is not well and that the pursuit of science has ceased to be an aristocratic game, free because it is irrelevant to important questions. How to keep science and scientists (as well as other ideas and other men) free and at the same time responsive to the needs of the society remains our central political question. Medvedev's book is an important commentary on how not to solve it.

John H. Gagnon is a professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Stony Brook.

PREFACE

THIS BOOK CONSISTS of three parts. The first two were written in 1961-1962 and augmented in 1963-1964; the third was written in 1966-1967. Each part, for various reasons, differs from the others in style and method of analysis of the facts. In the first place, the existing situations in science described in each section differed, and the problems around which the debate was carried on were changing, even though genetics remained the center of attention. In the second place, the different parts of the book were written under different conditions. In 1961-1962 Lysenkoism still occupied a dominating position in the biological and agricultural sciences and was fully supported by the higher authorities. Criticism of its positions was actually banned in the press and was mercilessly eradicated by all means of press control. By 1966 Lysenkoism, as such, had already disappeared from Soviet science, not having survived even one year of open discussion. The first parts of the book therefore are active, aggressive, and polemical in character, while the concluding part is by and large descriptive, especially when dealing with the events after October, 1964. And, finally, I appear in different capacities in each of the three parts: in the first as historian; in the second as an on-looker; and in the third as participant, since the first version of the manuscript itself became, after 1962, one of the elements of the debate, and developed in the course of it. The manuscript was used as ammunition, and hundreds of men attempted to make that ammunition effective.

Many scientists have aided me greatly, particularly the following comrades, who supported me from the very beginning of my work and who helped to collect and analyze the factual material. Although many of them are famous scientists, I list them without their degrees or positions since, in the struggle for the triumph of truth which we all carried on for many years, neither post nor standing played any role. It is good to realize that many of them became my personal friends. In citing their names here I once more recall these men with pleasure and gratitude—their honesty, nobility, high principles, and courage in the defense of scientific truth, as well as their patriotism: V. P. Efroimson, Y. N. Vavilov, V. M. Klechkovsky, A. I. Atabekova, N. A. Maisuryan, A. A. Liubishchev, B. L. Astaurov, V. V. Sakharov, F. K. Bakhteev, P. M. Zhukovsky, A. R. Zhebrak, V. V. Alpatov, V. J. Mirek, V. D. Dudintsev, V. Y. Aleksandrov, V. S. Kirpichnikov, L. V. Breslavets,

N. R. Ivanov, D. K. Belyaev, V. I. Tsalkin, N. V. Timofeev-Resovsky, I. I. Knunyants, D. V. Lebedev, I. A. Rapoport, A. M. Smirnov, A. V. Sokolov, E. M. Murtazin, M. K. Chakhlyan, L. Y. Blyakher, A. Efeikin, A. A. Lyapunov, R. A. Medvedev, M. G. Tsubina, P. M. Smirnov, and many other comrades.

Z. A. M.

January, 1967, Obninsk

PREFACE TO THE SECOND DRAFT

CPYRGHT

THE CATEGORICAL condemnation, by the XXth and XXIInd Congresses of the Communist Party, of the theory and practice of the personality cult was met with enthusiasm by all the Soviet people as an event of historical significance and as a turning point in the development of our country and of the international Communist movement. Everybody can now see clearly how many-sided and burdensome were the consequences of the personality cult, and how timely and courageous were the actions directed toward restoration of Lenin's principles of democracy, the socialist law, a steadfast observance of the right of Soviet citizens, and the methods of collective leadership.

The long-time failure to observe these principles was not reflected solely in political events. The cult of personality also had a serious impact on the ideological and scientific spheres of our life and violated those conditions of free scientific creativity which should be basically inherent in the socialist system. The environment of the personality cult seriously influenced the development of a number of natural sciences, and above all, biology and agronomy. A study of that influence is required with pressing urgency.

This book attempts to analyze, from that point of view, the widely known biological-agronomic controversy which began at the end of the twenties and continued, with periodic intensification, until very recent times. Understanding the responsibilities behind this task, I drew on a great number of Soviet scientists for discussions of the preliminary versions of the book, and also tried to take into consideration the comments of comrades whose roles in the events described were, in my view, far from positive. Leonardo da Vinci's observation that opponents hoping you make mistakes are more useful than friends trying to conceal them is not entirely true in

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this situation; as a rule, friends did not try to conceal the shortcomings of this work, and I am grateful to them for much.

The first version of the book was prepared in the beginning of 1962, but it was changed and augmented many times as a result of numerous discussions. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to all comrades who, by their comments, considerations, and additions, aided in the preparation of the book in its present form.

Z. A. M.

October, 1962

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HAS LYSENKOISM BEEN LIQUIDATED?

As a result of the processes and measures described, the position of Lysenkoism was weakened. Its influence on Soviet biology dropped sharply, and the number of people considering themselves to be representatives of Michurinist biology fell considerably. But Lysenkoism is far from having been liquidated; nor has it lost its aggressiveness. Neither has it lost from its midst people capable of grasping and comprehending modern biology, biochemistry, and genetics, and capable of real education, yet unwilling to relinquish the primitive collection of dogmas they have so firmly mastered and held for so long. What is more to the point, they were also unwilling to relinquish the high posts they had occupied for so long (by no means because of their high qualifications). The philosophical ideologists of Lysenkoism did not disappear either, and some of them (e.g., Platonov) continue to be publicly active in its support. Lysenkoism also did not lose many administrative opportunities in science—the full renovation of scientific institutions will still take many years. The causes for this are numerous, and explicable to a degree.

It is by now apparent that Lysenkoism, long masquerading under the designation "Michurinist biology," is a pseudoscience. It was a pseudoscience in the form in which it appeared in 1936, in 1948, and in 1958, and in the form in which it appears in 1966. Lysenkoism is not only a pseudoscience and scientific falsification, it is also undoubtedly a harmful practical tendency which has caused, and in many instances still does cause, grave damage to the national economy. And yet the active leaders of this trend still occupy important posts and professorial chairs and are in charge of many departments and laboratories (Shlykov, Sizov, Teterov, Studitsky, Platonov, Kushner, Glushchenko, and others). They have a public forum (e.g., the journal *Oktyabr*); they enjoy many privileges and opportunities and actively support each other. No small number of them are still included in the Committee on Awards of Scientific Degrees, and on various editorial boards, soviets, and committees. They also still own the experimental farm at Gorki Leninskii, directed by our old friends Lysenko, Prezent, and Ol'shansky.

What are the reasons for this paradox, and what is the prognosis? There are many reasons, only some of which will be cited. First of all, there is the general democratization of scientific and social life. The constant struggle over many years, by scientists, against repressions and administration by injunction in science makes a new, radical cleanup of scientific establishments difficult now, when truth has triumphed. A cleanup is going on, but by legal means of competition and recertification. It is a *gradual* selective process.

It is apparent that since October, 1964, interference in scientific discussions by higher political and administrative organs has sharply dropped. Their resolutions are basically left to scientists, as they should be. In 1948 the Lysenkoites achieved a rapid rout of scientific institutions and replacement of editorial boards, academic councils, and so forth, by the same methods of decrees from ministries, government departments, and boards, and by creation of special plenipotentiary commissions—in other words, by a coup. Today these methods are inapplicable; hence the reverse process is proceeding at a much slower pace.

It should also be pointed out that the general scientific isolation of Lysenkoites, the derision and lack of respect on the part of the majority of the scientific community, which they constantly feel, force them to this day to band into more or less homogeneous groups, maintaining mutual support and preserving caste.

They have also been able to utilize the principles brought forward in the struggle against them, and above all the principle of freedom of speech. This permits them now and again, in one form or another, to propagandize their erroneous, false dogmas, to criticize their opponents, and to falsify the real situation in biology.

There is no danger in these activities, which are unavoidable in a democratically structured science. In the main, publication of this type of material is carried on in *Oktyabr*.⁹ It may also be found in purely scientific journals in the form of various reviews and tendentious generalizations.

Such clamant obstacles exist in the scientific life of any country. In ours they are still at a higher level than is generally found internationally, but they are gradually being reduced. Resistance to such hindrances has been established, and this is the most important thing.

Preservation of Lysenkoism is aided by still another circumstance—the excessive importance, in our science, of various degrees and titles. These (candidate, doctor, professor, corresponding member, academician) are awarded for life by strict international tradition. And no matter how strange it seems that even now, for instance, Prezent is a professor and a full member of LAAAS, or that Lysenko belongs to three academies, is a laureate of many prizes, a Hero of Socialist Labor, and bearer of nine orders of Lenin, nonetheless these are lifetime privileges and they cannot be revoked without making such high titles and awards appear worthless. The interconnections among these titles and awards and the positions occu-

pled are such that a bearer of a title also has a lifetime income independent of his scientific reputation. The latter could be very low or even negative—the income still continues. Furthermore, the strict official and unofficial regulations concerning corresponding positions and titles, especially in the academies of science and the universities of the capital, create great difficulties in the promotion of young, capable scientists to the posts now occupied by the members of the old Lysenko guard, richly equipped with titles.

And, finally, the controversy described was so prolonged, so deep are the roots of Lysenkoism in secondary and higher education, for so long has it been instilled into the minds of the youth, beginning with 1937, that our population of scientists has become far too heterogeneous in its attitudes toward Lysenkoism. A large number of persons, now good and capable scientists, went through a stage in their development at which they trusted Michurinist biology. This is especially true of those who received their secondary and higher education between 1948 and 1960. Many, not having proper guidance, published mistaken works. Not a small number of mature scientists were also in error during that period, and gradually discovered the truth for themselves. The transition of biologists into ceaseless and uncompromising fighters against Lysenkoism and its unprincipled and dogmatic representatives went through many intermediate stages, and varied widely in the different periods of the controversy. And how many journalists, essayists, publicists, writers, philosophers were there who first praised and later abused Lysenko! To disentangle the shades of guilt and innocence, of lack of principles and sincere delusions, of trust and deception is now very difficult. And there is hardly need to do so. The important thing is that Lysenkoism has now been unmasked forever as a pseudoscience, and recognized as a shameful stain on our history. And this was accomplished by the whole collective of Soviet scientists which was finally able to rid itself in the main from this far-flung, false doctrine.

CELEBRA LA OCLAE REUNION DE CONSULTA EN LA HABANA; LLAMAMIENTO AL ESTUDIANTADO LATINOAMERICANO

CPYRGHT

A LOS ESTUDIANTES LATINOAMERICANOS:

secuentes con sus postulados, tanto en América Latina como en otros continentes.

● A cuarenta meses de celebrado el IV Congreso Latinoamericano de Estudiantes, que dejó constituida la Organización Continental Latinoamericana de Estudiantes (OCLAE), y encabezando la frase del guerrillero Camilo Torres: "ES NECESARIO QUE LA CONVICCION REVOLUCIONARIA DEL ESTUDIANTE LO LLEVE A UN COMPROMISO REAL HASTA LAS ULTIMAS CONSECUENCIAS", acaba de celebrarse en La Habana una Reunión de Consulta, con la participación de diversas Uniones y representaciones estudiantiles de nuestro continente.

Durante este Encuentro se ha logrado intercambiar experiencias y analizar críticamente el funcionamiento de la OCLAE con el propósito de situarla en correspondencia con el ascenso de las luchas antimperialistas del estudiantado y los pueblos de América Latina.

Resultado esencial de este análisis es el criterio expresado por todos los participantes de que la actual situación del movimiento estudiantil latinoamericano demanda que la OCLAE modifique su estilo de trabajo, haciéndolo más dinámico y efectivo y promoviendo una coordinación basada en acciones concretas contra el imperialismo yanqui, que serán llevadas a cabo por los estudiantes en cada país.

Fue analizada también la tónica que deberá caracterizar a las luchas por la reforma universitaria, frente a la política del imperialismo norteamericano de obtener un mayor control desde todos los puntos de vista de las universidades, en nombre de supuestas reformas adecuadas a los intereses capitalistas, concluyéndose que se hacía necesario desmascarar ante el estudiantado y la opinión pública latinoamericana y mundial a los que, dentro de los claustros y órganos de dirección de las universidades, sirven, como domesticados ideólogos, de instrumento a la sistemática ocupación imperialista en el plano cultural. En lo referente a los constantes intentos de los gobiernos lacayos de reprimir cualquier actividad revolucionaria en nuestros centros de estudios, como parte de su política agresiva contra el pueblo, se concluyó que es necesario utilizar todos los métodos posibles de rechazo: desde la propaganda sistemática hasta acciones que revistan caracteres nacionales e internacionales.

Se analizó, además, que la experiencia de los años transcurridos después del IV CLAE, nos ha enseñado que, al margen de determinadas estructuras nacionales estudiantiles pueden surgir y desarrollarse en múltiples centros universitarios verdaderas vanguardias que se lanzan a enfrentar el aparato represivo de las oligarquías y el imperialismo yanqui.

Ha sido un criterio general que la OCLAE debe establecer relaciones con aquellas organizaciones que sin pertenecer formalmente a la misma, vienen desarrollando actividades con-

La definición precisa del concepto representatividad será tarea de los preparativos del V Congreso, el cual deberá realizarse una vez que el plan de acciones acordado permita poner de manifiesto qué organizaciones o entidades estudiantiles están actuando de acuerdo con los principios y objetivos definidos en el IV CLAE.

Exhortamos al estudiantado latinoamericano a cerrar filas frente a las odiosas condiciones en que viven sometidos nuestros pueblos, a desarrollar acciones que conmuevan desde sus cimientos las estructuras de poder proimperialistas existentes en nuestros países, a buscar nuevas formas de organización para la lucha oponiendo a la violencia imperialista, la violencia revolucionaria; a respaldar con acciones concretas el plan de jornadas trazado para el año 1970, que a continuación ponemos en manos de ustedes.

Entendemos necesario jerarquizar a nivel internacional las siguientes Jornadas:

- JORNADA DE CAMILO TORRES (Febrero 15).
- JORNADA CONTRA LA PENETRACION IMPERIALISTA EN LAS UNIVERSIDADES (Junio 15)
- JORNADA DE SOLIDARIDAD CON CUBA (26 de Julio)
- JORNADA DEL GUERRILLERO HEROICO (8-15 de octubre)
- JORNADA CONTINENTAL DE APOYO A VIET NAM (15-21 de octubre)

Además de las anteriores jornadas, deben celebrarse en cada país las principales fechas conmemorativas con diversas acciones que provoquen la solidaridad continental.

Para contribuir a un mayor éxito en la celebración de estas jornadas y fechas conmemorativas, es necesario que las organizaciones desplieguen en torno a ellas una propaganda a través de todos los medios a su alcance, la que será complementada y enriquecida con la que se elaborará en la sede, consistente en afiches, boletines radiales y a través de los órganos de difusión de la organización continental.

Conscientes de las grandes luchas que se desarrollan en nuestros pueblos contra la explotación cada vez mayor de los regímenes oligárquicos y el imperialismo yanqui, comprendemos la necesidad de adoptar con decisión, nuestro papel en estas luchas, inspirándonos en el mensaje que nos legara el Comandante Che Guevara:

"En cualquier lugar que nos sorprenda la muerte bienvenida sea, siempre que ése, nuestro grito de guerra, haya llegado hasta un oído receptivo, y otra mano se tienda para empuñar nuestras armas, y otros hombres se apresten a entonar los cantos luctuosos con tableteo de ametralladoras y nuevos gritos de guerra y victorias".

HASTA LA VICTORIA SIEMPRE.
SECRETARIADO PERMANENTE

Soviet Editor, a Liberal, Said to Resign in Protest

CPYRGHT

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Feb. 14—Aleksandr T. Tvardovsky, the chief editor of Novy Mir, a liberal literary journal, was reported today to have resigned in protest over a shake-up in his editorial board. He contended it undermined his authority and would change the character of the magazine.

His reported resignation, not yet officially announced here, follows a dispute between Mr. Tvardovsky and his conservative antagonists over the contents of Novy Mir. He contended that the journal should publish high-quality works even if they exposed shortcomings in Soviet society.

His opponents said Mr. Tvardovsky failed to show awareness of an ideological threat from the West and often lent his journal's pages to articles that could be used for anti-Soviet purposes.

Mr. Tvardovsky's reported departure has already stirred emotional reactions among the few people who have heard the news.

Reliable sources said Mr. Tvardovsky tendered his resignation yesterday on the ground that it was useless for him to continue in a situation where conservatives opposed to his views had been named to the editorial board and liberals supporting him had been forced out.

He was referring to the decision announced last week by the secretariat of the Union of Writers—over Mr. Tvardovsky's vote—to dismiss four members of Novy Mir's board of editors, including Mr. Tvardovsky's deputy editor, A. I. Kondratovich.

They were replaced by men whose views were said to be

more in keeping with the ideological orthodoxy advocated by the conservative leadership of the writers union and the party.

It was reported that Mr. Tvardovsky's successor is Vasily A. Kosolapov, a moderate, who was one of those named to the board.

He is thought to be a compromise choice—neither so conservative as to completely antagonize Novy Mir's readers nor so liberal as to defeat the purpose of the shake-up.

Mr. Kosolapov was the chief editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta, the newspaper of the writers union, from 1960 to 1962, before Aleksandr B. Chakovsky, the present editor, took over.

Under Mr. Kosolapov's leadership, the paper printed several controversial works, including Yevgeny Yevtushenko's poem "Babi Yar" in 1961. That poem created a stir for suggesting that a memorial had not been built to Jews killed at Babi Yar in Kiev because of lingering Russian anti-Semitism.

In recent years, Mr. Kosolapov had been a member of the editorial board of Voprosy Literatury, a middle-of-the-road journal aimed at specialists in literature.

Mr. Tvardovsky, who is 59 years old, was under pressure from the writers' union leadership last summer to resign, but he refused. Because of his eminence as a poet and his lengthy history of party membership, including a one-time candidate membership in the Central Committee, he could probably resist being dismissed.

He was said to have decided to resign to show his resentment at the replacement of Mr. Kondratovich and other members of the board, Igor I. Vinogradov, Vladimir Y. Lakshin and Igor A. Sats.

Mr. Lakshin, 36, is regarded by many Soviet intellectuals as the most prominent literary critic in the Soviet Union, but conservatives have continually attacked him for his support of Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn and other writers disapproved by them.

New Members Listed

Mr. Tvardovsky was also said to believe that the men named to the board would try to undermine his policy. The newcomer is Dmitri G. Bolshov who was given the title of first deputy editor. Mr. Bolshov is regarded as an ideological conservative.

His last position was as a member of the State Committee for Radio and Television. Previously he served for six years as editor of the newspaper Sovetskaya Kultura and from 1947 to 1957, his biography lists him as a member of the leadership of the Young Communist League.

Others named to the board were Oleg P. Smirnov, Aleksandr Y. Rekemchuk, and Aleksandr I. Ovcharenko.

The latest campaign against Mr. Tvardovsky began last summer when the conservative magazine Ogonyok accused Novy Mir of harboring "cosmopolitans," a particularly odious term of attack since it was used by Stalin against his opponents. This attack was echoed by other newspapers and Mr. Tvardovsky himself was criticized.

Last fall, Mr. Tvardovsky replied to his critics and said that Novy Mir did not have to convince Soviet readers of its patriotism and did not have to put up with the "crude demagoguery" leveled against it.

This seemed to end the polemics for a while, indicating that the party for the moment did not want to upset the balance between conservatives and liberals. But the expulsion of Mr. Solzhenitsyn from the writers union last November and the appearance of an openly pro-Stalinist book in the

conservative journal Oktyabr written by its editor, Yevgeny

Kochetov, led to concern that the balance had shifted to the side of the conservatives.

Mr. Solzhenitsyn was accused of not taking strong enough measures against publication of his works abroad, and apparently the same attack was later made against Mr. Tvardovsky.

Last Wednesday, in the same issue of Literaturnaya Gazeta that announced changes in Novy Mir's board, Mr. Tvardovsky printed a short letter saying that an anti-Stalinist poem of his had been published in the West without his knowledge. Soviet readers recognized the letter as having been written under pressure from the writers union.

The same issue of the newspaper contained criticism of Mr. Kochetov's novel, "What Do You Want?" Although the book, with its open call for a return to the discipline of the Stalinist days, had alienated and angered many Russians, the criticism was rather mild.

This has reinforced the view that at the present time, with the Soviet Union preparing for Lenin's centenary on April 22, ideological orthodoxy is clearly in the ascendancy.

Mr. Tvardovsky was first named editor of Novy Mir in 1950 but was dismissed in 1954 for publication in 1953 of an article by Vladimir N. Pomerantsev that was the first anti-Stalinist article to appear in the Soviet press calling for freer discussion of issues.

His successor as editor, Konstantin Simonov, was forced to resign in 1957 following a dispute over the novel "Not by Bread Alone" by Vladimir D. Dudintsev, which was published in Novy Mir. Mr. Tvardovsky assumed the chief editorship again in 1958.

CPYRGHT

Soviet Liberal Editor Quits Over Shakeup

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By Anthony Astrachan
Washington Post Staff Writer

MOSCOW, Feb. 14—Alexander Tvardovsky resigned yesterday as editor of the liberal literary magazine Novy Mir, reliable sources said today.

His resignation appeared to be the climax of a long campaign by Soviet literary orthodoxy to change the pattern of Novy Mir (New World), the magazine most respected by the Soviet intelligentsia.

Many observers thought this campaign was linked with a general repression of unorthodox thinkers whose best-known victim so far is novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn, expelled last year from the Soviet writers' union. Novy Mir published most of the few things by Solzhenitsyn that have appeared in the Soviet Union, including the novel "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich."

Tvardovsky, 60 and in bad health, reportedly drew on his political strength as a former candidate member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to resist the campaign as long as he did.

It was therefore significant that reliable sources said the final crunch began in a party subcommittee, presumably a higher level than the writers' union. Novy Mir is officially an organ of the union.

Rejected New Editors

The party unit reportedly told Tvardovsky he would have to do two things: Denounce the publication of one of his poems in the West and accept the replacement of four members of his editorial staff.

Tvardovsky reportedly agreed to do the first but refused to work with the proposed new editors.

Literaturnaya Gazeta, (Literary Gazette), the voice of the writers' union, published two notes on Feb. 11.

One was a statement by Tvardovsky condemning the appearance of a poem called "By Right of Remembrance" in "incomplete and distorted form" in three publications—Suddeutscher Zeitung in West Germany, Figaro Littéraire in France, and the Russian emigre magazine Posev. No mention was made of the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine, which published the poem in full.

Tvardovsky said the poem was published abroad against his will. He called it an impudent action intended to "defame" his work and objected to its being given the "lying caption, 'Over Stalin's Ashes.'" The poem has not been published in the Soviet Union.

Replacements

The other Literary Gazette note was a statement that a meeting of the secretariat of the Soviet writers' union had decided to appoint five new editors of Novy Mir and relieve four others of their duties. Among those attending the meeting were Tvardovsky; Konstantin Fedin, the first secretary of the writers' union and an editor of Novy Mir, and Konstantin Voronkov, whom some Western publications have identified as the representative of the secret police at the top level of the writers' union.

The new men were D. G. Bolshov as first deputy editor-in-chief, O. P. Smirnov, V. S. Kosolapov, A. I. Ovcharenko and A. E. Rekemchuk.

Bolshov is a former editor in chief of Sovetskaya Kultura and of Soviet television documentaries. Both are considered hotbeds of party ideology and of hack work of the kind Novy Mir has always tried to avoid.

Some Intellectuals say Rekemchuk is more liberal than the magazine Molodaya Gvar-

dia (Young Guard), an orthodox magazine for which he worked. He was recently the chief editor of the Moscow film studio.

Kosolapov was an editor of Voprosy Literaturi (Problems of Literature), a dry but moderate publication. He was named yesterday to replace Tvardovsky as chief editor.

Those Ousted

The men removed were Vladimir Y. Lakshin, Igor I. Vinogradov, A. I. Kondratovitch and I. A. Sats.

Lakshin was the best known, chiefly for his defense of Solzhenitsyn and of the late Mikhail Bulgakov's "The Master and Margarita." He was criticized last year by the theoretical journal Kommunist for insufficiently honoring the role of the party in literary criticism, and for taking the form of writing more seriously than its contents. The latter is a cardinal sin in Marxist-Leninist theory because it can encourage praise of an author who writes "well" but whose content seems anti-Soviet.

Tvardovsky resigned two days after the rejiggering of his staff was announced, and the sources said his resignation was accepted immediately.

Magazine Praised

It remains to be seen how much Novy Mir will change. Even establishment figures praised it as the single publication to read in the Soviet Union, if one had to make a choice. Its 288 pages each month contained poems, short stories, literary criticism and book reviews, and sometimes a sociological or economic piece.

Last year it published three poems by Andrei Voznesensky, often described as the best of young Soviet poets but one seldom published these days. Its most recent issue contained an economic article

by Alexander Birman, a lib-

eral economist, describing the ailments and possible cures of the Soviet economy in unusually frank terms.

At 70 kopecks (77 cents) an issue, its 127,000 copies each month were considered a bargain and quickly snapped up.

Tvardovsky became editor of Novy Mir in 1958. Even before then it was the Soviet literary leader, however. It published Isaac Babel and Boris Pasternak, and such stalwarts of the literary establishment as Mikhail Sholokhov and Maxim Gorky. It published the famous "On Sincerity in Literature" by Vladimir Pom-erantsev, shortly after Stalin died in 1953—an article that paved the way for the cultural thaw under Nikita Khrushchev.

Recently Criticized

The qualities for which Novy Mir aimed were good writing and honesty and as much freedom from cant as is possible under the Soviet system. Recently it came under attack for refusing to espouse pastoral patriotism, the patriotism of birch trees and folklore.

Since the fall of Khrushchev, the party has set basic guidelines for culture and the censors have set basic practice. Within those limits—narrowed in December ideological pronouncements—an editor could take a risk and publish something that once would have led to the closing of his publication.

Once in print, a piece of writing became fair game for attack, however. And too many attacks, whether for publishing the wrong things or not publishing enough of the "right" ones, can lead to the removal of an editor, as Tvardovsky's resignation has shown.

TIME,
23 February 1970

R for Russia

SINCE Communist Party Boss Leonid Brezhnev addressed the Central Committee last December, his withering attack on the Soviet Union's shortcomings has been the No. 1 topic of discussion whenever citizens gather in private. In a two-hour, 40-minute talk, Brezhnev delivered scathing criticisms of inefficiency and mismanagement, naming names and citing specific examples of waste. Only the more general parts of the speech were reprinted in a *Pravda* editorial, but the entire blast is being read as a letter at closed party meetings.

Intellectual Sensation. Brezhnev's angry accusations have inspired thoughtful replies from a number of prominent Soviet citizens. One of the most compelling responses was circulating last week among intellectuals in Moscow. Some thought that it came from Academician Andrei Sakharov, the gifted physicist whose 10,000-word essay outlining a scenario of economic convergence between the U.S. and the Soviet Union created a sensation among intellectuals 18 months ago. Others believed that it was written by someone who knows and shares the physicist's view, though not necessarily by Sakharov himself. Sakharov was removed from work requiring security clearance after the essay had been circulated. If the new letter is Sakharov's it indicates that he still feels sufficiently independent to write an extremely candid appraisal of the current state of Soviet affairs. The text:

"Leonid Ilyich,

"Your letter, addressed to all members of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., is being read aloud at closed

party meetings. It cites certain details, unknown to the rank and file; but in general, a picture is painted which has long been known to party members as well as the whole people.

"We have known for a long time that we have lost not only the battle for the moon but the economic race as a whole; that the productivity of labor is insignificant here; that our country is turning into a raw-material-supply appendix of Europe; and that we hold out only because of our fabulous natural resources and the traditional patience of the peasants. Everyone knows that no one wants to do real work here but just shows off before his chief, that such artificial events as jubilees and anniversaries have become more important for us than real events of economic and social life.

"All this is a result of the fact that for many years we have been living in an imaginary world and are deceiving each other, and we cannot bring ourselves to face the truth at a time when other countries do not live in the clouds but build their economies in the real world and therefore are getting ahead of us still more and more. There is not a single friendly gathering at which this would not be discussed. After all, everyone knows that overlong collective self-deception leads inevitably to catastrophe. In all of Russia there is talk about it. And now—your letter.

"This is a bold and correct step on your part, and history will give you credit for it. But history will not forgive you if salvation measures do not follow the signal. And they are very simple. A cure follows from the diagnosis. The total mutual lying can be cured

only by public discussion. What amount of initiative, intellect and enthusiasm will emerge, if finally mouths are no longer gagged. Dozens of articles lie in editorial offices of magazines, dozens of books have been typed, which honestly analyze our life. All this is suppressed. Solzhenitsyn—the pride of Russian literature—was driven out of the Writers' Union. The parliament, which costs so much money, has become a blind voting machine.

"Public discussion and only public discussion can put sick Russia on the path of recovery."

Criticism and self-criticism were two of the things urged by Brezhnev in his speech, and he appears to be getting them—perhaps more than he intended. Mostly, his recommendations applied to the economic sphere, where new approaches are plainly needed to overcome the sluggish performance of recent years. After all, 1970 was the target date by which Soviet planners expected their economy to surpass that of the U.S.

The "Sakharov letter" applauds that spirit, but it also raises an intriguing question: Can the open atmosphere urged by Brezhnev for factories and planning boards be extended to other areas of Soviet life?

THE NEWS, Mexico City
25 January 1970

The Communist Dream Cuba Depports NEWS Staffer

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

By PIETER VAN BENNEKOM
First in a Series

HAVANA, Cuba. — "Well, how did you like Cuba?" I was asked by one of a group of Canadian tourists as we were waiting to board the Cubana Airlines flight to Mexico City at Havana's José Martí International Airport.

I looked around for a minute. From behind a glass partition, Luis González, who had been my constant companion for most of my stay in Cuba, still had his eyes on me. In the corner of the waiting room sat a fat woman with a machinegun on her lap.

I decided against answering the Canadian tourist's question as to how I had enjoyed my stay in Cuba. "I'll tell you when we get to Mexico City," I said.

None of the other passengers knew that I was being deported from Cuba as an undesirable alien.

None of them knew that Luis González, the inconspicuous Cuban who kept a faithful eye on me through the glass, was more than a constant companion. He had been my personal bodyguard, assigned by his boss to sleep in the same hotel room with me, eat with me and keep me under constant observation every minute of the day.

Safely back in Mexico City. I am ready now to tell anyone "how I enjoyed my stay in Cuba."

The bizarre week I spent there began on Friday, Jan. 9, when I took Cubana's bi-weekly Ilushin-18 four-engine plane to Havana. (Round-trip Mexico City-Havana fare is 120 dollars) I had checked with the Cuban consulate in Mexico City previously and had been told that as a citizen of the Netherlands I needed only my valid Dutch passport and my smallpox vaccination certificate.

Upon arrival at the airport 15 kilometers south of Havana I dutifully stated to the interviewing soldier that I was a journalist by profession and that I intended to have a look around Cuba although I was technically on vacation.

That set the alarm bells ringing. All other passengers were cleared and accompanied to their respective destinations in Havana — it is impossible to leave the airport by oneself, some Cuban authority has to take responsibility for an arriving foreign national — but I stayed behind.

A short, middle-aged man by the name of Campusano finally showed me his credential as an official of the press department of the Cuban Foreign Relations Ministry, interviewed me again, made a couple of lengthy phone calls and finally escorted me in a chauffeur-driven Buick to the Deauville Hotel on Havana's water front. He said he would come for me between 8:30 and 9 the next morning to take me to the ministry.

With a punctuality surprising of a Latin American country, he called me at 8:25 a.m. and faithfully waited with his chauffeur and Buick for half an hour while I had breakfast.

Courtously opening and closing doors for me as if I were some VIP personage, comrade Campusano took me to the press department of the Foreign Relations Ministry.

An attractive secretary who couldn't type very well because she said she had just come back from cutting sugar cane, took all my personal data, including every country I had ever visited and two passport photographs. She privately expressed her doubts whether I would be allowed to work as a newsmen in Cuba because many of the press attachés normally provided for visiting foreign newsmen were also cutting sugar cane.

But the head of the press department, José Manuel Suárez, would communicate his decision to me personally. Waiting to see him, I was expecting to meet a top-level bureaucrat but his appearance took me by surprise.

Six-foot-three and weighing an estimated 215 pounds, Suárez was clothed in high boots, dirty pants, an unironed open shirt with a worn brown jacket. He had a dark brushcut, his face was pockmarked and he wore dark glasses, apparently because he was cross-eyed. He, also, had recently done a stint in the sugar cane fields.

Suárez was short and to the point. Foreign journalists had to be cleared through a Cuban embassy abroad after submitting their latest writings. Since I had not gone through this process, I could do one of two things: take the first flight out or stay in Cuba as a Dutch tourist, in which case my freedom of movement or the length of my stay would not be limited.

I suggested to him that this would be an ostrich-like policy since a newspaperman, even as a tourist, always has his eyes and ears wide open and that chances are he will write something about what he saw when he's back to

his normal job. There was nothing to prevent me from doing this, Suárez replied, but as a tourist I would not be allowed to interview any officials and my tape recorder would have to stay behind at the airport. So I chose to stay as a tourist.

During a courtesy call to the Dutch embassy later, I found out that the treatment I had received was quite arbitrary. A spokesman at the embassy said that just three months prior to my visit three Dutch journalists coming directly from Holland had been allowed to work in Cuba, albeit under the guidance of a "press attaché," without clearance of the Cuban embassy in Holland. The bi-lateral agreement between CPYRGHT Holland and Holland entitling Dutch citizens to visit Cuba without a visa doesn't say anything about journalists.

My embassy told me to keep in touch and report any developments, but that they were powerless as there was no appeal against any decision by the Cuban authorities, even if completely arbitrary.

This I found out all too well. After spending the weekend making some informal contacts at and around Havana's social center, the Coppelía ice cream parlor, which in my opinion was some thing that could be expected of a tourist, I got my next surprise when I returned to my hotel Monday night.

Two people had been waiting for me all day, the older introducing himself as Roberto López of the Cuban immigration department. The other man whose name was Luis, López said, was to be my watchdog for the rest of my stay in Cuba. He made no excuse about it, didn't call it a "guide" or an "assistant." When I inquired what specifically I had done that made this drastic measure necessary, I didn't get an answer. They were sorry for the inconvenience, but the watchdog would have to stay with me every minute of the day and night. I would still be allowed to stay in Cuba as long as I pleased.

Thank God my hotel room had twin beds and that Luis didn't snore. We got to know each other quite well over the next few days. He was 26 years old, married, had a two-year-old girl and was an avid baseball fan. He wasn't a bad sort of guy. One couldn't have anything against him as a person. He had been working with immigration for about a year as a lowly airport official and he had never had a similar assignment. Apart from being away from his wife and family, he probably didn't mind it too much, because I am sure he never ate and drank as well in his life although he couldn't admit so.

But he did cramp my style considerably. It wasn't the complete freedom I had been promised as a tourist. If I wanted to write something down for fear of forgetting it, I had to go to the bathroom and flush the toilet repeatedly or run the shower. And I just couldn't freely make social contacts with Luis constantly at my side or behind me. He said he didn't speak any foreign language but I could never be sure of that. In my daily reports to my embassy I had to use a code, not only because of Luis but also because the telephone conversations were bugged anyway.

For the sake of honesty I must admit that I escaped from Luis once against the advice of my own embassy. If I did so, the Cuban authorities would be likely to pin any phony charge on me and I would likely be led before a Cuban people's tribunal, the embassy warned. But when I made my escape, I felt relatively safe because Luis was at fault. Being an avid baseball fan, he had left me to listen to the live broadcast of a Cuban league ballgame involving his hometown team and I do not think he reported my disappearance to his superiors for fear of reprisals against himself.

When I returned to my hotel late that night after meeting some Cuban friends I had made during the week, Luis was waiting for me but nothing happened. He threatened, however, that I wouldn't get off as lightly if I tried another escapade.

I was just planning to take a big trip into the interior to the other end of the island country when I got a phone call from Cubana Airlines. Did I have a return ticket for Jan. 19 to Mexico City? Yes, I did, but I was planning to spend another week. That wouldn't be possible, the Cubana girl said, because my name was on the list to leave Cuba that following day, Friday, Jan. 16. Who put my name on that list? The answer was that the press department of the Foreign Relations Ministry was responsible for that.

Angry I got on the phone to Suárez again. Yes, that was correct. I had to leave the following day. He was sending my exit orders over immediately. Why? Suárez professed ignorance. Could I speak to his boss? No, the decision taken by the Cuban immigration department was final, Luis would stay with me until I boarded the plane. Goodbye.

And that's the way it happened. As I climbed the steps of the plane, I remembered with bitterness the station identification of every Cuban radio station I had heard so often: Cuba, First Free Territory in America.

The surprises weren't over yet. When I was safely home with the tape recorder which had faithfully been returned at the airport, I found that the Cubans had listened to every one of the tapes and had erased some personal conversation with a friend which mentioned Cuba in a passing joke.

Pieter van Bennekom, author of this article, has been on the staff of THE NEWS since October, 1968. He previously worked on newspapers in his native Holland, in the United States where he studied journalism on a Fulbright scholarship, and in Canada. Van Bennekom boasts extensive free-lance experience and speaks five languages: English, Spanish, Dutch, French and German.

THE NEWS, Mexico City

26 January 1970

The Communist Dream

SDSers Become 'Millionaires' in Cuba

CPYRGHT

By PIETER VAN BENNEKOM

HAVANA, Cuba.— The state-controlled Cuban press, radio and television have found a new object for hero-worship.

Their heroes are 216 Americans, who Saturday finished a six-week stint in Cuba's sugar cane fields doing one of the hardest jobs in the world for little reward other than needing Uncle Sam a little bit.

But the Cuban press has exploited this first large-scale attempt to break the American boycott against the communist Caribbean island country to the maximum for its publicity value.

Protected by a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that the State Department cannot revoke anybody's passport for going to Cuba because this is an infringement on the citizens' right to travel, the 216 were recruited by various militant organizations such as the Students for a Democratic Society or the Black Panthers. They had to pay their own way to Mexico City and from there were flown out aboard three Cuban Airlines flights at the cost of the Fidel Castro regime.

They weren't the only foreign volunteers in Cuba's all-out effort to harvest a record sugar crop of 10 million tons this year. Brigades from just about all communist countries in the world, including North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front from South Vietnam and the diplomatic personnel of all embassies of communist countries located in Havana.

But the Americans, dubbed the "We Shall Overcome Brigade," definitely stole the show. They are now on a two-week tour of Cuba as tourists, but during their stay on the Rubén Martínez Villena sugar plantation in Havana province not far from the capital, they were the darlings of the Cuban press.

Eight-column headlines and pictures on the front pages of Cuba's only two daily newspapers, the a.m. Granma and the p.m. Juventud Rebelde, were the order of the day. Inside full-page pictures spreads, extensive interviews were published. Listeners to Havana radio stations were informed daily of the heroic deeds television shows from the plantation were beamed into the homes of all viewers.

Few people have actually met them. On their days off they stayed around the plantation making music and engaging in sports activities and on one occasion were taken en masse to the No. 1 Cuban beach resort of Varadero, a two-hour drive east of Havana.

It is impossible to travel independently to any plantation, including the Rubén Martínez Villena. And even if one managed to get to the gate, it would be impossible to enter without official authorization. The talk in Havana was that the Americans were so closely guarded because the authorities fear an attempt against the lives of the Americans by opponents of the regime or some other form of interference.

Whatever went on at the Rubén Martínez Villena plantation, it's unlikely the Americans would have had much time left to be trained in sabotage for after their return to the United States. All evidence was to the fact that they really cut sugar cane, getting up around 5 p.m. every morning to be able to be in the fields at sunup after showering and breakfasting. There they stayed all day till sundown with two breaks. It's such hard work that nearly every Cuban hates it with a passion and the Americans would have to go to bed pretty early at night for the 5 a.m. wakeup march of "On Your Feet, On Your Feet." The Cuban press did make mention of lectures and films at night but from the titles and the people giving them they seemed to be limited to ideological indoctrination.

The "We Shall Overcome" brigade will undoubtedly come back as schooled communists but it is doubtful if they learned anything specifically about techniques for disrupting society which they didn't know already.

Not all of them cut sugar cane every day. Some of the girls were left behind to do the washing, clean up the dormitories or do other domestic tasks. But the biggest honor of the moment in Cuba was bestowed upon them for their effort in the fields: they earned the title "millionaire" and in a live nationally televised program were presented with the "millionaires" flag. In Cuban terminology, a "millionaire" is a brigade or contingent of cutters which has cut 1 million arrobas of sugar cane. (The Cuban measure arroba is about 25 pounds.)

"Back in the States they were saying that we wouldn't be able to cut one piece of grass and here we cut a million arrobas," one of them said in an interview with the newspaper Granma. "Many of us had never worked before, let alone something as hard as this, but we've all done it for the great satisfaction of doing something useful without the money incentive."

The brigade was made up of 125 men and 91 women, ranging in ages from 16 to 61, but most of them in their early 20s. They included whites, blacks and Americans of Mexican, Puerto Rican and Asian descent. They worked alongside 59 Cubans. The plantation was at one time owned by the Atlantic Gulf Corporation, but nationalized soon after Castro took power in 1959. It had dormitories, an open dining area, a sports field and a recreation area. Top-flight Cuban entertainers made the trip to the plantation on weekends.

On Christmas Day the Americans were singled out for the honor of cutting cane side by side with Fidel Castro himself, who was setting the example for the Cuban population. Granma said the Americans went to bed extra early Christmas Eve, because "tomorrow we have to cut even more."

Jean Cluster, a 25-year-old Boston girl, was quoted in Granma, "The fact that impressed me most about his visit that before his arrival, he was Mr. Castro for me, not Fidel. And I couldn't understand that a revolutionary like him, the leader of a country, could ever come so close to the people, speaking to them. The way he talked to us and in general communicated with the people really impressed me."

The worst problem they had in the beginning was cutting the sugar cane too high. One has to stoop over to cut it as low as possible to the ground because that's where the highest sugar content is. On Dec. 8 they cut 1,500 pounds, on Dec. 10, 3,125 pounds. On Dec. 15, 3,750 pounds and on Jan. 1, 5,925. They got their million arrobas (25 million pounds) on Jan. 10.

For a few days, they were sent on the plantation by 10 Vietnamese, five from the North and five Viet Cong from the South. That really gave the Cuban press an opportunity to gloat. Nguyen Van Can of North Vietnam was quoted in Juventud Rebelde as saying that the United States government should make its young people happy by letting them cut sugar cane instead of sending them to die in Vietnam.

And the following is a quote from John Mitchell of Boston, an ex-GI who served in Vietnam and on the Guantanamo naval base.

"I was disgusted with that dirty war that the Yankees want to keep up. I had to do something constructive and practical against that war. That's why I came to Cuba. When I cut (sugar cane) right next to Cubans and Vietnamese, I felt like a real man. I was very impressed and happy. You can only achieve that working in a socialist country. When I saw the Vietnamese in the field I wanted to apologize, tell them I was sorry. But I got a lump in the throat. I just got a firm grip on my machete and begin to cut a lot, a lot, a lot of cane."

Wayne Lovemark, 27, of Woodstock, N.Y., a college graduate, said he was "living the happiest moments of his life. Here we feel secure, bound together by one common interest. In Cuba we know why we live and for what we struggle."

Lisa Diamond, 20, of Berkeley, Calif., said she had thought in the beginning that their contribution to the harvest was just symbolic. "But now that we got the million arrobas, I'm really thrilled."

Despite their effort and despite the million arrobas, the Rubén Martínez Villena plantation had one of the lowest productions of all in Havana province and reached to only about 60 to 85 percent of its target according to the daily newspaper statistics.

THE NEWS, Mexico City
27 January 1970

The Communist Dream

10 Million Tons of Sugar— Does It Really Matter?

CPYRGHT

By PIETER VAN
BENNEKOM
One in a Series

HAVANA, Cuba — VANI

The unsuspecting foreigner might for his first hour in Cuba think that it's the name of a soft drink, a brand of shoes or tooth paste.

VANI!

It's written on all billboards in Cuba, it flashes at you from every noon light and you hear it hundreds of times a day over the radio, television and at all public functions including concerts, college classes or meetings.

"Van" means "They go." And it refers to the record 10 million tons of sugar cane Cuba hopes to harvest this year. The full slogan, which has become Cuba's motto, is "The 10 million Go — Word of a Cuban." (Los 10 Millones Van — Palabra de Cubano.)

The entire national effort has been directed towards the sugar harvest this year. When it's over in mid-July, few able-bodied Cubans will not have had a machete in their hands.

It would be no mean feat if Cuba got its 10 million tons this year, considering the fact that the biggest harvest on record was about 7 million tons in 1957, two years before the communist revolution which brought Fidel Castro to power.

An exact timetable has been worked out for the 10 million tons. The first million was scheduled to be "in" by Dec. 23 and by 11:30 p.m. that day all radio stations jubilantly announced they had it.

The second million, reached Monday Jan. 19 was late by only one-half day. The target dates for the following millions are Feb. 9, Feb. 28, March 17, April 3, April 20, May 30 and July 15. If the 10 million aren't complete by that time, they'll still have a two-week grace period because the harvest doesn't finish till the end of July in some parts of the country.

Newspapers publish the calendar daily with red chalkmarks beside the first two millions as having been achieved already. Daily statistics on what every province and every sugar plantation cut that day, how far above and below their quota they were and what place they took in the "standings." Honor lists are published every day. When a brigade gets to one million arrobas, its members get the venerable title of "millionaires" and merit a cover story in the newspapers, 10 minutes on the radio and in some cases a special television program.

Many Cubans and foreigners were skeptical when the completion of the first and second millions were announced. But in the end, if they have the 10 million on paper but not in fact, they'll have a hard time fooling the international sugar organizations. Their measures are pretty exact. Cuba has planted much more sugar cane than in previous years and the 10 million are on the field. To cut them, the Cubans are literally sending every-

body out to the fields and have an enormous campaign going to whip up enthusiasm. Instead of commercials on radio, one heard the sound of a choo-choo train with a voice saying "There goes the third million."

Fidel Castro cuts cane. The chief judge on the highest court in the land, a 65-year-old man who is the only human being entitled to sign death sentences in Cuba, goes to the cane fields every weekend. All government employees including the highest-ranking cut cane. Students take their books into the fields, cut cane by day and study by night for four months and then come back to Havana for two months to take examinations. The army — military service is compulsory for three years from age 16 to 19 — cuts cane. Out of a factory of 100 workers, 20 are drafted to go cut cane. The others are forced to work two hours overtime to make up for those absent for no extra pay. Of the other population, random drawings are held and when your number is called, it's your turn to get up at 4:30 a.m., go to the gathering points where the trucks pick you up to take you to the cane fields to bend over and cut and cut and cut from sun-up to sundown to get back home around 8 at night. You never know for how long you'll do it. They never tell you in advance. The pay is 7 dollars a month.

Most Cubans hate it, although they get free food that's better than what they get at home and are given free cigars. They'll do anything to escape it, like faking an injury, but when they are out cutting, they'll cut hard because the general belief is that those showing laziness will be kept longer for punishment.

The official explanation for Havana's empty streets is that everybody's gone to cut cane by day and study planation for the empty or closed stores is that the employees have gone to the fields.

A collective effort like this cannot be without flaws. All the unexperienced cane cutters will never be able to compete with professionals in speed and ability. They cut the sugar cane too high, leaving the

body out to the fields and which has the highest sugar content standing on the fields.

Getting everybody to cut cane isn't the answer to harvesting 10 million tons. Cuba needs the supporting effort in transportation, distribution and marketing. After being cut, the cane has to be processed at the mills within 48 hours. After that period, it starts to lose its quality. And people who have been on plantations say that cane sometimes lies around for three weeks before transport is arranged.

But the saddest part of it all is that it really doesn't matter. Cuba produces so little else and has run up such huge foreign debts that Fidel Castro will never be able to pull Cuba out of the hole with sugar, whether he harvests 10 million or 25 million. They'll be able to sell the 10 million without too much difficulty thanks to the Soviet Union's promise to buy 7 million. But for the overall economy, it will mean little according to the experts.

Instead of a means to raise the general standard of living, the 10 million figure has become a goal in itself. It has become something for the population to look forward to in their dreary existence. But it won't be the cure-all the population is led to believe.

The Cuban rulers know this and they're already planning the next campaign. After July, 1970, the Year of the Livestock will begin. That's when the 65-year-old chief judge of the highest Cuban court will probably go out to milk cows, cut grass, staff an abattoir or drive a milk truck. The scene will be repeated with the same massive effort and the population will be indoctrinated with cow slogans instead of sugar slogans.

Whether it'll ever get Cuba out of the hole—nobody's optimistic. A member of the diplomatic corps in Havana put it this way. "When you first come here, you have an open mind in respect for the Cuban experiment. You may feel a romantic soft spot in your heart for that small country that is going it all alone out there in America. But the longer you stay here, the more you come to the realization that it just doesn't work."

THE NEWS, Mexico City
29 January 1970

The Communist Dream

CPYRIGHT

Cuba: World's Biggest Black Market

By
PIETER VAN BENNEKOM
One in a Series

HAVANA, Cuba. — "I can't tell you that there's nothing to eat in my house."

The young Cuban whom I befriended during my stay in Cuba told me this in a low whisper, looking furtively over his shoulder, always afraid of being picked up for saying the wrong thing to a foreigner, even if it is the truth.

The statement, and the way he made it, typifies life in Cuba in 1970 — eleven years after the revolution which gave Cuba a communist totalitarian system.

During those 11 years, the Cubans have seen things grow steadily worse for them, to the point that in 1970, they have less to eat than ever, less to clothe themselves with than ever and less to do with their leisure time than ever.

"I can tell you how horrible it is, but you'll never really know what it's like unless you have to live it yourself," my Cuban friend said.

Even the government admits 1970 will be harder than ever. The official government slogans proclaim it "The Year of the Decisive Effort."

The Cubans will have to make that "decisive effort" on a close-to-starvation diet of bread and rice. Literally everything is rationed in Cuba, but the bread and rice rations are the only ones more than sufficient for personal consumption.

For every family there are two big Russian loaves of bread and a pound of rice per person at the store every day. And just before closing time, you can go

pick up more without rations because there's usually something left. The variety in the Cuban diet consists mainly of bread with rice one day and rice with bread the next.

The rest of the rations are almost non-existent: one-half pound of meat per person per week; two ounces of coffee per person per week; vegetables, eggs and butter are non-existent. Only children get a glass of milk at school. Every family has the right to one bottle of liquor once every two months; there is no choice, you take what there is.

The same situation exists in clothing. There is no choice. You are handed out one pair of pants per year, one shirt per year, one pair of shoes per year and if they're not your size, that's your tough luck. Under these circumstances, it's a miracle that the people on the street seem reasonably well dressed. But on closer observation, one notices little imperfections. Every woman has a pair of nylon stockings but the things to hold them up with must be in short supply because many women walk around with stockings falling off. Zippers, in men's as well as in women's clothing, are often missing. The ironing leaves something to be desired, probably because it takes six months to have a piece of clothing drycleaned.

And although Cuba this winter is experiencing the coldest weather in 50 years, winter clothing is conspicuously absent. The explanation is simple: there just wasn't any available this year despite the fact that the temperature descended to a chilly 35 degrees in several parts of Cuba.

But a lot is always available on the black market. "Cuba's the biggest black market in the world. It's worse than I've ever seen or heard of in Europe during and after World War II," says a member of the diplomatic corps.

A little piece of beef which would cost 50 cents in the store sells for 10 dollars on the "bolsa negra" (Cuba's word for the black market). Any kind of consumer goods are available from time to time. The young buy an LP of the Beatles for 60 dollars; an ordinary pair of sun glasses sells for 60 dollars; a small bottle of deodorant which a European woman said stank and wasn't worth 25 cents found a willing buyer for 15 dollars. Even weak marijuana is occasionally sold for 10 dollars a cigaret. The penalty for smoking marijuana is indefinite detention.

In a way it is not surprising that there is such a flourishing black market in Cuba. Everybody has money left over. To fill one's monthly rations would cost only 15 dollars, while the average salary is about 200 dollars a month. There is nothing to spend money on but the movies—they cost one dollar but will be free by January, 1971—a portion of ice cream for 50 cents at Havana's social center, Coppelia's ice cream parlor, or public transportation—the fare for Havana's city buses has been lowered from 8 cents to a nickel. There is no way anybody can spend 200 dollars a month. Even prostitution has been eliminated by the Castro government. The leftover money usually finds its way to the black market.

Almost everybody in Cu-

ba is a black marketeer. Foreigners can buy most things with hard currency at the diplomatic store and Western diplomats accuse the Russians of being the biggest black marketeers in Cuba. "I saw one of those Russians buy a shopping cart full of oranges, supposedly for his personal consumption. And another bought 36 tins of pineapple."

Theft from government warehouses is also a common occurrence. I found myself in the middle of a shootout once at 2 a.m. walking home along the Malecón (seafront) when four police patrol cars stopped a stolen truck full of supplies with gunfire. People are almost forced to take to the black market because the official rations aren't met. "If you have a piece of paper good for a piece of meat for the week, there's no guarantee you're going to get it. You've got a good chance it's all gone by the time you get there. And you can't carry over your rations to next week. You just lose them," according to my Cuban friends.

"The only answer is to line up at the stores as soon as you get your rations." This has given rise to another phenomenon: the professional linesmen. To pick up your rations, you pay someone to stand in line for you for hours on end. You pay him 5 dollars to pick up a 50-cent piece of meat.

Long lineups are the predominant impression anyone takes out of Havana. The only time a Cuban can

get a decent meal is to eat in a restaurant. The standard waiting time in the line for a pizza parlor is two hours. But again, you can pay someone 5 dollars to stand in line for you so you can buy a 1.20-dollar pizza inside.

For normal restaurants, where all sorts of meat, fish and fowl dishes are served on a limited basis, the lines start forming around 8 at night. People stand in line all night long to make reservations for the following morning for that evening. Twenty-four hours after you begin lining up you get to eat.

The lineups are all the more eye-catching because the streets are empty. There is little traffic because Cuba has imported few motor vehicles except military trucks since the revolution. The result is that the prices of cars have been driven sky-high. If a Cuban happens to have a car, he probably won't sell it for anything, but if under some circumstances he is forced to sell, the going price is 3,000 dollars for a pre-revolution car such as a 1953 Rambler. Cars, such as a Canadian-made 1935 Oldsmobile, sell for such fantastic prices as 30,000 dollars.

A motorcycle will also fetch 3,000 dollars.

There is the occasional fight in the lineups, but generally people take it without complaints. They ask "Quién es el último?" (who's the last one) and just take their place at the end.

Long lineups also form Saturdays and Sundays; the only two days the bars are open. They serve Cuban rum and the National Beer, served in labelless bottles. Other diversions are TV and the movies, which have started to offer a wider selection during the last two years. An old Errol

Flynn movie is playing in Havana at the moment and Perry Mason is on television.

But the big attraction is Coppelia's ice cream parlor kitty-corner to the old Hilton hotel which has been renamed the Habana Libre. That's where close to a thousand people mill around every night and all social contacts among the young are made. The sign announces that 49 different flavors of ice cream are available, but by the time you get through the line after an hour or so, you just take what there is. That's Cuba.

THE NEWS, Mexico City
30 January 1970

Rush to Leave Cuba Continues

CPYRGHT

CPYRGHT

HAVANA, Cuba. — It's an old joke, but people still tell it to each other.

A big bird comes to visit Cuba for a couple of weeks. He has a look around and when the time comes to go back home again, he stands on the Malecón (Havana's waterfront) and starts flapping his wings to take off. But nothing happens. Something is dragging him down. He looks around and there's 4,000 Cubans hanging on to his tail.

What most Cubans want more than anything else in the world is to get out of the country. The United States is the Heaven the Cubans hope to get to some day.

In all fairness to the Castro regime, it must be noted that there has always been a drain from Cuba to the U.S. Even before the Revolution of 1959 many Cubans left their tropical island country for the greener pastures of America in search of better opportunities. The process has been continued during communism through the regular mercy flights from Varadero east of Havana which have taken more than 1 million Cubans out of Cuba since Fidel Castro took over.

By Peter Van Bennekom

CPYRGHT

Last in a Series

But now that there is still a waiting list of two years for these flights, the Cuban authorities are taking no more applications and getting out of the country has become a frenzy. So fantastic are the schemes currently being thought up that no one would be surprised if someone did try to reach Miami hanging on to the tail of a big bird.

The only foreign embassy in Havana giving political asylum is Mexico's. But now that 11 Cuban refugees are said to be living on the premises permanently — four in the old ambassador's residence and seven in the embassy — this road has almost been closed. Not that the road is such an attractive one Cuba refuses to extend safe-conduct passes to the airport so that the refugees are destined to spend the rest of their days within the walls of the embassy and the ambassador's residence. No one can get within a block of the Mexican embassy without being stopped and asked his business.

The three-meter high gates around the embassy have been barricaded with concrete structures to prevent a motor vehicle from ramming through.

The last one to reach the relative safety of the Mexican diplomatic mission was a polevaulter who could be seen practicing for three months in the area until the Cuban watchmen outside just nodded at each other and said, "There's that nut again with his polevault." But one morning he polevaulted right over the gate.

Add to this tense situation the fact that Mexican press attache was allegedly caught spying for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and that Cuba has consistently refused to extradite hijackers of Mexican commercial planes even though a regular airlink exists between Havana and Mexico City — it is only logical that Mexican-Cuban diplomatic relations have deteriorated during the past year.

Among the Cuban population itself the wildest stories circulate. A rumor once spread overnight that the Portuguese embassy was issuing exit visas. Overnight a lineup four blocks long formed at the gates of the Portuguese diplomatic mission. When the embassy employees arrived in the morning, they knew of nothing and had to send them all home.

One of the most dangerous methods is to try to bridge the straits of Miami in a stolen plane or boat. The Cuban coast guard patrols day and night to prevent another Bay of Pigs invasion, but while "defending Cuba against the imperialists" they'll also intercept most Cubans attempting an illegal exit.

Then there's always the Guantánamo naval base, that one enclave on Cuba's southeastern coast still held by the United States. An article in Juventud Rebelde, Havana's afternoon newspaper, of Jan. 14 best illustrates the hazards of that route. There is a color picture of a fence surrounding the base on the newspaper's front page with a sign that reads in English and in Spanish: U.S. Government Reservation. No

trespassing. Keep Out. Readers are referred inside where an eight-column headline warns: Guantánamo — The Risks of an Escape.

The article says most Cubans who try the route die of fatigue, hunger and thirst during the trip across the rough terrain. Or they are shot by Cuban border guards or blown up by American land mines. In other cases, they fall victim to Cuban racketeers who milk prospective escapees for every cent they have for promises to guide them through and then take off or show them the wrong way. The Guantánamo naval

base occupies 25 square miles and has a 20-mile border with Cuba.

Cuba recently claimed to have discovered a racket headed by two locals, Carlos Martinez Flores, 27, and Alfredo Caminero Garcia, 50. Their alleged confessions read as follows:

They said two people offered them 800 dollars to take them out of the country to the base. They took the money and never showed up at the rendezvous. They said they took 400 dollars from another man with the same result.

The reported Salvadoran article goes on to tell horror stories of the fate of Guantánamo travelers. In April, 1969, the article said, the body of a man who had been beaten up and strangled with a belt was found with his genitals eaten by vultures. Further investigation revealed that the man had formed part of a group of escapees who had apparently fought an internal feud.

When a member of a group of escapees stays behind from fatigue, hunger or thirst, the rest of the

usually murders him and buries the body in order not to leave any traces, the article asserted.

A middle-aged woman was found walking around in the zone insane. She and her husband had tried the route, but he had suffered a heart attack and died, which had triggered the woman's nervous breakdown, according to the article.

Any Cuban needs a lot of courage to attempt an escape through Guantánamo.

RADIO HAVANA

11 February 1970

NEWSMAN BERATED FOR ARTICLES ON SUGAR HARVEST

Pieter van (Venekon) is a Dutchman. He came to Cuba like so many other foreign visitors without the need for a visa. When he identified himself as a journalist he was given the opportunity to personally see the progress of the sugar harvest, despite the fact that he had no authorization to do so. He did not take advantage of this, however, and preferred to spend 5 days in a grand hotel.

Without even seeing the color of sugarcane, he wrote five articles on the Cuban sugarcane harvest. He could have written them in Washington or Miami, but he wanted the articles to appear from the scene. Naive readers will believe that all his information was obtained in the canefields.

"But he did not need to see or learn anything. The truth did not interest him. His task was to deface the facts, to paint a false picture, to hide the beautiful truth of a people which enthusiastically devotes its energy to the harvest of 10 million tons of sugar—an important battle in the country's economic development."

The ASSOCIATED PRESS has published portions of Van (Venekon's) report, which includes news from the Cuban press. This journalist had time to watch television, listen to the radio, visit concert hall and schools, read the newspaper, watch city lights; but he had no time to visit the canefields. "According to him, this extraordinary mobilization of the people is carried out under threats and coercion, and the work is executed for fear that any sign of laziness may cause the worker to remain indefinitely in the canefield."

"He charges that canecutters cut the cane much too high, leaving the lower portion--which produces the most sugar--in the ground. How can he justify this statement in light of the one that the workers work under threats and coercion? If the workers are closely watched, how could they dare do such a thing? This would be a serious defiance. This Dutch journalist has too much bad intentions and too little intelligence."

"Any honest and intelligent journalist, regardless of his way of thinking, can in 5 days write interesting things about the sugar harvest. He can discover, for example, the magnitude of this battle and the enthusiasm of the people. He can also see that our future is based on our effort and not on chance. He can discover that very rarely in history has a small underdeveloped nation, blockaded and threatened by imperialism, launched out into a battle of this size, and very rarely has such a battle taken place in the open, with complete information to the public every day, every hour, pointing out achievements and failures, presenting the truth to the people."

"An honest journalist would have visited the harvest and been unable to hide his admiration. But Pieter van (Venekon), a writer without prestige, is not that kind of journalist. He writes at so many dollars a line, and according to what his boss wants."

April 28	USSR	Despite Bolshevik declaration (1917) affirming self-determination for the peoples of the Tsarist Empire, the Red Army invaded Azerbaydzhan on April 28, 1920 - 50th anniversary - and proclaimed it a Soviet Socialist Republic.
April 30	Latin America	The Ninth Inter-American Conference, meeting in Bogota 1948, adopted "Organization of American States" (OAS) as the new name for the Pan-American Union, and condemned International Communism and all other forms of totalitarianism as incompatible with inter-American principles.

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

March 1970

D A T E S W O R T H N O T I N G

March 10	Czechoslovakia	1948 - Jan Masaryk, foreign minister and son of Tomas Masaryk, fell to his death from a foreign ministry window two weeks after the Communist coup. The Communists announced he was a suicide, but it was widely believed Masaryk was murdered on Soviet instructions. During the "Prague Spring" twenty years later, students called for a reinvestigation of Masaryk's death. In response, on 5 April 1968 Dubcek ordered the case reopened. However, hopes for an honest verdict were doomed by the Soviet invasion.... On 19 December 1969 the Czechoslovak government announced Masaryk's death was either suicide or -- a new theory -- an accident. Contradictory evidence, pointing strongly to murder, appears in a new book, <u>The Masaryk Case</u> by Claire Sterling, based on an independent investigation in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
March 28-30	Stockholm	The new World Conference on Vietnam sponsored by the (continuing) Stockholm Conference with support from the (Communist) World Council of Peace. This month will also mark, on March 19, the 20th anniversary of the Stockholm Appeal, one of WCP's most effective ventures, which collected millions of signatures on petitions to ban the atom bomb.
April		On the basis of past performance, the period from Easter through April is a likely time for peace demonstrations organized by Communists, peace and youth fronts.
April 4	Europe	NATO treaty signed in 1949.
April 22	USSR	Vladimir Ilyich Lenin born in 1870 - hundredth anniversary. (Died 21 January 1924.)

THE COMMUNIST SCENE

1. The attached short backgrounder on the French CP Congress is intended to fill in what is not dealt with in the various attached press accounts of the event. It also offers a view of the Congress not given in the press accounts and one which is in accord with our longer term strategy of depicting Soviet-style Communism (which includes French orthodox Communism) as stagnant, sterile, "sclerotic." Many respected Sovietologists hold that the Soviet system has come to a dead-end, that it doesn't know where to go from here. It is the wave of the past. And the PCF, with its spiritual kinship with Soviet Communism, can be portrayed also as having stopped at dead center -- satisfied to vegetate in place. It is this lack of movement and progress that alienates intellectuals like Roger Garaudy. And the more that are alienated, the better.

The attached translation of a small part of Garaudy's latest book, *The Great Turning Point of Socialism* represents some of the book's most acid criticism of the Soviet Union (we have underlined the more outstanding passages). The *Le Monde* summary of an article by Auguste LeCoeur, a former Secretary of the PCF, an untranslated article by him, an article from the weekly English edition of *Le Monde*, as well as British, and U.S. news accounts round out the supporting material.

25X1C10b [REDACTED]
Garaudy's "farewell" speech which, while apparently basically a reiteration of his well known theses (see for example last month's *Perspectives*), did contain some slaps at the Soviet Union for cynically trafficking with Spain and Greece, whose ideologies the USSR so piously condemns.

2. The attached background piece on the European Security Conference is intended mostly for the purpose of apprising the field of some of the facts and conjectures surrounding this strange Soviet initiative.

25X1C10b [REDACTED] 25X1C10b
3. We have not written a backgrounder on the Czechoslovak situation this month, but have included a large number of newspaper accounts of the month's developments.

25X1C10b [REDACTED] 25X1C10b
[REDACTED] to the embarrassment of the Soviet Union and the local Communist party. The outstanding event of this period was the Central Committee Plenum which resulted in a realignment of Czechoslovak leadership, and most of attached newspaper accounts speculate on the meaning of the personnel changes. In a situation where Husak is increasingly portrayed in news coverage as steering a middle (moderate?) course between Dubcek-type Communists and Stalinists, [REDACTED] 25X1C10b
[REDACTED]

25X1C10b

[REDACTED] some of the attached news clips document the continually tightening suppression of the people, the steady return to a traditional Communist police state.

25X1C10b

4. The final attachment is the text of a radio broadcast from Zagreb, the capital of Croatia, Yugoslavia, by one Milika Sundic, an especially caustic critic of the Soviet Union. This time he takes off on the Brezhnev Doctrine in a very effective presentation.

[REDACTED]

25X1C10b

March 1970

THE COMMUNIST SCENE

(24 January - 20 February 1970)

1. French CP Mired in Orthodoxy

The 19th French Communist Party Congress, held 4-8 February, followed its expected conservative course, produced no surprises, and left all observers with the feeling that the PCF was mired more deeply than ever in sterile orthodoxy. As expected, seriouslyailing Waldoack Becket

ILLEGIB

2. Moscow Meeting of CP's on European Security Conference

On 14-15 January, delegates from 28 European Communist parties (including the Yugoslav CP) gathered quietly in Moscow (even furtively, since some, like the French, at first tried to hide the fact of a meeting). The hastily assembled group discussed the general subject of European security and the possibility of convoking a larger conference on the issue. The matter of a European Security Conference has been an item on the Soviet international agenda since the spring of 1967, when it was introduced at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact countries in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia. The idea was brought up again at the World Communist Conference in Moscow last June, at which time a committee representing 13 parties was appointed to look into the matter.

Soviet motives for putting forth the idea were a matter of conjecture in the beginning and they still are. At first it seemed the aim was to split the U.S. from NATO. Now the Soviets have acknowledged (on the insistence of European powers friendly to the U.S.) that the U.S. has a legitimate place at such a conference. Whether the proposed conference is a mere propaganda gesture or something more serious is open to question. Current conjecture even includes the thesis that it may have something to do with the Soviets' difficulties in the Far East with China; they may be looking for some sort of regularization of their problems with the West, the better to deal with the East. The topics to be discussed are vaguely defined, if at all. Preliminary Soviet feelers proposed a mid-1970 European Security Conference. Now, unable to meet this deadline, the Soviets have advanced the idea of an intermediate "People's Congress."

Little was revealed about what transpired at the January meeting and the final communique was notably uncommunicative. But the consensus of curious outside observers and newsmen was that the Soviets were once again treated to a demonstration of the small respect in which they are held by the international Communist movement they claim to lead. At least six parties, foremost among them the Yugoslav party, reportedly rejected the Soviet design for the larger conference. The difference apparently hinges on the Soviet desire for a conference they can control and which would be oriented against U.S. "imperialism," whereas the Yugoslavs and Italians are pushing for a broader grouping to include bourgeois, democratic, and even religious groups of consequence. There is also a difference of opinion on what the relation of an intermediate "People's Congress" should be to a European Security Conference. It is because of such unresolved differences that the communique communicated so little.

Non-Communist European officials are politely sceptical, and the U.S. position, as derived from the NATO communique of last December, is that preliminary meetings and careful preparation to delineate the issues at stake between East and West should precede such a conference.

(Attached are two news accounts, plus a TASS summary of Soviet spokesman Zamyatin's press conference on 13 January, a Yugoslav press agency summary of their views, and the final communique.)

French Communists Oust Dissenter from Party Posts

By HENRY GINIGER
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Feb. 8 — The French Communist party removed an ideological thorn in its side today by dropping Rogers Garaudy, one of its principal intellectuals, from the Central Committee and the Politburo.

Mr. Garaudy, who has spent almost 36 of his 56 years in the party, was relegated to the rank and file at the end of the party's 19th congress in the municipal gymnasium of suburban Nanterre, a Communist stronghold.

Mr. Garaudy's criticisms of the Soviet Union and of its invasion of Czechoslovakia were unacceptable to the party leadership, which affirmed, in the theses adopted by the congress, that "the French Communist party intends to develop and reinforce its close cooperation with the Communist party of the Soviet Union."

The party criticized the invasion when it happened in August, 1968, but the leadership has since refused to allow its traditional solidarity with Moscow to be altered.

Members Estimated at 300,000

The five-day congress was told by Georges Marchais of the Central Committee that it had distributed 454,350 cards to the local federations and that the party membership had

increased by 80,000 since 1961. It is believed, however, that a large number of cards are not held by individuals, and the

general estimate of Communist membership is between 300,000 and 350,000. The party claimed about a million members just after the war. Despite the drop, the party remains the biggest in France.

In dealing with Mr. Garaudy, the party sharply departed from the peremptory way it has dealt with deviation in the past. At the beginning of last month Mr. Garaudy was given space in the party newspaper, L'Humanité, to defend his ideas, and last Friday he was given time on the floor of the congress.

Dissidents who have been allowed to speak in the past did so to acknowledge their errors and engage in self-criticism. Not so with Mr. Garaudy, who was a lonely figure as he sat among nearly 1,200 delegates in the vast concrete and glass hall and listened for two days to repeated attacks on him and his positions.

For his recent book, "The Great Turning Point of Socialism," Mr. Garaudy was accused of "right-wing deviationism" and of "anti-Sovietism." In the book Mr. Garaudy develops the idea that advanced industrial countries like France are producing a new society in which engi-

scientific personnel were assuming great importance. Such

people formed with the traditional working class "a new historical bloc," according to Mr. Garaudy, who was subsequently accused to trying to "dilute" the working class and to diminish its importance.

Delegates Hoot Him

On Friday the delegates listened in cold silence to the scholarly, bespectacled theoretician or else hooted him when he attacked the Soviet Union.

Mr. Garaudy defended his thesis that there cannot be one "ideal model" for socialism but that each country had to find its own way.

He asked why, if the party condemned the Soviet invasion, it was bad to inquire into its causes. He described the basic cause as the refusal by Moscow to recognize that the search for new forms of socialism adapted to national traditions was legitimate. He said the French people ought to be told without equivocation that "the socialism that we wish to establish in our country is not that which is today militarily imposed on Czechoslovakia."

Mr. Garaudy said this ought to be done because the party's present attitude on the Czechoslovak affair was hurting its relations with other leftist groups.

He said it was not he who was engaging in anti-Sovietism but the Soviet Union itself when it shipped coal to Spain

while coal miners were on strike there or when it helped build electric power stations for a Greek Government that had jailed Communist leaders.

Mr. Garaudy was critical of his own party as well, saying he had been condemned before there had been discussion. He refused to break with the party, however.

"In speaking for the last time from this platform," he said, "I want to say with sadness but without bitterness that if the methods of the past have weighed heavily and have distorted real debate, nothing can tear from me the confidence I have in the future of our party."

This did not mollify anyone, and Mr. Garaudy returned to his seat in silence. This morning a slate of names for the new Central Committee was adopted unanimously, but that of Mr. Garaudy, who had been a member for 24 years, was not among them. The committee was enlarged from 95 to 107 to bring in younger people.

Waldeck Rochet, the party's ailing 64-year-old secretary general, was re-elected, but Mr. Marchais was named to a new post of deputy secretary general. Mr. Rochet did not attend the Congress, and Mr. Marchais, who is noted for his close adherence to Soviet positions, is looked to, as his probable successor.

THE OBSERVER, London
8 February 1970

Silent treatment for Communist trying to lose his chains

CPYRGHT PARIS, 7 February

THE CONGRESS of the French Communist Party, meeting near Paris in the huge Palais des Sports at Nanterre, has become the stage for a tragedy.

NEAL ASCHERSON witnesses a gruesome festival of party discipline which shows that the Communists of Western Europe find it hard to drop old habits.

CPYRGHT

The biggest party in France, meeting at a moment when French society is seething with discontent and loud with a babel of revolutionary voices, is putting its energies into smashing a nut with a sledgehammer.

Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79-01194A000400020015-8

M Roger Garaudy, member of the Politburo, is charged with vile heresy, and every speaker who mounts the tribune is another prosecutor in what has become a great show trial beneath the red flag. When Garaudy at last rose to defend himself on Friday, it was known that many silently agreed with at least part of what he had to say. Yet when he ended, not one of the 1,000 delegates dared to clap: the silence was stifling.

And the stage had its backdrop, scenery fit for the other Communist Parties of western Europe as well. The foreground: a white plaster bust of Lenin, gift of the Soviet delegation, so placed as to glare straight into M. Garaudy's face. The background: an immense window across Nanterre which draws the eye from big slums and slag heaps on the right to white skeleton skyscrapers on the left, the glass and steel faculties in which France's technocrats will be trained.

Growth point

This is the landscape which the Communists of western Europe must traverse, from the familiar territory of the old working class to the new world of the young engineer, the chemist, the technical intellectual and the students—those whom the old Communist analysis considers middle class, but who now, so often, proclaim themselves revolutionaries and range themselves with the exploited.

For Garaudy, the alliance of such men and women with the workers is a 'new historical bloc,' a political fact which his Party—and all Communists in industrial countries—should recognise as the growth point of the future. He deduces from it that the Party should worry less about allying with outdated political parties, and more about internal democracy: the French must stop imitating the sort of Communism which suited illiterate Russian masses in 1917 with only a minute working class.

For defying the Party line, Garaudy will be thrown out of the Politburo and probably the Central Committee. As a Party veteran, a clever professor who has swung from stoniest Stalinism to messianic visions of computerised liberty, he will expect no better. Yet in the gallery at Nanterre, the militants of other Communist Parties fumed. Why, when with imagination and *flan* great sections of other French classes could be captured for socialism, do the French comrades retreat into this gruesome festival of discipline?

Not all Communists in the West are as shackled by the past as the French. Yet all of them, in different degrees, have the same problems. The cold-war years, in retrospect, were a feather bed: the Communists lived comfortably in the political ghetto with the hard

struggle was defensive. Now the barriers are down. Not only do most Western societies accept Communists as part of political normality; the tide of general discontent with capitalism, the mixed-economy State and the concentration of economic power is running high. Yet somehow, like well-preserved but elderly gentlemen whose divorce has at last come through, the Communist Parties of western Europe cannot take advantage of the situation.

In most of these parties, there are roughly three groups. The first is the centre, the leadership, usually ex-Stalinists now committed to different degrees of de-Stalinisation. In Italy, Luigi Longo seeks power through parliamentary means and alliance with 'bourgeois' parties; he distances himself from Soviet behaviour and promises an open, plural society in which other parties will continue to compete with Communists in free elections. These principles of a 'national road' and a peaceful transition to Communism are generally accepted, but the British leaders, for instance, are far keener on free debate within the Party than the French.

The second group is the Stalinist backlash. These are older men to whom loyalty to the Russians remains the touchstone of Communist purity. Since Czechoslovakia, when many Western Parties condemned the Soviet-led intervention, this backlash has grown almost into an 'international.'

Mr Palme Dutt, urging British Communists last year to revoke their condemnation of the Russian invasion and 'wipe out this stain from our record,' has his allies in the Stalinist rebels in Finland who have split their party because it took part in government, in the Austrian Stalinists who last year secured the expulsion of the famous philosopher Ernst Fischer, in Senator Donini in Italy and in Etienne Fajon this week at Nanterre, who boasted of his party's support for the present Czechoslovak leaders and proclaims 'unwavering loyalty' to the Soviet Union.

Thousands of Communists, privately dismayed by Soviet behaviour still feel that public solidarity matters more. A groan of anger rose from this Congress when Garaudy attacked Poland for sending coal to Spain while the Asturian miners were on strike, and Russia for supplying power stations 'to the Greek fascists.' Although the mass of Greek Communists both abroad and working in resistance within Greece rejects the slavishly pro-Soviet leadership in exile, the French asked only the Muscovite faction to Nanterre.

The third group is the Left, the passionate and swelling army of young Communists who are determined to haul their parties out of their historic rut. Especially since May 1968, many young men and

women who followed Dutschko and others to the barricades have gradually been drawn towards Communism with the resolve to overhaul it from within. Once they would have been instantly chased out as Trotskyite wreckers and splitters. Today, somewhat unwillingly, they are heard, and many older intellectuals have joined their ranks.

Their attack has two main prongs:—

1. The Soviet problem. To reformers like Manny Johnson in England, Rossana Rosanda in Italy, Roger Garaudy in France, the 'Youth Battalion' in Iceland, the Soviet Union and its system are sick. To proclaim solidarity with that bloc—which Swedish young Communists call 'social-fascist,' in Chinese terminology—is wrong. What is needed is an official analysis by each party to decide how and where the Russians under Stalin distorted the democratic centralism of Lenin. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was a mere consequence of that sickness.

2. The approach to power. The Left suspects that its leaders are secretly frightened of revolution. The 'Paris May' and the furious year of 1969 in Italy showed that a revolutionary mood was growing in some Western countries. Why does the party waste time shooting its cuffs in the ante-rooms of bourgeois coalitions when it could help a worker-student uprising to seize power?

Last steps

Examples are quickly cited. In France, the party funk'd revolution in May 1968 and turned the general strike into a mere wage claim. In Italy—the leftist 'manifesto' group around Rossana Rosanda would say—the party did the same with the revolutionary strikes and occupations last year. In Finland, once in government the party was even tougher on the trade unions than the Social Democrats. To the leftists, the Communist Parties of the West are threatening to turn into 'parties of order' which buy their way into government by guaranteeing the orderly behaviour of the workers.

It is true that the closer to power these parties come, the harder the last steps appear. They have become law abiding, constitutional. They resemble increasingly the socialist parties, on the eve of the First World War, especially in Italy and France, where the Communist Parties today are the biggest, best organised and almost the oldest parties in the land. In 1914 came the grand debacle when the German, French and Belgian socialists abandoned their principles and voted for war credits. Can this happen again, if Luigi Longo agrees to join an Italian Government committed to NATO?

This is the crisis of the Communist Parties of the West, now that the cold war has ended and new social conflicts born of a combination of tradition and technology are beginning.

LE MONDE, Paris (English Edition)
11 February 1970

DISSIDENT AMONG FRENCH COMMUNISTS

CPYRGHT

A case of political suicide

A forty-nine-year-old former metal worker was made effective leader of the French Communist Party this week. With Secretary-General Waldeck Rochet ailing, and errant intellectual Roger Garaudy removed from the Central Committee and the Political Bureau, the field is virtually free for Georges Marchais, appointed Deputy Secretary-General at the party's congress last weekend.

M. Garaudy was dismissed for an anti-Soviet attitude and for what was considered a revisionist view of the role of the intellectual. M. Marchais, though he belongs to a younger

generation, shares M. Rochet's reputation for unconditional fidelity to Moscow.

The fate of M. Garaudy, spokesman for a humanist brand of Communism and relentless critic of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, was virtually sealed from the moment he was condemned by the Party Central Committee in October 1969. The constant criticism he came under during the party congress was merely ratification of that decision, and his exclusion from the inner sanctum of the party was a mere formality. CPYRGHT

What, apart from its philosophical and doctrinal aspects, are the essential facts of "the Garaudy affair?" They can be summed up as follows: Roger Garaudy, the French Communist Party's veteran ideologist, called for party decisions to be preceded by free discussion inside the party; there was no discussion and M. Garaudy was allowed to speak only after having been duly censured. His fate, in fact, had been virtually sealed with his public condemnation in October 1969 by the Party Central Committee.

As M. Garaudy himself pointed out, he has been a Party militant for thirty-six years and a member of the Central Committee for twenty-four of them. He could have added that in the party's services he spent nearly three years in prison and internment camp, that he has been a member of the Political Bureau for fourteen years and a parliamentary deputy for eleven, that he has written nineteen books which received the Party's "imprimatur" as against two which did not, and that he has suffered his share of kicks in the teeth, even if he himself has dealt out a few on the Party's behalf.

No one knows better than he the procedure of which he is now the victim and which he approved when applied to Communists whose tenure and position in the Party hierarchy was at least equal to his own. He has no need to be told that "the Party is always right," having himself said it often enough and acted accordingly. Then how could this experienced man, while continuing to proclaim his fidelity to the Party and his confidence in the future, justice and

By P. VIANSSON-PONTÉ

triumph of its cause, deliberately place himself in this situation, and commit what is for a Communist the political suicide of pitting himself against the Party?

Obviously it was not naïvely. That would be too simple. M. Garaudy cannot have thought that his analysis of contemporary society and the conclusions he drew from it would prevail, that the hour of aggiornamento had come and that persuasiveness was sufficient to win support.

Did he then act as the result of a painful personal orientation, accepting in advance the consequences of his attitude? There again, without questioning his sincerity, the explanation seems too facile. His statements combine the absolute certainty of being in the right, the view that there can be no socialist revolution without prior transformation of the Communist parties, and the desire to go on serving his own party, even at the price of excommunication, by speeding up the necessary awareness and inevitable evolution.

There is a temptation to wonder, when such a man makes such a choice, whether he does not believe that Communism has reached the last-chance stage, that it is high time the right questions were asked, that the major changes that can save everything are still possible, but that tomorrow it will be too late.

After having been for so long a fervent and completely orthodox Communist, M. Garaudy sincerely wanted the Party transformed. He thought such a transformation was possible and that the changes had already begun. In 1954, the year after

Stalin's death, while Moscow correspondent for the French Party daily *L'Humanité* (and perhaps even before), he outlined in his cautious way the opening up of his own field, philosophy. His search soon extended from scientific socialism and Marxist humanism to literature. It was as a result of May 1968 in France and, particularly, August 1968 in Czechoslovakia, that Garaudy wrote the two books which caused his break with the Party: *Pour un Modèle Français du Socialisme* (For A French-Style Socialism) and *Le Grand Tour-nant du Socialisme* (Socialism at The Crossroads).

Despite May and despite Prague, M. Garaudy is well aware that the French Communist Party has very little interest in changing itself and thus lifting the barriers to true unity of the French Left, the absolutely essential condition for obtaining political power. It would not however be the first time that the French Communist Party has symbolically executed a leader who could not or would not keep in step and whose only wrong was to be right too soon.

But the gulf to be crossed is a deep one. It means not only distressing strategic revisions and a brutal switch in tactics, but also, even more than a change of method and habit, a change in the party's very nature. So, to get the party's thinking going, to fire the imaginations of its members and force them to examine their consciences, M. Garaudy struck a spectacular, exemplary stance.

"The party is always right," certainly, but he nevertheless hopes that after the party has "executed" him, it will come round to accepting his views of where that right is to be found.

CPYRGHT

LE FIGARO, Paris
3 February 1970

POINT DE VUE

Le 19^e Congrès du P.C. est terminé

par Auguste LECŒUR

L'ORGANE central du parti communiste, du samedi 31 janvier, titrait en première page : « LA TRIBUNE DE DISCUSSION EST TERMINÉE ». Bien sûr il est dit dans l'article que l'on en parlerait encore au congrès, mais à la vérité, n'en déplaise aux commentateurs avides de sensationnel et qui pour ce faire ont aiguisé leur plume, c'est le 19^e congrès qui est terminé.

Dans l'enthousiasme, les congressistes, triés sur le volet, réduiront à néant les positions « liquidatrices » de Roger Garaudy et de ses amis. Seule la réunion de la commission politique, qui siège à huis clos, sera plus vivante et plus dramatique en raison des cas particuliers qu'elle aura à examiner, celui d'Aragon, par exemple, dont le maintien au Comité central (ou son exclusion de ce Comité) est posé.

Pour son 19^e congrès, le P.C. a bénéficié d'une excellente publicité. L'O.R.T.F. aidant, il peut se prévaloir d'une large préparation démocratique. Mais cette préparation à grand spectacle n'avait comme but que d'empêcher la confrontation à armes égales des positions de la direction du P.C. avec celles dont Garaudy était le porteur.

Ce 19^e congrès se terminera avec les mêmes confetti et dans le même enthousiasme que le précédent, mais jamais les cartes n'auront été autant maquillées, jamais la discordance entre la situation réelle et les conclusions du congrès n'auront été aussi grandes. Aucun des grands problèmes n'aura été résolu sur le fond. Pourtant deux d'entre eux où s'imbriquent les politique présente et future du parti sont des plus préoccupantes, savoir :

1. la direction du parti ;
2. les thèses défendues par Garaudy.

• LA DIRECTION

Peu avant sa mort — au 17^e congrès — Maurice Thorez, après avoir créé pour son usage le poste de président du parti, confiait celui de secrétaire général à W. Rochet. Il s'agissait, pour le chef incontesté et incontestable du parti — conscient de ses limites physiques — de faire assurer, en cas d'accident, la direction par un exécutant consciencieux et surtout d'écarter de ce poste Jacques Duclos qui avait été toujours son second. W. Rochet, militant intelligent, doué d'un rare bon sens, ne manquant ni d'habileté ni d'astuce, fut à la hauteur de ses responsabilités tant que les problèmes politiques n'exigèrent pas de lui qu'il se distinguât des autres membres du bureau politique, par des initiatives heureuses et l'affirmation de son autorité. Or, cela, M. Waldeck Rochet ne le pouvait pas. Pendant tout le temps où il suffisait de régler les affaires courantes, ce fut un excellent président de la direction collégiale, mais pas un chef. Au premier remous politique d'importance, il ne put maintenir l'unité de pensée du bureau politique.

A la veille du 19^e congrès, cette situation s'est aggravée et le P.C. souffre de l'insuffisance de sa direction. Il n'y a pas actuellement de successeur à Maurice Thorez. Reconduire M. Waldeck Rochet ou désigner un successeur pris dans la vieille garde, c'est pour le P.C. prouver son incapacité à se doter d'une direction que la situation politique exige. Et, en ne s'arrêtant que sur les noms les plus cités, Marchais, Leroy ou Laurent, aucun d'entre eux, même Leroy, qui est le plus capable, n'a l'autorité nécessaire pour faire l'unanimité au bureau politique, ni les qualités d'un chef de parti.

La désignation la plus significative ne sera donc pas la reconduction de M. Waldeck Rochet ou la désignation de son successeur, mais l'entrée au bureau politique de tel ou tel nouveau venu susceptible d'assumer cette direction pour l'avenir.

• LES THESES DEFENDUES PAR GARAUDY

C'est ici que se situe le centre des difficultés. La direction du P.C. avait préparé ses thèses qui, soumises et approuvées par les cellules et les sections, selon les modalités habituelles, lui donnaient le quitus pour la politique passée, y compris et surtout pour son comportement à l'égard de la Tchécoslovaquie.

La contestation de Garaudy ne s'est pas manifestée pendant la discussion mais bien avant et les thèses de la direction étaient essentiellement dirigées contre un fort courant politique qui avait pris naissance au moment de l'agression soviétique et qui se développait au sein du parti. Garaudy n'était que l'expression de ce courant et il est devenu la « tête de Turc » rêvée comme il s'en trouve une chaque fois que la direction est en difficulté. Maurice Thorez, en bon stalinien, disait : « L'on ne peut faire progresser le parti que contre quelqu'un. » Au P.C., l'on attache beaucoup de prix à conquérir les intellectuels. Honneurs, flagorneries et avantages de toutes sortes leur sont accordés. Dans le rapport qui sera présenté au 19^e congrès, sera souligné une nouvelle fois et avec une force accrue la nécessité de l'alliance de la classe ouvrière et des intellectuels. C'est vrai, mais à la condition que ces intellectuels veuillent bien se limiter au rôle de potiche d'honneur et ne pas prétendre à interpréter Marx ou Lénine d'une façon différente de celle de la direction.

L'agressivité à l'encontre de Garaudy est d'autant plus vive que non seulement il interprète Marx et Lénine autrement que Brejnev, mais il est, de plus, le porte-parole d'une conception différente du communisme. C'est cette conception novatrice que la direction du parti, d'une part, et le congrès, d'autre part, ont à charge d'étouffer.

Cette conception du communisme défendue par Garaudy, et que beaucoup de journalistes découvrent aujourd'hui, n'est pas nouvelle. Elle est le fruit d'un long et difficile cheminement. Il est intéressant de constater que ce sont d'abord des militants ouvriers, instruits par la pratique, qui, les premiers, ont tenté de les faire triompher. Qu'elle soit aujourd'hui défendue avec éclat par l'un des plus talentueux intellectuels du P.C. démontre leur emprise vivace.

Cette diversité est encore mise en lumière par l'adhésion de Fernand Dupuy, député-maire de Cholsy-le-Rol.

Fernand Dupuy doit tout au P.C., son passé et son présent. Permanent en Haute-Vienne, il fut poursuivi par la vindicte excessive de militants locaux. Maurice Thorez, qui l'appréciait, le fit venir à Paris pour en faire son secrétaire, puis le « parachuta » dans son fief, où il n'y a rien à conquérir mais à maintenir, et il en fit le maire et le député.

Ainsi donc, des communistes, au sommet de la direction ou parlementaires, de situations économiques et sociales différentes, prennent conscience que le dogmatisme de leur parti, sa subordination aux pratiques, aux théories et à la diplomatie soviétique, paralyse le mouvement ouvrier et le met dans l'impossibilité de jouer un rôle de premier plan dans la direction des affaires politiques du pays.

Garaudy demandait que les thèses de la direction du parti soient amendées sur trois points. Citons-les :

- « 1. L'analyse des rapports de classes en France en 1970 ;
2. Une prise de position claire sur notre vole vers le socialisme et un jugement clair sur les comportements qui, dans le mouvement communiste, s'y opposent ;
3. Une définition claire de la conception léniniste du centralisme démocratique. » (*L'Humanité*, 2 janvier 1970.)

C'est sur le fond — quelques détails différant dans la forme — le mot à mot des têtes de chapitres des Thèses du mouvement communiste démocratique et national, publiées par *La Nation Socialiste* dans son numéro de juin 1958.

Les positions dogmatiques de la direction du P.C. sur le rapport des classes, sur l'évolution des couches sociales qui naissent des techniques et des sciences nouvelles, comme hier la classe ouvrière naissait de la machine à vapeur, son « sulvisme » intolérable des pratiques et des théories soviétiques en matière de socialisme et, enfin, son attachement à un « centralisme démocratique » humanement avilissant et politiquement antidémocratique, sont autant de positions que les communistes du rang conservent sur l'estomac comme des aliments mal digérés.

L'affaire Garaudy, en donnant une forte résonance à sa pensée, va agir sur beaucoup de communistes à la façon d'un vomitif. Les thèses d'un autre temps de la direction du parti vont évidemment triompher au congrès, mais, de plus en plus, elles apparaîtront comme inadaptées et insupportables. Tôt ou tard, le mouvement communiste adoptera les thèses défendues aujourd'hui par Roger Garaudy. La répression idéologique peut en retarder l'avènement mais elle est incapable de l'empêcher. La question qui se pose est d'aider les communistes du rang à évoluer vers une réelle démocratie politique et une conception du socialisme plus en rapport avec les particularités nationales. En multipliant les contacts au sommet avec les dirigeants communistes, les leaders de la gauche française se rendent complices de cette répression idéologique et retardent l'évolution démocratique de la base du parti.

Auguste Lecoœur,
ancien membre
du bureau politique du P. C.

LE MONDE, Paris
6 February 1970

M. Auguste Lecoœur : l'affaire Garaudy va agir à la façon d'un vomitif

CPYRGHT

Dans la *Nation socialiste*, M. Auguste Lecoœur, ancien secrétaire à l'organisation du parti communiste, exclu en 1955, explique qu'il ne se fait guère d'illusion sur le congrès de Nanterre : « Une fois de plus la montagne accouchera d'une souris et le congrès « enthousiaste » réduira à néant les velléités novatrices de Roger Garaudy et de ses amis politiques. »

Les positions du philosophe, M. Lecoœur relève qu'elles ne sont pas nouvelles : « Ce sont d'abord des militants ouvriers, instruits par la pratique, qui les premiers ont tenté de les faire triompher. Qu'elles soient aujourd'hui défendues avec éclat par l'un des plus talentueux intellectuels du P.C. démontre leur emprise vivace. »

Quand M. Garaudy demande

que les thèses de la direction du parti soient amendées sur trois points — analyse des rapports de classe en France, comportements qui s'opposent à la progression vers le socialisme, centralisme démocratique, — il ne fait, affirme M. Lecoœur, que reprendre les thèses du mouvement communiste démocratique et national publiées en juin 1958.

Dans cette constatation, le directeur de la *Nation socialiste* voit la preuve de l'évolution qui entraînerait les communistes du rang : ils « conservent désormais sur l'estomac, comme des aliments mal digérés » les positions dogmatiques de la direction du P.C. Et il prévoit : « L'affaire Garaudy, par sa résonance, va agir sur beaucoup de communistes à la façon d'un vomitif. »

LE MONDE, Paris
February 1970

Auguste Lecoœur: The Garaudy Affair Will Be an Emetic

Auguste Lecoœur, former Organization Secretary of the Communist Party, expelled in 1955, explains in the *Nation Socialiste* that he has few illusions about the Nanterre Congress: "Once more the mountain will give birth to a

mouse, and the 'enthusiastic' congress will boil down to a nullification of the innovative ideas of Roger Garaudy and his political friends."

Lecocur points out that the philosopher's positions are not new: "It was the worker militants who, educated by experience, first tried to secure their triumph. That they are today loudly defended by one of the most talented intellectuals of the Communist Party shows their deep-rooted influence."

When Garaudy asks that the theses of the party leadership be amended on three points -- analysis of class relations in France, democratic centralism, and behavior opposing progression towards socialism, he does no more, Lecocur asserts, then revive the theses, which were published in June 1958, of the democratic and national Communist movement.

In this statement the Nation Socialiste editor sees proof of the evolution that would involve the ranks of the Communists: Hereafter they will retain the dogmatic positions of the Communist party leadership "like poorly digested food on the stomach." And he predicts, "The Garaudy affair in its repercussions will be, for many Communists, an emetic."

LE MONDE, Paris
6 February 1970

DANS UNE INTERVIEW A « IL GIORNO »

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M. Roger Garaudy : la fraction des militants qui partagent mes opinions ne réussira pas à s'exprimer

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Rome (AFP) -- M. Roger Garaudy, dans une interview accordée avant l'ouverture du congrès du parti communiste et publiée mercredi dans le quotidien milanais Il Giorno (gauche modérée), déclare : « La fraction de militants qui partagent mes opinions ne réussira pas à s'exprimer, et le congrès, tel qu'il a été préparé, se prononcera à l'unanimité ou presque contre mes thèses. (...) Ce n'est pas seulement un drame d'intellectuel, c'est un problème de militant. (...) Le parti, pour moi, ce ne sont pas ses dirigeants, ce sont ces trois cents quatre cent mille militants qui m'ont enseigné la route de la dignité et de la solidarité humaine. Malgré la déception

et l'amertume, je ne me séparerai pas de ces hommes. Et puis je crois qu'un jour le tournant se fera. »

Au sujet du marxisme-léninisme, M. Garaudy remarque : « Ce n'est pas un dogme ni un catalogue fixe de lois philosophiques ou économiques, mais une méthodologie. Une méthodologie de l'initiative historique, la science et l'art de déterminer un « possible historique » à travers les contradictions d'une époque et d'une société. »

Traitant des rapports entre la lutte des classes et la théorie du nouveau « bloc historique » que le philosophe avait développée dans son livre

récent, Le Grand Tournant au socialisme, Roger Garaudy affirme : « Il n'y a pas besoin de redéfinir le concept de classe ouvrière. Et cela parce que Marx n'en a jamais donné une définition restrictive, limitée aux travailleurs manuels. Au contraire, il a prévu son élargissement progressif aux techniciens et aux intellectuels. » « En introduisant la notion de « bloc historique », que j'ai empruntée à Gramsci, ajoute M. Garaudy, je n'ai pas voulu trouver un substitut au concept de classe ouvrière mais, au contraire, donner justement un fondement doctrinaire au rôle pilote de cette classe à notre époque. »

A propos de ses jugements

sur les événements de Tchécoslovaquie, M. Garaudy affirme : « Je ne suis pas homme de croisade antisoviétique, je ne le serai jamais. Mais dire que l'occupation de la Tchécoslovaquie a terni, dans l'esprit de millions d'hommes, l'image de la révolution d'Octobre, ce n'est pas faire de l'antisoviétisme, non plus que d'affirmer que le socialisme que nous voulons construire en France est différent de celui qui est imposé militairement à Prague. Chaque militant est responsable du bon renom du socialisme dans le monde. Nous avons le droit et le devoir de demander que les erreurs commises par les dirigeants soviétiques soient réparées. »

LE MONDE, Paris
6 February 1970

In an Interview in "Il Giorno"

Roger Garaudy: The Few Militants Who Share My Opinion
Will Not Be Able to Express Themselves

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Rome (AFP) -- Roger Garaudy, in an interview given before the opening of the Communist Party Congress and published on Wednesday in the Milan daily "Il Giorno" (moderate left), states: "The few militants who share my opinion

will not be able to express themselves, and the congress, as it has been planned, will unanimously or almost unanimously, declare opposition to my theses.... It is not only an intellectual drama; it is also a problem for the militant.... The party, for me, is not its leaders; it is the three or four hundred thousand militants who have taught me the way of human dignity and solidarity. In spite of the disappointment and the bitterness, I will never divorce myself from these men. I think then that one day the turning-point will be reached."

On the subject of Marxist-Leninism, Garaudy remarks: "It is not a dogma or a fixed catalogue of philosophical or economic laws, but a methodology. A methodology of historical initiative, of science, and of the art of determining "historic possibility" through the contradictions of an age and a society."

Concerning the relation of the class struggle and the new "historical bloc" theory developed by the philosopher in his recent book, The Great Turning-Point of Socialism, Garaudy asserts, "There is no need to redefine the concept of the working class. And this is because Marx never gave a restricted definition that was limited to manual laborers. On the contrary, he foresaw its extension to the technicians and intellectuals."

Garaudy adds, "In introducing the idea of the 'historical bloc' which I borrowed from Gramsci, I did not wish to find a substitute for the concept of the working class, but on the contrary, to give a doctrinaire foundation to the pilot role of this class in our age."

Concerning his judgments on the events in Czechoslovakia, Garaudy asserts "I am not a part of the anti-Soviet crusade; I never will be. But to say that the occupation of Czechoslovakia has tarnished, in the minds of millions of men, the image of the October Revolution, is not anti-Soviet -- no more than to assert that the socialism we want to build in France differs from that which is militarily imposed in Prague. Each militant is responsible for the good name of socialism in the world. We have the right and the duty to ask that the errors committed by Soviet leaders be corrected."

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Excerpts from: Le Grand Tournant du Socialisme (The Great Turning Point of Socialism) by Roger Garaudy, Paris, 1969. (pp. 125-136 and 144-150.)

[Emphasis added]

...These crimes against socialism, perpetrated by the Stalinist apparatus, assumed three main forms:

The first was exile by the Stalinist political police which decapitated the governments of socialist nations as it had done in the USSR. This political insanity resulted in the trials of Kostov in Bulgaria, Gomulka in Poland, Rajk in Hungary, Patrascanu in Romania, and Slansky in Czechoslovakia. The eye-witness report in The Confession by Arthur London, a former member of the international brigades in Spain and the French resistance and then a Czech minister, reveal the mechanism of these trials where confessions of mistakes they had not committed were extracted from the accused by means of blackmail "in the name of the party."

The second consequence of this bureaucratized centralism based on dogmatization using the "Soviet model" was the mechanical application of this "model" to nations having other types of government, potentials and past histories. This blind extrapolation led to economic monstrosities: the system of forced industrialization, where the basic conditions had not been created, resulted in voluntary tours de force such as the construction of Stalinvaroch in Hungary where a gigantic steel complex was built thousands of kilometers from any source of raw materials such as coal and iron ore. Soviet "political advisors" did as much damage to the economy as to justice and the police. By forcing intolerable sacrifices on the people, the methods of centralized, authoritarian planning produced the same results as forced agricultural collectivization in the USSR 20 years earlier. (The only exception was Bulgaria, where the true existence of a "farm party," an independent force outside the communist party, served a beneficial purpose.) They played into the hands of socialism's worst enemies by giving them a foundation among the people. In 1956, East Germany, Poland and Hungary were thus led to the brink of counterrevolution. To prevent the restoration of fascism in the heart of Europe, there was no other choice, made necessary by previous mistakes, but Soviet military intervention in Budapest (cf. Peut-on être communiste aujourd'hui? [Is It Possible to Be a Communist Today?], Grasset, 1967, pp. 43-45).

The same dogma of the single "model" of socialism led Stalin to undertake a program of excommunication which weakened and divided the communist movement. This dogma was very contrary to Lenin's teachings which, as we have pointed out, still emphasize what was of universal value in the October Revolution, what was specifically Russian about it, what resulted from theory and, lastly, what history actually produced. In 1948, Yugoslavia having been the first socialist nation to confront authoritarian dogmatism and seek its own approach to the construction of socialism, its leaders were denounced as counterrevolutionary agents, spies, murderers, and fascists. These accusations were again levelled 20 years later, in the name of the same postulates and even more brutally, when on 21 August 1968 Soviet tanks crushed the attempts by Czech communists to develop a "model" of socialism corresponding to the

requirements of a highly developed society. Brezhnev thus went beyond the limits of Stalinism; at least Stalin did not invade Yugoslavia! He did this by using the same procedures for an entire people and his party as those used during the trials in Moscow, Prague and elsewhere. Today, he has forced Czech communist leaders to accept the following agreement: their party's congress is allowed to meet provided they guarantee its approval of the need and legitimacy of the Soviet invasion. To fulfill this requirement, the future congress is now being prefabricated by removing from every party organization those individuals who neither accept being dictated to nor approve the use of a foreign model.

It is significant that the occupying nation and its collaborators are either anxious to obtain a statement of self-criticism or threaten those individuals with new trials who, between January and August 1968, during particularly difficult times, tried to correct the mistakes of Novotny's Stalinist leadership, although Novotny himself is not being asked to account for the split he created between the people and the party apparatus.

However, in 1956 after giving old militants the worst shock of their lives, the 20th Congress of the CPSU raised hopes that such mistakes would never again be committed and that such crimes would no longer be perpetrated.

Placing the errors and crimes of the Stalinist period in their historical perspective, in other words, as part of the painful but finally triumphant progress along the path to the construction of socialism on material bases, the 20th Congress opened the way to a new future following the example of self-criticism set by no party or government until that time.

This self-criticism had unquestionably been made in a rather unusual fashion, having been carried out behind the closed doors of the congress and provided that fraternal parties divulged none of the terms. Consequently, our parties had to bear the heavy responsibility of documents whose authenticity no one questioned but which we were only allowed to discuss as a "report attributed to ... Khrushchev."

This very form was not a chance result of history. There where no political discussion was possible outside of official dogma, for more than a quarter of a century political change within the party, within the Soviets, and in public opinion could take place only in the form of an explosion like Khrushchev's sudden denunciation of Stalin before the party congress or, like a few years earlier, Khrushchev's sudden disappearance through the trap door with neither the Supreme Soviet nor the party members being consulted and without Soviet citizens receiving the least explanation. (It is significant that in Czechoslovakia, where Stalinist methods were reintroduced following the August 1968 Soviet invasion, the party CC (heavily purged without consulting the militants and party congress) in September 1969 dismissed the president of the National Assembly and rearranged the composition of the ministry without consulting either the elected assemblies or the voters.)

Despite these limitations, the beneficial effects of this criticism soon became apparent. The agricultural problem was not solved, but it was at least discussed. Similarly, by realistically recognizing that when Stalin died in 1953 the nation had still not quite returned to 1929 or even 1913 production levels, the essential condition for recovery had been created, this being a recognition of the failure of the previous system.

A start on liberalization of the regime, greater freedom of opinion and criticism and official recognition of the need for material participation and economic reforms could, within a democratic context, have produced an increase in industrial productivity and helped encourage new undertakings. (In effect, the annual growth rate was not higher than during previous years. See 1962 USSR Statistical Yearbook published in Moscow in 1963, page 67.) Brilliant Soviet successes in the conquest of space which, with Gagarin's first space flight, even preceded American attempts, seemed to symbolize the October Revolution's ability to come up for air for a third time and carry out those decisive changes allowing it to fully satisfy the requirements of the new scientific and technical revolution.

The weight of previous government structure limited and, in the final analysis, paralyzed this chance for renewal.

First of all, associating criticism of the past with Stalin's "cult of personality" would have meant ridiculously limiting its scope. Stalin's personality unquestionably played a certain role, but it was primarily an effect and not a cause, having been but the final expression of a centralized bureaucratic system.

Thus, focusing on the "cult of personality" meant skirting the real problem and creating the dangerous illusion that only personalities have to be changed for everything to fall into place. Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist Party, then had the merit of stating the real problem by pointing out that the so-called "Stalinist" perversion was not due to Stalin's personality but of necessity could be accounted for by the system. At the time, he drew accusations from the public (instigated by the CPSU) which stated that such questioning of the system meant making socialism itself responsible for the "cult." What Togliatti was questioning was in no way socialism but rather the bureaucratic, authoritarian and centralized "model" and the form it took in the USSR.

The second limitation on the criticism which began with the 20th Congress was that of having tried to protect past governments as much as possible. After denouncing Stalin's "mistakes," as if they had been purely contingent and due to his personality, his main theoretical writing, The Principles of Leninism, was said to still be basically valid. It was thus possible to maintain the Stalinist view of the party and state which was opposed to the approach of Marx and Lenin and was the theoretical foundation and justification for the entire Stalinist system.

This bureaucratic centralism's basic principle was the dogma according to which the communist party and state must direct all forms of social activity

from economic production to intellectual and artistic creation by introducing an awareness "from outside" (without mentioning the other point of revolutionary subjectivity, dialectically inseparable from the former according to Marx and Lenin, i.e., the initiative of the masses).

This monopoly on thinking and decision-making processes might have been a temporary necessity at one or another phase in the revolution in a backward, besieged nation suffering from material poverty and a shortage of cadres. However, it cannot become a permanent principle of the construction of socialism. Of necessity, in the long run a system founded on such a principle leads to bureaucratic, authoritarian and dogmatic distortions and the decline of socialism.

The same applies to the party. Since everything is decided "from above" by the leading group, various party officials are only left with the role of carrying out and, even in the best of instances, commenting on directives from the "center."

Furthermore, how could the membership truly discuss a given orientation if no political information was available to it? To use but a recent example, on 21 August 1968 no Soviet citizen (except for members of the Political Bureau and a few high officials) knew the contents of the response of the Czech Party to the accusations of member nations of the Warsaw Pact. What we must of necessity call mistrust (not to say contempt) of the masses, 50 years after the Revolution the Soviet press, radio and television are still only making public those ideas and facts suited to justifying the party line.

This distrust, moreover, has spread to "fraternal" parties and their leaders. On 21 August the note sent to the leaders of all "fraternal" parties informing them of the invasion began with the following official lie: "Called by the majority of the CC and its presidium..." This same official lie was the only source of information available to members of the CPSU and Pravda's readers.

Such is the evil result of this attitude by the Party, and, still concerning this matter, this is the reason Togliatti, drawing the conclusions from his previous criticism, recognized the need for a "new type of party." He was using Lenin's words and point of view when suggesting the organization's forms should be modified to suit conditions existing in each nation and specific period of time. Today, a communist party in an economically and technically advanced nation having bourgeois democratic traditions and during a time of peace and legality cannot continue to have those organizational forms which Lenin legitimately outlined for an illegal party active in an underdeveloped nation emerging without transition not from a bourgeois democracy but a semifeudal and autocratic regime.

The third basic limitation of the 20th Congress was that Khrushchev's criticism did not question but rather perpetuated this shift in objectives and confusion of means with ends characterizing the Stalinist era. The means necessary to overcome underdevelopment had gradually become identified

with the goals of socialism. When, after Stalin, Khrushchev called for catching up with and passing the United States, this appeal was disappointing in two ways. First of all, this objective could not be attained using the methods he advocated (especially by delaying, mostly for ideological reasons, the "computer revolution" which was nevertheless decisive, there today being more than 42,000 computers in the United States against 4,000 in the Soviet Union). To appreciate the subjectivity and lack of realism of this appeal, it only needs to be remembered that, after Khrushchev, with the plan he instituted in 1961 (and later abandoned), the USSR was to have pulled ahead of the United States in key areas in 1970 and left it behind in all areas by 1980.

Secondly, and above all, even in economic and technical terms socialism's objective cannot be the same as capitalism's with a mere quantitative difference. Socialism's successes are not only measured in terms of the number of refrigerators and television sets. Even its technical superiority must be ascertained by the satisfaction and creation of other needs making possible man's full development. *Another model of society must be created.*

Socialism can only create a "new man" by preparing for the development of new requirements. As Marx pointed out in his criticism of popular socialism, socialism does not consist solely of providing the masses with the forms of comfort, luxury, and art which had previously always been the exclusive domain of the privileged. Instead, it means creating new requirements and new ways of satisfying them and thus creating original forms of happiness, beauty, and even life itself.

Not only did the criticism of Stalinism contain these limits within itself from the very beginning, but the complexity of the structures and apparatus forged during the quarter century of bureaucratic centralism soon diminished the range of human choice. The criticism was not carried to the point where it would have made possible radical change and a new start in socialism which, economically, technically, and militarily strengthened, could reorganize its political and cultural superstructures on this basis by raising them to a level corresponding to both the new status of the productive forces in the Soviet Union and the requirements of the new scientific and technical revolution. In reality, Soviet leaders at the time were anxious to turn over a new page, and, less than 10 years after the 20th Congress, criticism of Stalinism was completely buried. Its leaders, who formed the main backbone of the party and state, were trained by Stalinism and received their assignments under Stalin on the basis of criteria then in effect including the acceptance of official dogma, unquestioning implementation on all levels of directives coming from above and the centralized bureaucratic and authoritarian operation of all institutions. In 1966, when the CPSU was preparing for its 23rd Congress there was fear this apparatus, which was already practicing a form of neo-Stalinism, would even consider officially rehabilitating Stalin, since many articles, written among others by high-ranking military men and important officials, were already involved in the ideological preparation for this restoration. It was at this time that 25 well-known scientists and artists sent a letter to Brezhnev. It was signed by several of the most important physicists in the USSR including Igor Tamm, Kapitsa and Sakharov, film directors such as Romm, artists like Maya Plisetskaya and one man who played an extremely important role in Soviet diplomacy, Mayski. They pointed out that any rehabilitation of Stalin "would be a major catastrophe" both in the Soviet Union itself and

abroad, where any attempt to restore Stalinism would lead to splits between the Soviet party and communist parties in capitalist nations.

There was no official rehabilitation, but there was an increase in the number of acts inspired by the strictest form of Stalinist tradition. One of the most typical examples was the 1967 decree modifying article 190 of the penal code of the Federative Socialist Republic of Russia which forbids the "non-denunciation" of crimes. Following the Siniyavskiy and Daniel and then the Ginsberg trials and, by "analogy," broadening the application of repressive measures, the Supreme Soviet of the Socialist Federative Soviet Republic of Russia outlawed "literary protest." Any person having knowledge of this type of protest was expected to denounce it or face punishment as severe as that for the crime in question. This gives an idea of the extent of the neo-Stalinist restoration. (The return of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia, one year after the invasion, could be seen in the same fashion when denunciation was made a national duty in a ministerial note. [Note by Czech Minister of Education, 16 September 1969].)

* * * * *

...Effective, unimpaired implementation of such a reform and its political impact required complete intellectual freedom, in other words, three basic possibilities: the freedom to gather and communicate information; the right of free speech without fear of punishment other than the criticism of spoken opinion; the end to restrictions imposed either by the state government or by myths inculcated by unilateral propaganda and "orientation" of the masses.

Without these neither democratic nor scientific method can exist.

The behavior of the Soviet Union's present leaders is significant in this respect. Although after 50 years of socialism new generations of intellectuals are emerging and being recruited in the working class and although they have developed an awareness of their deep-rooted solidarity with a working class of which most of them form an integral part, it is paradoxical to hear it repeated that intellectuals must subordinate themselves to a working class of which they have long been members in the USSR. These statements only tend to require the subordination of intellectuals (as, moreover, of the working class) to the central party apparatus and its officials who consider themselves the infallible interpreters of the conscience of a working class theoretically in power but which, by virtue of this "preestablished harmony," is never consulted.

This bureaucratic, centralized and authoritarian point of view remains the main obstacle standing in the way of carrying out economic reforms, political democratization and the liberation of culture.

In itself, the replacement of administrative management methods by economic methods constitutes true progress. It implied a change in production planning methods and the encouragement of workers. Restrictions imposed from above had to be liberalized. Exchanges between companies for business purposes could replace the leadership of a centralized state at least to a large degree

if not entirely. In effect, the replacement of the centralized supply of production equipment by the ordinary wholesale trade takes place at an unsuitably slow pace. Due to its bureaucratic complexity, the system for encouragement was only a very mediocre success.

The basic reason for all this was the lag between changes in companies and the methods of administrative state organizations whose style of work failed to evolve.

The slowdown was so extensive during recent years that breeding and agricultural output in general decreased from previous years, and there was a fall in industrial growth and especially in key areas such as cement and steel. The United States won the race to the moon, although the USSR had gained a considerable advance 10 years earlier with Gagarin's first flight in space.

It is becoming more and more clear that the centralized, authoritarian system, which was effective during the initial phase of the construction of socialism, has today become obsolete and inapplicable during a new phase in the development of the productive forces.

One of the main consequences of the new scientific and technical revolution has been that, contrary to the "industrial" era, it requires a decrease in the number of decision-making centers and an extraordinary increase in the creative initiative of workers, in other words an explosion of subjectivity.

Only socialism can achieve these conditions. For this, however, it must see to the continuing modification of all social relationships to satisfy the requirements of major scientific and technical developments.

As it happens, the current Soviet leaders are opposed not only to changes which have become necessary in the Soviet Union but to all attempts by communist parties (especially in socialist nations) to develop models of socialism corresponding to their social structures and national histories.

As during Stalin's time, statements run contrary to actual policy. There is an increase in the number of affirmations that there is no guiding party and according to these every party functions independently and freely chooses its approach to socialism and so forth. In practice, the policy is one of excommunication and boycotts of Yugoslavia in 1948, the halt in all aid to China and the breach of contracts in 1960 as well as the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The Soviet press is quite explicit concerning the true reasons for the invasion. Unable to give even the smallest proof of enough "counterrevolutionary" activity to threaten socialism in Czechoslovakia, Pravda soon made it clear that *it was not the counterrevolutionaries which the Soviet tanks were to fight in Prague. Instead, it was the Czech communists who had to be "brought into line."* The 24 August 1968 issue of Pravda revealed the true nature of the problem in these terms, "The fundamental Leninist principles of party organization, in other words the principles of democratic centralism, had been virtually denied." According to Brezhnev's views, this served to undermine "the party's role of leadership."

As it happens, "practical" steps effectively taken by the Czechoslovak Communist Party between January and August 1968 can be reduced to three in number.

The first consisted of the elimination of censorship and the establishment of freedom of speech.

The second involved the creation of "worker councils" within companies allowing everyone, already on an economic level and at his very place of employment, to participate in those decisions on which his future depended and to be, according to Marx's fundamental thesis, the subject of history and not its object.

The third was the change in the party charter in order to put an end to structures and practices inherited from Stalin and Novotny. The essential purpose of the new charter was to provide every militant with a real opportunity to participate in the elaboration of the party line. It condemned the creation of "factions" which destroy unity and, consequently, the effectiveness of the communist party, and it provided for a series of measures intended to prevent a return to Stalinist theory and practice.

The first of these measures called for putting an end to the mixing of party and state by forbidding the concentration of positions of leadership in the party and state.

The second recognized the rights of the minority and, by allowing it to express itself in the party organs, did not reduce it to silence. This permitted free emulation of theoretical and political initiative and thus made possible progress by the party other than by explosions or "palace revolutions" (as, for example, Khrushchev's eviction).

The third instituted secret balloting on all levels for the appointment of party leaders.

The fourth guaranteed supervision of party activities and its administering organizations by the publication of CC reports and the elimination of direct or indirect censorship exercised by the administrative apparatus in power.

It was this return to Lenin's principles concerning a democratic centralism in which centralism does not eliminate democracy, principles systematically violated by Stalin and his successors, which Brezhnev and Pravda called the negation of democratic centralism and the abandonment of the party's role of leadership. Soviet tanks entered Prague to prevent any questioning of the Stalinist interpretation as well as the chances of contagion which this questioning meant for other socialist nations and the dangers it created for bureaucratic apparatuses. It was also for this reason that the same Soviet pressure was exerted on all parties using various means depending on the situation.

This is why it is not enough for us to disapprove of military intervention; we must also be clearly aware of the theoretical and political principles underlying it, and we must unfailingly unmask and fight them. This is a struggle

of principle, since a return to methods used previous to the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the least concession to the re-Stalinization policy would lead communist parties to bankruptcy. Today, the choice is clear: either a majority mass policy alone capable of assembling all forces anxious to establish socialism in our nation or an alignment with the views of present Soviet leaders who turn their backs on the fundamental democratic requirements of victory and a construction of socialism in highly developed countries. Communist parties making the latter choice run a heavy risk of becoming small sects devoted to a form of socialism they consider to be the only one possible but which in no way corresponds to the people's needs and aspirations.

Today, this decisive choice is the great turning point in socialism. The future of the communist parties depends on their ability to view democratic centralism and the party's role of leadership in terms expressed by Marx and Lenin and not by Stalin and Brezhnev.

Excerpts From:
Le Grand Tournant du Socialisme
 (The Great Turning Point of Socialism)

by Roger Garaudy
 (pp.125-136 and 144-150)

CPYRGHT

— Ces crimes contre le socialisme, perpétrés par l'appareil stalinien, prirent trois formes principales :

— La première fut celle de l'exportation de la police politique stalinienne qui décapita les états-majors des pays socialistes comme elle l'avait fait en U. R. S. S. Cette démence politique engendra les procès de Kostov en Bulgarie, de Gomulka en Pologne, de Rajk en Hongrie, de Patrascanu en Roumanie, de Slansky en Tchécoslovaquie. Le témoignage de l'une des victimes, *L'Aveu*, d'Arthur London, ancien combattant des Brigades internationales d'Espagne et de la Résistance française, puis ministre en Tchécoslovaquie, a mis à nu le mécanisme de ces procès où l'on obtenait des accusés, par un chantage à « l'esprit de parti », l'avoué de fautes qu'ils n'avaient pas commises.

— La deuxième conséquence de ce centralisme bureaucratique fondé sur la dogmatisation à partir du « modèle soviétique », ce fut l'application mécanique de ce « modèle » à des pays ayant d'autres structures, d'autres possibilités, un autre passé. Cette extrapolation aveugle conduisit à des monstruosité économiques : le système de l'industrialisation forcée, là où les conditions objectives n'étaient pas réalisées, aboutit à des « tours de force » volontaristes du genre de la création de Stalinvaroch, en Hongrie, où un complexe sidérurgique gigantesque était installé à des milliers de kilomètres des sources de matière première : charbon et minerai de fer. Les « conseillers politiques » soviétiques ne firent pas moins de ravages dans l'économie que dans la justice et la police : les méthodes de planification centralisée et autoritaire, en imposant aux peuples un taux de sacrifice devenu intolérable, aboutirent au même résultat que, vingt ans plus tôt, la collectivisation agricole forcée en U. R. S. S.¹ Elles firent le jeu des pires ennemis du socialisme en leur donnant une base de masse : en 1956, l'Allemagne de l'Est, la Pologne, la Hongrie furent ainsi conduites au bord de la contre-révolution. Pour empêcher la restauration du fascisme au cœur de l'Europe, il n'y eut plus d'autre recours — rendu nécessaire par les erreurs antérieures — que celui d'une intervention militaire soviétique à Budapest.²

1. La seule exception est celle de la Bulgarie, où l'existence réelle d'un « parti paysan », comme force autonome en dehors du Parti communiste, a joué un rôle bienfaisant.

2. Voir *Peut-on être communiste aujourd'hui ?* (Grasset, 1967), p. 43-45.

Le même dogme du « modèle » unique du socialisme — si contraire à l'enseignement de Lénine soulignant toujours avec force, comme nous l'avons rappelé, ce qui, dans la révolution d'Octobre, avait valeur universelle et ce qui, en elle, était spécifiquement russe, ce qui découlait des principes et ce qui résultait de l'histoire — conduisit Staline à des excommunications qui affaiblirent et divisèrent le mouvement communiste. En 1948, la Yougoslavie ayant été le premier pays socialiste à affronter le dogmatisme autoritaire et à chercher sa propre voie pour la construction du socialisme, ses dirigeants furent dénoncés comme agents contre-révolutionnaires, espions, assassins et fascistes. Cela se reproduisit vingt ans après, au nom des mêmes postulats, et avec des méthodes plus brutales encore, puisque le 21 août 1968 les chars soviétiques étouffèrent la tentative des communistes tchécoslovaques de rechercher un « modèle » de socialisme correspondant aux exigences d'une société hautement développée. Brejnev est ainsi allé au-delà du stalinisme : Staline, au moins, n'avait pas envahi la Yougoslavie ! Il est allé aussi au-delà du stalinisme en appliquant à un peuple entier et à son parti les procédés employés, au cours des procès de Moscou, de Prague et d'ailleurs. Il impose aujourd'hui aux dirigeants communistes tchèques ce marché : vous pourrez tenir le congrès de votre parti si vous nous donnez la garantie qu'il conclura à la nécessité et à la légitimité de l'intervention soviétique. Pour atteindre cet objectif, le futur congrès est dès maintenant préfabriqué en épurant chaque organisme du Parti des éléments qui n'acceptent ni le diktat ni l'importation du modèle étranger.

Il est significatif que l'occupant et ses collaborateurs veuillent arracher une autocritique ou menacer de nouveaux procès ceux qui, de janvier à août 1968, dans des conditions particulièrement difficiles, ont essayé de corriger les erreurs de la direction stalinienne de Novotny à qui l'on ne demande aucun compte pour le fossé qu'il avait creusé entre le peuple et l'appareil du Parti.

Pourtant le XX^e Congrès du Parti communiste de l'U. R. S. S., en 1956, après avoir créé, chez les vieux militants, le plus terrible choc de notre vie, pouvait faire lever l'espérance que de telles erreurs ne seraient plus commises, que de tels crimes ne seraient plus perpétrés.

Situant les erreurs et les crimes de la période stalinienne dans leur perspective historique, c'est-à-dire dans le cheminement douloureux mais finalement triomphant de la construction des bases matérielles du socialisme, le XX^e Congrès pouvait ouvrir un avenir neuf après l'exemple d'une autocritique qu'aucun parti ni aucun État n'avait donné jusque-là.

Sans doute cette autocritique avait été faite d'une manière singulière : dans le huis clos du Congrès et sous la condition que les partis frères n'en divulguent pas les termes. Si bien qu'une lourde hypothèque a pesé sur nos partis : d'un texte dont nul ne contestait l'authenticité, nous étions tenus à ne parler que comme du « rapport attribué à... Khrouchtchev ».

Cette forme même n'était pas un hasard de l'histoire : là où aucune discussion politique n'était possible, en dehors des dogmes officiels, depuis plus d'un quart de siècle, ni dans le Parti, ni dans les Soviets, ni dans l'opinion, un changement politique ne pouvait se produire que sous forme d'explosion, comme la brusque dénonciation de Staline par Khrouchtchev au Congrès du Parti — ou comme, quelques années plus tard, la brusque disparition de Khrouchtchev dans la trappe aux oubliettes, sans que soient consultés ni le Soviet suprême, ni la base du Parti, et sans la moindre explication donnée aux citoyens soviétiques¹.

Malgré ces limitations, les effets bienfaisants de cette critique ne tardèrent pas à se manifester : le problème agricole ne fut pas résolu, mais il fut au moins posé, et en reconnaissant, de manière réaliste, qu'à la mort de Staline, en 1953, l'on n'avait pas encore tout à fait rattrapé le niveau de production de 1929, ni de 1913, la condition première d'un redressement était réalisée : reconnaître la faillite du système antérieur.

Un commencement de libéralisation du régime, une plus grande liberté d'opinion et de critique, une reconnaissance officielle de la nécessité de l'intéressement matériel et d'une réforme économique auraient pu

1. Il est significatif qu'en Tchécoslovaquie, où les méthodes stalinienne ont été réintroduites après l'invasion soviétique d'août 1968, le Comité central du Parti (largement épuré sans consultation des militants et sans Congrès du Parti), en septembre 1969, destitua le président de l'Assemblée nationale et bouleversa la composition du ministère en dehors de toute consultation des Assemblées élues et des électeurs.

permettre, dans un contexte démocratique, une augmentation de la productivité industrielle et apporter une stimulation à la création¹. Les éclatants succès soviétiques dans la conquête de l'espace, devançant même, avec le premier vol cosmique de Gagarine, les tentatives américaines, semblaient symboliser cette possibilité, pour la révolution d'Octobre, de retrouver son troisième souffle et de réaliser la mutation décisive qui lui permettrait de répondre pleinement aux exigences de la nouvelle révolution scientifique et technique.

La pesanteur des structures antérieures limita et, finalement, paralysa cette possibilité de renouveau.

D'abord c'était réduire dérisoirement la portée de la critique du passé que de la ramener au « culte de la personnalité » de Staline. La personnalité de Staline a certes joué un rôle, mais, pour l'essentiel, elle est un effet et non une cause. Elle n'est que l'expression limitée d'un système bureaucratique centralisé.

Mettre au premier plan le « culte de la personnalité », c'est donc escamoter le vrai problème et créer l'illusion dangereuse qu'il suffisait de changer la personnalité pour que tout rentre dans l'ordre. Le dirigeant du Parti communiste italien, Palmiro Togliatti, eut alors le mérite de poser le vrai problème en montrant que la perversion dite « stalinienne » n'était pas due à la personnalité de Staline mais découlait nécessairement du système. Il s'attira, à l'époque, un blâme public, lancé par le Parti communiste soviétique, déclarant que mettre ainsi en cause le système c'était mettre en cause le socialisme lui-même comme responsable du « culte ». Alors que ce que Togliatti mettait en cause ce n'était nullement le socialisme mais le « modèle » bureaucratique, autoritaire et centralisé, la forme sous laquelle il s'est réalisé en Union soviétique.

La deuxième limitation apportée à la critique commença au XX^e Congrès, c'est d'avoir essayé de sauver autant que possible les structures du passé : après avoir dénoncé les « erreurs » de Staline, comme si elles étaient purement contingentes, liées à son caractère personnel, l'on déclara que son ouvrage théorique principal, *Les Principes du léninisme*, demeurerait pour l'essentiel valable. L'on conservait ainsi la conception stalinienne du Parti et de l'État, opposée à la conception de Marx et de Lénine, et qui était le fondement théorique et la justification de tout le système stalinien.

1. En fait le taux annuel n'a pas été supérieur à ceux des années précédentes. Voir *Annuaire statistique de l'U. R. S. S. en 1962*. Publié à Moscou en 1963 (p. 67).

Le principe de base de ce centralisme bureaucratique, c'est le dogme selon lequel le Parti communiste et l'État doivent diriger toutes les formes de l'activité sociale, depuis la production économique jusqu'à la création intellectuelle et artistique, en apportant « du dehors » la conscience (sans retenir l'autre moment de la subjectivité révolutionnaire, dialectiquement inséparable du premier chez Marx et chez Lénine : l'initiative des masses).

Ce monopole du savoir et de la décision a pu être une nécessité transitoire à telle ou telle étape de la révolution, dans un pays arriéré, assiégé, accablé par la pénurie matérielle et par le manque de cadres. Il ne peut devenir un principe permanent pour la construction du socialisme. Un système fondé sur un tel principe conduit nécessairement, dans le long terme, à la déformation bureaucratique, autoritaire et dogmatique, à la dégénérescence du socialisme.

Il en est de même du Parti : tout étant décidé « en haut », par le groupe dirigeant, les diverses instances du parti n'ont d'autre rôle que d'exécuter et, dans le meilleur des cas, de commenter les directives du « centre ».

Comment, d'ailleurs, la « base » pourrait-elle discuter valablement de l'orientation alors qu'elle ne dispose d'aucune information politique ? Pour ne retenir qu'un exemple proche : au 21 août 1968, aucun citoyen soviétique (sauf les membres du Bureau politique et quelques hauts fonctionnaires) ne connaissait la réponse du Parti tchécoslovaque aux accusations des membres du Pacte de Varsovie. Avec ce qu'on est bien obligé d'appeler une méfiance (pour ne pas dire un mépris) des masses, la presse soviétique, la radio, la télévision, cinquante ans après la Révolution, ne distillent que les idées ou les faits propres à justifier la ligne du Parti.

Cette méfiance s'étend d'ailleurs aux partis « frères » et à leurs dirigeants. Le 21 août, la communication adressée aux dirigeants de tous les partis « frères », pour les informer de l'intervention, commençait par ce mensonge officiel : « Appelés par la majorité du Comité central et de son présidium... » Ce même mensonge officiel est la seule information dont disposaient les membres du Parti communiste de l'U. R. S. S. et les lecteurs de la *Pravda*.

Telle est la malfeasance de cette conception du Parti et c'est pourquoi, sur ce point encore, Togliatti, tirant les conséquences de sa précédente critique, concluait à la nécessité d'un « parti de type nouveau ». Il reprenait ainsi l'expression de Lénine, et dans l'esprit de Lénine, c'est-à-dire en adaptant les formes d'organisation aux conditions de chaque pays et de chaque époque : un parti communiste aujourd'hui, dans un pays économiquement et techniquement avancé, avec des traditions démocratiques bourgeoises, en temps de

paix et de légalité, ne saurait conserver les formes d'organisation très légitimement élaborées par Lénine pour un parti illégal, dans un pays sous-développé et sortant sans transition non pas d'une démocratie bourgeoise mais d'un régime semi-féodal et autocratique.

La troisième limitation fondamentale du XX^e Congrès, c'est que la critique de Khrouchtchev ne mettait pas en cause mais au contraire perpétuait ce transfert des objectifs, cette confusion des moyens avec les fins, qui caractérisait l'ère stalinienne : les moyens nécessaires pour vaincre le sous-développement s'étaient peu à peu identifiés avec les fins du socialisme. Lorsque Khrouchtchev, après Staline, lançait le mot d'ordre : rattraper et dépasser les États-Unis, ce mot d'ordre était doublement décevant, d'abord parce que cet objectif ne pouvait être atteint avec les méthodes qu'il préconisait (notamment en retardant, pour une large part pour des raisons idéologiques, la « révolution des ordinateurs », pourtant décisive — les États-Unis disposant aujourd'hui de plus de quarante-deux mille ordinateurs contre quatre mille en Union soviétique). Pour mesurer le subjectivisme et l'irréalisme de tels propos, il suffit de rappeler que, d'après Khrouchtchev, avec le plan qu'il avait lancé en 1961 (et abandonné depuis), l'U. R. S. S. devait dépasser les États-Unis dans les secteurs clés en 1970, et l'emporter dans tous les domaines en 1980.

Ensuite et surtout l'objectif du socialisme ne peut être, même sur le plan économique et technique, celui du capitalisme avec une simple différence quantitative. Les performances du socialisme ne se mesurent pas seulement par le nombre des réfrigérateurs ou des appareils de télévision. Sa supériorité, même technique, doit s'affirmer par la satisfaction et la création d'autres besoins permettant l'épanouissement de l'homme. *Un autre modèle de civilisation est à créer.*

Le socialisme ne peut former un « homme nouveau » qu'en préparant les conditions de la naissance de besoins nouveaux : le socialisme, comme Marx l'a montré dans sa critique du socialisme vulgaire, ne consiste pas seulement à étendre aux masses populaires les formes de confort, de luxe, ou d'art, qui avaient été jusque-là l'apanage des privilégiés, mais à créer des besoins nouveaux et des moyens nouveaux de les satisfaire, à créer ainsi des formes inédites du bonheur, de la beauté et de la vie même.

Non seulement, dès le départ, la critique du stalinisme portait en elle ces limites, mais la pesanteur des structures et de l'appareil forgés pendant un quart de siècle de centralisme bureaucratique érodèrent très vite le choix humain : la critique n'a pas été poussée jusqu'au point où elle eût permis une mutation radicale et un nouveau départ du socialisme qui, économiquement, techniquement et militairement affermi, pouvait, sur

cette base, réorganisés par les sciences et culturelles, en les élevant à un niveau correspondant à la fois à l'état nouveau des forces productives en Union soviétique et aux exigences de la nouvelle révolution scientifique et technique. En réalité, les actuels dirigeants soviétiques avaient hâte de tourner la page et, moins de dix ans après le XX^e Congrès, la critique du stalinisme était complètement enterrée. Ses dirigeants, qui constituent l'armature essentielle du Parti et de l'État, ont été formés par le stalinisme et mis en place au temps de Staline en fonction des critères de l'époque : acceptation des dogmes officiels, exécution sans discussion, à tous les niveaux, des directives venues d'en haut, fonctionnement centralisé, bureaucratique et autoritaire de toutes les institutions. En 1966, au moment où le Parti communiste de l'U. R. S. S. préparait son XXIII^e Congrès, l'on pouvait craindre que cet appareil, qui déjà pratiquait un néo-stalinisme, ne songe même à réhabiliter officiellement Staline, car de nombreux articles, écrits notamment par des militaires de haut grade et par des fonctionnaires importants, préparaient, sur le plan idéologique, cette restauration. C'est alors qu'une lettre de vingt-cinq personnalités scientifiques et artistiques fut adressée à Brejnev : elle portait les signatures de quelques-uns des plus grands physiciens de l'U. R. S. S. comme Igor Tamm, Kapitza, Sakharov, de cinéastes comme Romm, d'artistes comme Maïa Plissetzkaïa, d'un homme qui a joué un rôle de premier plan dans la diplomatie soviétique : Maïski. Ils montraient que tout retour à Staline « serait une grande catastrophe », à la fois en Union soviétique même et à l'extérieur, où toute tentative de restauration du stalinisme conduirait à des scissions entre le Parti soviétique et les partis communistes des pays capitalistes.

La réhabilitation n'eut pas lieu officiellement mais les actes inspirés par la tradition stalinienne la plus rigoureuse se sont multipliés. L'un des exemples les plus typiques est le décret de 1967 modifiant l'article 190 du Code pénal de la République socialiste fédérative de Russie, qui réprime la non-dénonciation de crimes. Après les procès de Siniavski et Daniel, puis de Guinzbourg, étendant, par « analogie », le champ d'application des mesures répressives, le Soviet suprême de la R. S. F. S. R. a fait tomber les « protestations littéraires » sous le coup de la loi, et toute personne ayant eu connaissance d'une protestation de ce genre est tenue de la dénoncer sous peine de sanctions pénales aussi sévères que celles qui répriment le crime en question. Cela permet de mesurer l'ampleur de la restauration néo-stalinienne¹.

1. La restauration du stalinisme en Tchécoslovaquie, un an après l'invasion, se manifesta de la même manière en érigant, par circulaires ministérielles, la délation en devoir national. (Circulaire du ministre de l'Éducation nationale tchécoslovaque du 16 septembre 1969.)

La mise en œuvre effective, sans freinage, d'une telle réforme et de ses incidences politiques impliquait une pleine liberté intellectuelle, c'est-à-dire trois possibilités essentielles : la liberté de recueillir et de transmettre

librement, sans crainte de sanctions autres que la critique des opinions que l'on avance ; la fin des contraintes imposées soit par le pouvoir de l'État, soit par les mythes inculqués par une propagande unilatérale et une « mise en condition » des masses.

Sans quoi, il n'y a ni méthode démocratique, ni méthode scientifique.

Le comportement des actuels dirigeants de l'Union soviétique est, à cet égard, significatif. Alors qu'après cinquante ans de socialisme de nouvelles générations d'intellectuels sont nées, recrutées dans la classe ouvrière, et qui ont pris conscience de leur solidarité profonde avec une classe ouvrière dont, pour la plupart, ils font partie intégrante, il est paradoxal d'entendre répéter que les intellectuels doivent se subordonner à une classe ouvrière dont, en U. R. S. S., ils font depuis longtemps partie. Ces déclamations tendent seulement à exiger la subordination des intellectuels (comme, d'ailleurs, de la classe ouvrière) à l'appareil central du Parti et à ses fonctionnaires qui se considèrent comme interprètes infailibles de la conscience d'une classe ouvrière théoriquement au pouvoir, mais qu'en vertu de cette « harmonie préétablie » l'on ne consulte jamais.

Cette conception bureaucratique, centralisée et autoritaire, demeure le principal obstacle à la réalisation de la réforme économique, à la démocratisation politique, à la libération de la culture.

Le remplacement des méthodes administratives de gestion par les méthodes économiques est, en soi, un progrès évident. Elle impliquait un changement dans les méthodes de planification de la production et de stimulation des travailleurs. Les réglementations imposées d'en haut devaient être réduites ; les échanges entre entreprises dans le cadre du marché pouvaient, sinon entièrement, du moins dans une large mesure, remplacer la direction d'État centralisée. En fait, le remplacement de l'approvisionnement centralisé en moyens de production par le commerce de gros ordinaire se fait beaucoup moins vite qu'il ne convient. Le système de stimulation, du fait de sa complexité bureaucratique, n'a réussi que très médiocrement.

La raison fondamentale de tout cela, c'est le décalage entre la réforme des entreprises et les méthodes des organismes d'État dirigeants, qui n'ont pas changé leur style de travail.

Le freinage est tel qu'au cours des dernières années l'élevage et la production agricole en général marquent un recul sur les années précédentes, le rythme de croissance industrielle baisse, en particulier dans les secteurs clés comme le ciment et la sidérurgie. La course à la Lune a été gagnée par les États-Unis alors que dix ans plus tôt, avec le premier vol cosmique de Gagarine, l'U. R. S. S. avait pris une avance considérable.

De plus en plus, il devient clair que le système centralisé et autoritaire, qui a été efficace à une étape première de la construction du socialisme, est aujourd'hui périmé et irrationnel à une étape nouvelle du développement des forces productives.

L'une des conséquences majeures de la nouvelle révolution scientifique et technique c'est d'exiger, à l'inverse de la période « industrielle », une démultiplication des centres de décision et un développement immense de l'initiative créatrice des travailleurs, une explosion de subjectivité.

Le socialisme seul peut réaliser ces conditions. Mais il doit, pour cela, veiller au réajustement constant de l'ensemble des rapports sociaux aux exigences des grandes mutations scientifiques et techniques.

Or les actuels dirigeants soviétiques font obstacle non seulement aux changements devenus nécessaires en Union soviétique, mais à toute tentative des partis communistes (surtout dans les pays socialistes) de rechercher des modèles de socialisme correspondant à leur structure sociale et à leur histoire nationale.

Les textes, comme au temps de Staline, sont à l'inverse de la politique réelle : on multiplie les déclarations selon lesquelles il n'y a pas de parti-guide, selon lesquelles chaque parti se détermine de manière autonome et choisit librement sa voie vers le socialisme, etc. Et, dans la pratique, c'est l'excommunication et le boycottage de la Yougoslavie en 1948, l'arrêt de toute aide à la Chine et la rupture des contrats en 1960, l'invasion de la Tchécoslovaquie en 1968.

Sur les raisons véritables de l'invasion, la presse soviétique est parfaitement explicite : incapable de donner la moindre preuve d'une activité « contre-révolutionnaire » assez forte pour mettre en danger le socialisme en Tchécoslovaquie, la *Pravda* laissa très vite voir que *ce n'étaient pas les contre-révolutionnaires que les tanks soviétiques allaient combattre à Prague. Ce sont les communistes tchèques qu'il fallait « mettre au pas »*. Il est significatif d'ailleurs que, dès l'entrée des troupes, ce sont des dirigeants du Parti qui furent arrêtés. La *Pravda* du 24 août 1968 révèle le fond du problème : « Les principes léninistes fondamentaux de l'organisation du Parti, c'est-à-dire les principes du centralisme démocratique, étaient pratiquement niés. » Selon les conceptions de Brejnev, c'était saper « le rôle dirigeant du Parti ».

Or les mesures « pratiques » effectivement prises par le Parti communiste tchécoslovaque, de janvier à août 1968, se ramènent à trois :

1° La suppression de la censure, pour établir la liberté d'opinion.

2° La création de « conseils de travailleurs » dans les entreprises, pour permettre à chacun, déjà au niveau économique, et sur le lieu même de son travail, de participer à la prise de décisions dont dépend son avenir, d'être, selon le projet fondamental de Marx, sujet de l'histoire et non objet.

3° Le changement des statuts du Parti pour mettre fin aux structures et aux pratiques héritées de Staline et de Novotny. Les nouveaux statuts avaient pour objectif essentiel de donner à chaque militant la possibilité réelle de participer à l'élaboration de la ligne du Parti. Condamnant la formation de « factions » qui détruisent l'unité et, par conséquent, l'efficacité d'un

parti communiste, ils prévoient une série de mesures destinées à empêcher le retour à la théorie et à la pratique stalinienne :

a) En finir avec la confusion du Parti et de l'État, en interdisant le cumul des fonctions dirigeantes dans le Parti et dans l'État ;

b) Reconnaître les droits de la minorité en ne la réduisant pas au silence, en lui permettant de s'exprimer dans la presse du Parti, afin de permettre une libre émulation dans les initiatives théoriques et politiques et de rendre ainsi possible une évolution du Parti autrement que par voie d'explosion ou de « révolution de palais » (comme, par exemple, l'éviction de Khrouchtchev) ;

c) Instituer le scrutin secret à tous les niveaux pour la désignation des dirigeants du Parti ;

d) Garantir le contrôle de l'activité du Parti et de ses organismes de direction par la publication des comptes rendus du Comité central et la suppression de la censure directe ou indirecte exercée par l'appareil dirigeant en place.

C'est ce retour aux principes de Lénine d'un centralisme démocratique où le centralisme n'élimine pas la démocratie — principes systématiquement violés par Staline et ses successeurs — que Brejnev et la *Pravda* appellent la négation du centralisme démocratique et l'abandon du rôle dirigeant du Parti. C'est pour empêcher la mise en cause de l'interprétation stalinienne, avec les risques de contagion que cette mise en cause comportait pour les autres pays du monde socialiste et avec les dangers qu'elle faisait courir aux appareils bureaucratiques, que les tanks soviétiques sont entrés à Prague. C'est pour cela aussi que s'exercent dans tous les partis, par des moyens divers selon les situations, la même pression soviétique.

C'est pourquoi il ne suffit pas de désapprouver la forme militaire de l'intervention, mais d'avoir clairement conscience des principes théoriques et politiques qui la sous-tendent, de les démasquer et de les combattre sans faiblesse. Il s'agit d'une lutte de principe, car le retour aux méthodes antérieures au XX^e Congrès du Parti communiste de l'U. R. S. S., la moindre concession à la politique de restalinisation conduiraient les partis communistes à la faillite. Le choix est clair aujourd'hui : ou bien une grande politique de masse, seule capable de rassembler toutes les forces qui veulent le socialisme pour l'instaurer dans notre pays, ou bien l'alignement sur les conceptions des actuels dirigeants soviétiques, qui tournent le dos aux exigences démocratiques fondamentales de la victoire et de la construction du socialisme dans les pays hautement développés. Les partis communistes qui s'engageraient dans cette voie risqueraient fort de devenir de petites sectes vouées à la propagande d'un modèle de socialisme considéré comme seul possible et qui ne correspondrait nullement aux besoins et aux aspirations des peuples.

Ce choix décisif constitue aujourd'hui le grand tournant du socialisme. L'avenir des partis communistes, dépend de leur aptitude à concevoir le centralisme démocratique et le rôle dirigeant du Parti dans l'esprit de Marx et de Lénine, et non de Staline et de Brejnev.

NEW YORK TIMES
14 January 1970

Soviet Favors U.S. Role In European Conference

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

CPYRGHT

MOSCOW, Jan. 13 — The Soviet Union has taken "a favorable attitude" toward United States participation in the proposed all-European security conference, a Soviet Government spokesman said today.

Leonid M. Zamyatin, head of the press department of the Foreign Ministry, said at a news conference that this view was conveyed to the United States Government in November by the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin.

But the United States and other countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were sharply criticized by Mr. Zamyatin for "seeking means to complicate in every way" the holding of the conference, which was first proposed by the Warsaw Pact countries last year and has been actively promoted by the Communist bloc since then.

Attitude Known to West

Western diplomats said that Mr. Zamyatin, in welcoming American participation in the conference — originally limited to European states only — was making public what already had been indicated in private to various Western officials in recent months.

Mr. Zamyatin, who is the closest approximation to an official Soviet Government spokesman, had called the news conference to discuss the all-European conference, but as has become the custom lately, he threw the conference open to questions on any subject.

Mr. Zamyatin also made the following statements:

¶ Talks with the Chinese have resumed in Peking.

¶ American statements on possible new weapons systems to counter a Soviet threat do not help talks to limit strategic arms, but the Soviet Union is confident that the next round of talks, to begin in Vienna in April, "will be in the same spirit that marked Helsinki."

¶ The Soviet Union has never agreed to the so-called Rhodes formula in the Middle East if that means direct negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis.

¶ The Soviet Union is studying the Western proposal for a Big Four conference on improving the situation in Berlin but is not yet ready to reply.

¶ Despite reports in the Western press, the Soviet Union has no plans for a currency reform.

Positive Interpretation Seen

According to Western diplomats, Mr. Zamyatin gave a more positive interpretation at his news conference of the Soviet position than had been expressed earlier regarding a United States role in the European conference. Previously, they said, Soviet diplomats had told Western officials that the Russians had "no objections" to American participation in the conference, whose general goal has been stated by Communist officials as seeking to bring about a détente in Europe.

Many Western countries had told the Soviet Union that they would be unwilling to take part in the conference if the United States was excluded. They argue that the presence of NATO's strongest partner was needed to counter that of the Soviet Union.

In his prepared statement on

the European security conference, Mr. Zamyatin said that "the time is ripe" for its convening, but in answer to questions he indicated that there had been some slippage in the original Warsaw Pact plan to hold the meeting in the first half of this year in Helsinki.

The Warsaw Pact proposal for a conference has been coolly received by most NATO countries on the ground that the projected agenda was too loose and seemed largely a propaganda exercise by the Communist countries.

The United States and Britain, in particular, have argued that the agenda for such a meeting should be carefully prepared and come to grips with "real" security questions such as mutual cutbacks in forces and the ending of the division of Europe.

Mr. Zamyatin said, in reply to these Western criticisms, that "in some quarters, an intention is apparent to block the détente, to delay the conference for an indefinite period, among other things by talking about the need for careful preparation, and, if convened, to encumber it with such questions as it would be unable to decide. In other words, in advance, to doom the conference to failure."

He said last month's NATO ministers' conference in Brussels issued a vague communiqué that "appears to be influenced by the policy of those NATO quarters, first of all non-European, which regard with fear the prospects for the relaxation of tensions in Europe and the development of European co-operation and which are, therefore, seeking means to complicate in every way the preparations for, and the holding of, the conference."

The Brussels communiqué left the impression, he said, that some nations would like

the meeting to be a negotiation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, but he said that all neutral states should be present also.

Asked about United States participation, he said: "The Soviet Government has informed the United States Government about its favorable attitude toward the participation of the United States in the all-European conference."

"As far as we know other socialist countries have also expressed the same attitude," he said. The Soviet view was made known "about two weeks before" the NATO conference, he said, by Mr. Dobrynin.

In answer to questions, the Soviet spokesman said that the conference should not discuss the Berlin problem, which is a Big Four responsibility. He said the Soviet Union was studying a Western proposal on convening a Big Four meeting to talk about Berlin.

On West Germany, Mr. Zamyatin was less harsh in his comment that some recent articles in the Soviet press. However, he voiced full support for an East German proposal that diplomatic relations be established between West Germany and East Germany.

Mr. Zamyatin said that success in the current talks with Bonn to abandon the use of force should not be conditional for the convening of the all-European conference. Many Western diplomats have said that a breakdown in the Bonn-Moscow talks would probably cause West Germany not to attend a European conference.

Mr. Zamyatin repeated Soviet press criticism of recent statements by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the need to deploy additional offensive and defensive weapons to counter an accelerated Soviet deployment of offensive missiles.

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WASHINGTON POST
24 January 1970

Six Red Parties Reported In Clash With Soviets

By Anthony Astrachan

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Jan. 23—At least six Communist parties quarrelled with the Soviet Union at a meeting here last week, according to informed Communist sources.

Delegates of 28 European Communist parties met Jan. 14 and 15 to discuss the European security conference proposed by the Warsaw Pact nations and related topics.

The sources did not reveal the substance of the quarrel. Analysts used the reported facts, combined with information released in Yugoslavia last weekend, as the basis for speculation that several parties expressed resentment over Kremlin attempts to manipulate the idea of a security conference and a related European "peoples' congress" for Soviet purposes.

The sources did say that one delegate challenged a summing up by Boris Ponomarev, the senior secretary of the Soviet party and the man in charge of relations with Communist parties that are not in power.

"Comrade Ponomarev, are those your conclusions or are they meant to be the conclu-

sions of the conference?" he reportedly asked. Ponomarev was forced to let his remarks

stand as the Soviet view rather than as an agreed summation of the meeting that would have suited Soviet purposes.

The British, Italian, Spanish, Swedish and Yugoslav parties reportedly opposed the Soviet views and the French expressed reservations.

The sources also said that the Soviets wanted to keep the meeting secret but that several parties threatened to publish their own statements if no communique were issued.

In Belgrade last weekend, Dince Belovski, a member of the Yugoslav Presidium and a delegate to the meeting, hinted disapproval of the "closed" nature of the meeting and the fact that it was called suddenly. It was the first time since 1957 that the Yugoslavs had participated in such a meeting.

The official communique Jan. 15 said representatives of the 28 parties met and discussed "problems of collective security" and plans for the centenary of Lenin's birth "in a spirit of comradely cooperation."

In other words, it said nothing except that the meeting took place. The parties pro-

sumably could agree on no other form of words.

Belovski said the Yugoslavs supported the idea of a European people's congress of Communist, Socialist and "bourgeois, democratic and Christian" progressive groups.

Observers felt this could either help pressure reluctant

Western governments to participate in a European security conference, or act as a substitute for such a conference if the reluctance proved impossible to overcome.

Belovski said such a congress should allow free expression of divergent proposals, and should be based on a carefully prepared program that could win wide agreement rather than on a document "expressing the narrow interests of a group of countries or parties."

He also indicated a Yugoslav hope of negating the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty for Socialist countries, which was devised to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

To analysts here, such statements sound like a refusal to allow Soviet dictation to a

people's congress or a security conference. Neutral nations and Western Communist parties that are thinking this way might give Western governments a reason to show more interest in a security conference than they have found so far, some observers said.

The real intentions of the Soviet Union toward either a security conference or a people's congress are nearly impossible to assess.

They have said nothing publicly about a people's congress, which would certainly postpone a governmental security conference to 1971 or later. The Warsaw Pact countries called last year for a conference in the first half of 1970. The Soviet press has continued to plug hard at the need for an early conference, although officials here have recognized the possibility of delay.

A people's congress might also show how the East Europeans could use an all-European meeting to slip out from under Moscow's thumb a little. Western advocates of a security conference have urged this point, which Moscow and Washington both tend to ignore in public debate.

TASS, Moscow

13 January 1970

CPYRGHT

U.S. Participation in Conference Welcomed

--The Soviet Government has informed the Government of the United States of its favourable attitude to the participation of the United States in an all-European conference, said Leonid Zamyatin, head of the press department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He added that other socialist countries were displaying a similar attitude to the participation of the United States in that conference.

The press conference at the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was devoted to questions of preparing and convening a conference on problems of European security.

The GDR's proposal to conclude a treaty with the FRG was described by Leonid Zamyatin as a "useful and important initiative directed at easing tensions in the centre of Europe." In the present conditions when there exist two German states enjoying all sovereign rights, when they have different social systems, their relations can be based only on generally recognized norms of international law, Zamyatin said.

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Speaking of the meetings of factions and committees of the West German Bundestag planned in West Berlin, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman characterized them as "a result of the old policy pursued by the CDU-CSU party, which is insistently pushing the new West German Government to promote it." Such activities, Zamyatin said, have nothing to do with the task of ensuring tranquillity in the centre of Europe. The FRG has no rights to West Berlin.

Leonid Zamyatin said it was not expedient to link bilateral talks on the renunciation of force with the convocation of the all-European conference. The interests of the cause indicate against any whatsoever preliminary conditions for convening the conference.

The Soviet Government believes that the all-European conference can be held in the first half of this year, given that all states work in that direction. The Soviet Government is ready for a further exchange of views in the plane of practical preparations for the conference, Zamyatin said.

The results of the preliminary Soviet-American talks in Helsinki on the limitation of the strategic arms race are positively assessed in the Soviet Union. In this connection Zamyatin noted that Laird's statement on expanding the construction of the Safeguard system only confirms the existence in the United States of forces actively resisting a limitation of the strategic arms race and trying to create obstacles for talks on that matter. "Laird frightens Americans by a Soviet menace he has himself invented," Zamyatin said.

Leonid Zamyatin answered an unusual, as he put it, question in connection with a report by a Western agency about an alleged monetary reform in the Soviet Union. "Such reports are not true," Zamyatin said, expressing surprise that the "esteemed agency could circulate such inventions."

TANYUG, Belgrade
17 January 1970

European Congress Proposed at Moscow CP Parley

CPYRGHT

—At the meeting of representatives of communist and workers parties of European countries held in Moscow on January 14 and 15 Dimce Belovski, a member of the Presidential Council of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, delivered an address in which he said about the participation in this gathering that it ensued from the fact that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav Government, have had broad contacts and exchanges of views in order to seek the best possible ways to contribute to the promotion of relations and the development of cooperation of the European area. "The League of Communists of Yugoslavia devotes every attention to every idea and initiative aimed at contributing to the development of cooperation and development of peace and security in Europe."

Having supported the idea of a congress of European peoples, and said that the meeting in which he was taking part was an exchange of views in connection with this idea, Belovski added that the Yugoslav communists were prepared constructively and openly to seek the best possible ways and forms for the success of this initiative.

"I must further say that I have some observations of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia to state concerning the closed nature of this meeting and its surprise convocation. It is not only a question of short time, but of the fact that it was not preceded by bilateral consultations, at least as far as the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is concerned," said Belovski.

Having expressed the conviction that the development of peace and security in Europe is a delicate and difficult task and that there are numerous difficulties to overcome which stand or may stand in the way and added that what was encouraging was the realization of the European peoples that the further development of cooperation was the only alternative to a return to the cold war period, Belovski mentioned several elements in the Yugoslav views on the development of relations in Europe.

He stated that Europe is in a process of emancipation, as an expression of general strivings in present-day international relations, and that the working man and peoples seek much wider space for an active role in social and international relations than the existing structures allow. "We imagine the future of Europe as a community of independent and equal states. The future of Europe is not in division but in the development of common interests as the foundation for peace and security for all peoples and states on the continent. The security of Europe, therefore, does not lie in preserving the bloc division in their coexistence or in possible pacting between existing blocs," said Belovski, and added that logic and experience reveal that there can be no genuine relaxation and lasting rapprochement between peoples so long as Europe is divided.

The representative of Yugoslav communists stated that genuine security for European states and peoples should be sought in such a positive development of relations in Europe, as would ensure the necessary conditions for the strict observance of the United Nations Charter and application of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

This certainly implies coexistence and cooperation among not only states with different social systems, but all European states, upon the foundations of sovereignty, independence, equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of others for whatever reasons-- economic, political, military, ideologic etc.

The present European situation gives no reason for idealization or illusions. The bloc division of Europe will hardly be surmounted overnight, said Belovski. He expressed the view that what was forthcoming was probably a longer period of intensive contacts among European states and peoples, and very serious efforts for the development of cooperation in the economic, scientific-technological, cultural and political levels, so as to promote mutual understanding, develop confidence and create the material foundation upon which solutions could be sought for general European questions, such as security and other.

"By her independent and non-aligned policy, Yugoslavia is [words indistinct] striving to give her contribution towards all endeavors and initiatives aimed at a better, calmer and more secure Europe," stated Belovski. He said the League of Communists of Yugoslavia considers that both the conditions and need exist for the communist parties, workers' movements and all progressive forces in Europe to be active so that the development of European cooperation and building up of peace and security could be contributed to. It is within this context that we wish to visualize also the possibilities offered by the idea of a congress of European peoples.

"We agree with the views already expressed in this debate that the gathering we talk of should be new, substantially and qualitatively, and different from the earlier, largely manifestational gatherings of ideological fellow-minds, such as those in Berlin and Vienna," Belovski said. He noted that the number of persons to attend the congress was not of primary importance. What is important is that it is attended by well-qualified representatives of the largest possible number of those progressive and democratic parties, movements and forces in European countries, which unite an (enormous) cooperation of all countries and peoples.

Accordingly, the proposed congress of European peoples should be maximally broad by both its participants, and the ideas, proposals and initiatives which will flash across its platform.

The Yugoslav Communists consider that such a congress should bring together the responsible representatives of communist and workers' parties, social-democratic, socialist, various influential bourgeois, democratic and Christian parties, movements and groupings.

Belovski noted with satisfaction that the interest of a large number of parties, workers' movements and organizations, irrespective of ideological differences, and their readiness for contributing towards the development of cooperation, peace and security in Europe, have grown very high. "Nothing should be allowed to harm this general interest in and readiness for making a contribution, or to hamper or prevent an equitable participation of all European forces aiming at the development of cooperation among the peoples of this continent," he said.

According to the Yugoslav representative, the proposed congress of European peoples ought not to be only a political manifestation. It ought to be a working meeting, resulting from an intensive political activity in which the broadest European, political and social forces participate on an equal footing.

The initiative for convening a congress of European peoples must be imbued with the spirit of frankness and desire for bringing about a genuinely common effort of the largest possible number of progressive and democratic social-political forces. This, says Belovski, presupposes an equitable participation and partnership of all forces concerned not only at the congress, but also in all phases of the preparation for it and development of its concept and platform.

"The workers' movement, people's and all progressive forces of Europe can be fully mobilized on the basis of a platform and a vision which opens up the prospects of bringing about the national interests, tends to surmounting the division of Europe and helps the strivings for emancipation," Belovski said.

In this view, the proposed congress of European peoples, achieving the broadness of approach and concept and proving able to reflect the real interests of European peoples, would give a significant contribution to the current efforts for holding a conference on European cooperation and security. However, he added, the congress is a "very deep and wide undertaking, and ought not to be reduced to an instrument, or an auxiliary of the conference of European states, which we, like the others, otherwise support."

Belovski supported the suggestion put forth during the debate for the need for a previous, largest possible dialogue, which should explore and determine the possibilities and feeling of all forces interested in holding a European congress. It is only as a result of such consultations that a preparatory committee could ensue of such a broad composition as to reflect just this qualitatively new approach to the preparations for the congress. Consequently, he said, this exchange of opinions cannot, and ought not to adopt conclusions, platforms, etc.

"The ideas I set forth reflect the desire of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia for working out, in regard to the initiative for holding a congress of European peoples, the approach is marked with frankness, [words indistinct] of participation in all phases of preparations, equality and partnership of all forces concerned, so that a unity of effort could be ensured that would give a genuinely significant contribution to cooperation and peace in Europe," concluded the member of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Dimce Belovski.

[Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian at 1830 GMT on 17 January reports that LCY Presidium Member Dimce Belovski and Drago Kunc, head of the LCY Department for International Relations and Contacts, arrived in Belgrade from Moscow on 17 January after attending the Moscow meeting of European communist parties.]

TASS, Moscow
15 January 1970

CPYRGHT

Communique of European CP Meeting

--Representatives of 28 communist and workers parties of European countries met here on January 14 and 15.

"The participants in the meeting exchanged views on problems of collective security and peace on the European continent. They informed one another about the undertakings carried out by them in connection with the centenary of V. I. Lenin's birth. The meeting passed in a spirit of comradely cooperation," says a communique on the meeting.

Taking part in the meeting were representatives of the Central Committees of the Communist Party of Belgium, the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Communist Party of Great Britain, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the German Communist Party, the Communist Party of Germany, the Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin, the Communist Party of Greece, the Communist Party of Denmark, the Irish Workers Party, the Communist Party of Northern Ireland, the Communist Party of Spain, the Italian Communist Party, the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus, the Communist Party of Norway, the Polish United Workers Party, the Portuguese Communist Party, the Romanian Communist Party, the Communist Party of San Marino, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of Turkey, the Communist Party of Finland, the French Communist Party, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Swiss Party of Labour, the Left Party-Communist of Sweden, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London

31 January 1970

CPYRGHT

DARKNESS OVER PRAGUE

CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL scene in Czechoslovakia accompanying the three-day meeting of the party central committee which ended yesterday move that country another, possibly final, stage towards the elimination of all those associated, however remotely, with the reformist movement. The main Russian object, to prevent the break-up of Eastern Europe, was achieved when her forces marched in 17 months ago. That done, the rest could follow at leisure.

Dr HUSAK, the party leader, has been rather isolated by the changes. It is a measure of the distance Czechoslovakia has travelled towards her new dark age that he should now appear as the "liberal" by comparison with

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such sinister characters as INDRA and BILAK. These two, who were ready to collaborate with the Russians in 1968, now hover increasingly to the fore, though still without prominent office. Mr CERNIK, the Vicar-of-Bray-like figure who was at one time a supporter of Mr DUBCEK but changed sides last year, has been replaced as Prime Minister by the hard-liner LUBOMIR STROUGAL. Mr STROUGAL was Minister of the Interior under NOVOTNY and as such responsible for the imprisonment at that time of Dr HUSAK. "Think nothing of it" is now presumably their mutual attitude.

So the mill-wheels grind on in Czechoslovakia and the economy stagnates. Russia has a carrot for good behaviour to hold out there: the possibility of a big loan. Mr DUBCEK, in Ankara, must think himself well out of it all.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER

30 January 1970

CPYRGHT

The shadows around Husak

How one judges the latest turns in the seemingly endless round of changes in the state and party leadership in Czechoslovakia depends largely on one's estimate of the character, motives, and will of the man who replaced Mr DUBCEK at the top last April. Comparing his speeches with the empty dogmatism or dangerous rhetoric that comes from the lips of many of his present colleagues, Dr Husak's voice still sounds at any rate like the voice of a man speaking to his compatriots and making what sense he can in a desperate situation. Earlier this month, for example, while other voices were saying that "the term 'the fifties' is . . . an anti-socialist political concept" intended "to tie the hands of State and Party against the class enemy," Dr Husak was reminding Czechoslovakia of his imprisonment and, later, his refusal to serve under Novotny. More than that, he declared unambiguously that what had happened in January, 1968, at the beginning of Czechoslovakia's frustrated year of reform, was "no putsch," and that people who said it was a putsch "may be defending their personal positions which they held before January."

Listening to these voices, it seems likely that many Czechs and Slovaks are still disposed to believe that this ambitious, intelligent and rather old-fashioned Communist is at least the best First Secretary they have, and in the present climate in Eastern Europe more likely than any other to lead them to a more tolerable life than the one they have been living in recent months. If few of them any longer hope that Czechoslovakia might become another Yugoslavia, with Husak they might at least aspire to the condition of Kadar's Hungary.

It is this sort of modest hope that at first sight seems threatened by the latest reshuffle of forces around Dr Husak. The promotion of Mr Strougal to the premiership and of men like Antonin Kapek and Alois Indra in the party hierarchy clearly strengthens the most reactionary and conservative forces in Czechoslovakia. Strougal was Novotny's Minister of the Interior for many years, and since the invasion his has been one of the most bleak and repressive voices in the leadership. Kapek was an organiser of what has been called "the Liben faction," the first substantial grouping to welcome the invaders openly in the autumn of 1968, and to call loudly for the departure of Mr DUBCEK and the reversal of the course that had been set in January. Indra is known as one of the closest collaborators with Moscow. His appointment to the commission to supervise the most far-reaching phase of the party purge through the exchange of party cards, seen in the light of his remarks the other day about "the incommensurate mass character" of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, suggests all too clearly how drastic that purge is likely to be.

If it is realistic to see Dr Husak's continued control of the direction of affairs as Czechoslovakia's last hope of a tolerable life in the not too long run, everything would seem to depend now on whether Moscow realises that none of these deeply discredited men has a chance of getting the country back to work again. But one does not have to be a born pessimist to feel that the desperate preoccupations of Mr Brezhnev and his colleagues on so many other fronts may leave them little time for such sensitive judgments.

THE ECONOMIST
31 January 1970

When Husak Looks Liberal

CPYRGHT

It's what it reveals about the power of the ultras that makes the new clean-out in Czechoslovakia so ominous

By giving his consent to the decisions taken in Prague on Wednesday Mr Husak has been forced to give ground alarmingly to the ultra-conservatives of the Czechoslovak communist party. He is now an increasingly isolated figure: a conservative made to look liberal only by contrast with the men around him. He is going to find it hard not to give way to the demands of the hardliners for a complete return to the Novotny system, show trials and all. His one modest success this week is that Mr Dubcek has been got safely off to Ankara without first having to make a humiliating self-criticism at this week's meeting of the central committee.

Few tears will be shed in Czechoslovakia over the fall of the federal prime minister, Mr Oldrich Cernik. It is true that during the short-lived days of reform in the first half of 1968 he shared the leadership with Mr Dubcek, Mr Smrkovsky and President Svoboda. But since the invasion he has showed that he preferred power (or the appearance of it) to principle, and most Czechs probably remember him today as the man who signed the treaty which legalised the Soviet military occupation of their country. Rather surprisingly, although Mr Cernik has also lost his seat on the party presidium, he has been given a seat in the federal cabinet as minister in charge of the committee which supervises investment policy. This seems to remove the one even remotely plausible reason for sacking him; if he still holds an important economic post he can hardly be made the scapegoat for the economic mess Czechoslovakia is in now.

Mr Cernik's successor as federal prime minister, Mr Lubomir Strougal, is not the sort of man who is likely to get people back to work. He has the unenviable distinction of having been minister of the interior for nearly four years under Mr Novotny. He was not suspected of collaborating with the Russians at the time of the invasion. But ever since he was put in charge of the Czech party late in 1968 he has given the impression of a man determined to fight his way to the

top with the help of a secure power base in Bohemia and with a wholehearted endorsement of conservative policies. In recent months he has not seemed to be doing quite so well, and it may be doubted whether he really welcomes having to surrender his key post as head of the Czech party bureau in order to take over the thankless and vulnerable prime ministership.

For what matters in Prague today is not so much the government changes—seven other cabinet ministers, including the not-so-bad minister of the interior, Mr Jan Pelnar, resigned with Mr Cernik—but the effect of changes in the party hierarchy on the power struggle between the ultra-conservatives, like Alois Indra, and the relatively moderate men represented by Mr Husak. Two hardliners, including the doctrinaire editor of *Rude Pravo*, have been elected to the party secretariat. And the effect of the changes in the all-important 11-member party presidium is to leave Mr Husak with only two firm supporters—President Svoboda and the Slovak premier, Mr Colotka. The new Slovak party leader, Mr Lenart (who also joins the presidium), was prime minister under Novotny and his past record suggests that he will not stand up to pressure from the extremists. The Czech party leader, Mr Josef Kempny, was virtually unknown until he joined the party secretariat in November, 1968; he would not have got so far so fast if he had tried to withstand the prevailing trends.

Mr Husak's position could still be worse. He is still able to hold back to some extent the men like Alois Indra and Vasil Bilak, who are irretrievably discredited by their collaboration with the Russians in 1968; Indra has still achieved only alternate membership of the presidium. But Mr Husak's position has been seriously eroded this week; and it is not likely to be strengthened by the purge of the party that the forthcoming renewal of membership cards will make possible. Before long the Czechs may be reduced to regretting the days when Mr Husak was their party boss.

LE MONDE, PARIS
weekly English edition
February 1970

CPYRGHT

TWO-WAY TEST IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A stagnant economy for Strougal and orthodox guidance for Husak

Prague newspapers had announced that last week's session of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party would be devoted first to economic questions and then to party problems. But the Central Committee itself reversed this order, and ratified a number of political decisions before going on

to discuss the government's new economic policy, presented on January 28 by Václav Hula, Minister responsible for the Plan. The Central Committee thus appointed a team of new leaders before adopting the programme they will be responsible for implementing. The "normalization" period is over, and Czechoslovakia is now moving into the next phase: consolidation.

In less than a year the conservative elements in the party, rigidly orthodox Communists, seem to have recovered their importance and their influence. After First Secretary Alexander Dubcek's resignation in April

1969, they shared power for a time with former liberals who "realistically" backed the normalization programme prescribed by the Soviet Union. Last September they edged out the principal advocates of liberalization, or at least those who refused to recant, but they did not succeed in carrying out the wholesale purge they would have preferred. And now they are on top. Those appointed to key party and government posts last week were hard-line conservatives, down to the last man.

According to news agency reports early this week, the party was carrying on an extensive in-

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investigation of Mr. Dubcek's activities during the periods before and after his election as First Secretary.

Party Leader Gustav Husak will find himself more isolated than ever. Until last week he could count on a group of "realists" to counterbalance the growing influence of his rivals. Since coming to power he has lost the support of the liberals, who had suspended judgment until they saw him in action. He had promised a regime without excesses, though based on the model made in Moscow. But the liberals he had to deal with were men who had seen the human face of socialism, and neither could nor would forget it.

There still remained a number of men who surfaced during

Czechoslovakia's brief period of freedom, but were ready for any compromise to save their skins. But their position was uncertain, and their influence feeble beside that of the out-and-out conservatives. Now they have been swept aside. Mr. Husak has even had to accept the dismissal of one of his closest friends, Stefan Sadovsky, First Secretary of the Communist Party in Slovakia. The region is Mr. Husak's traditional fief; Mr. Sadovsky's place there has been taken by Josef Lenart, a faithful supporter of ex-President Antonin Novotny until January 1968.

It is true that Mr. Husak has taken advantage of the reshuffle to remove Lubomir Strougal from the country's real centre of power. Reputed to be the First

Secretary's most dangerous rival, Mr. Strougal was party leader in Bohemia-Moravia, and occupied the post of Second Secretary in the Central Committee. Having replaced Oldrich Cernik as head of the federal government, he will be weighed down with administrative tasks and he may well be held accountable if the government fails to reactivate the Czech economy.

Nevertheless, it is hard to avoid the impression that Mr. Husak is inevitably going to come up against increasing difficulties. He wanted to avoid wholesale purges and he is surrounded by men eager to hit back at the "counterrevolutionaries." He undertook, after acting the tough party boss for a while, to win the confidence of his countrymen.


His new colleagues are pressing for a return to authoritarian rule. He prided himself on the success of the new federal system, but now the advocates of centralization are back in force.

On one point, however, Mr. Husak has kept his promises: as early as last April he made it known that he would make no concession to public opinion. It is true that people have become so hopelessly disillusioned that they have lost interest in party intrigues. But it remains to be seen whether, without popular support, Mr. Husak will be able to control a party stiffened by many leaders who are far from friendly to him, and succeed in getting things moving again in Czechoslovakia.

CPYRGHT

EL NACIONAL, Caracas

30 January 1970



Checoslovaquia,

CPYRGHT

Punto final

Vuelve a plantearse en forma angustiosa ante la opinión pública progresista el problema de Checoslovaquia. Con la salida de la jefatura de gobierno de Oldrich Cernik y su sustitución por el neostalinista Lubomir Strougal, se acaba el último raso de democracia socialista en Checoslovaquia. La contrarrevolución burocrática es completa. Ha vuelto la oscuridad. La renuncia (o destitución), simultáneamente con la designación del nuevo jefe de gobierno, de los últimos progresistas miembros del Comité Central—entre ellos Alexander Dubcek— completa el cuadro de la represión total.

Lubomir Strougal pertenece, junto con hombres como Indra y Bilak, al círculo de los más funestos reaccionarios dentro del Partido Comunista Checoslovaco. Burocrata frío y duro, identifica al "socialismo" con la dictadura absoluta y vertical de una capa burocrática

de tipo soviético y staliniano. Forma parte del grupo —calificado de traidor por el Partido Comunista Checoslovaco en sus últimas manifestaciones libres y democráticas— que saludó con júbilo la invasión soviética de agosto de 1968, y que posteriormente propició una represión sangrienta. No satisfechos con la destitución de los comunistas democráticos, Strougal, Indra, Smrkovsky, Goldstücker y quizás del propio Cernik, y sólo la vehemente y dramática intercesión del viejo Svoboda ante los soviéticos pudo salvar la vida de esos patriotas en los primeros días de la intervención armada.

La reimposición del stalinismo a la nación checoslovaca significa la liquidación del socialismo en ese país. Al desaparecer las últimas esperanzas de un renacimiento de la democracia socialista —que en 1968 recogió el apoyo entusiasta y unánime de todo el pueblo—, los checoslovacos se ven acorralados. Ya muchos no verán otra alternativa que la de rechazar al socialismo en su conjunto, porque la única especie de "socialismo" que se les presenta es la más deformada y repugnante. Sólo los más inteligentes y sofisticados serán capaces de sobreponerse al horror actual y de ver que, pese a todo, el socialismo es algo más que su caricatura stalinista o burocrática. De tener fe en que algún día el socialismo renacerá, en la única forma que los pueblos contemporáneos pueden realmente aceptar y tolerar; es decir, la democrática. En ese sentido, el ascenso de Strougal y todo el proceso de represión en Checoslovaquia constituye un golpe al socialismo y un magnífico servicio rendido a la contrarrevolución. De ahora en adelante, muchos checoslovacos realmente mirarán hacia el Occidente y comenzarán a pensar que acaso el capitalismo podría ser preferible.

Los elementos más derechistas del Occidente lo saben y los últimos acontecimientos checoslovacos los llenan de profunda satisfacción. Ante la aparente prueba de que el comunismo no puede humanizarse, se sienten alborozados los partidarios del macartismo y de la "línea dura" en general. El 28 de enero de 1970 es un día de júbilo para los reaccionarios del Este como para los del Oeste.

NEW YORK TIMES
29 January 1970

Prague Dismisses Cernik, A Leader of '68 Reforms

By ALVIN SHUSTER
Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, Jan. 28—Oldrich Cernik, one of the leaders

of the 1968 liberal reform movement in Czechoslovakia, was ousted as Premier today and replaced by Lubomir Strougal, a conservative. Dr. Strougal, a 45-year-old party official with a reputation for orthodoxy, has been a driving force in the purge of liberals from regional and party organizations. He is also regarded as a rival to Dr. Gustav Husak, the party leader.

In a shuffle of party and Government posts, the Communist party's Central Committee also ousted Mr. Cernik from its ruling Presidium. He remains a member of the Central Committee and becomes Minister for Investment Development in the Cabinet, succeeding Miroslav Hruskovic.

Became a 'Realist'

Though once considered a hero of the reform movement and arrested by the Russians at the time of the Soviet-led invasion in August, 1968, Mr. Cernik has sought to survive by becoming a "realist" and urging accommodation with Moscow.

Many observers believe that Mr. Cernik's ouster resulted not only from his association with the drive for more democracy but also from the desire of the present leadership to place blame for Czechoslovakia's sagging economy.

The Central Committee, in the firm control of conservatives of various shades, also accepted the resignation today of Alexander Dubcek, the champion of the liberalization effort cut short by the invasion. He was replaced by Dr. Husak as party chief last April and was later removed from the Presidium and his state post as chairman of the Federal Assembly.

Dr. Dubcek's resignation from the committee was generally regarded as the price demanded by ultraconservatives for allowing him to take up his post this week as ambassador to Turkey.

The downfall of Mr. Dubcek, Josef Smrkovsky, once his principal associate, and now

Mr. Cernik, leaves in a position of responsibility only one of the "big four" of the liberal movement: 74-year-old President Ludvik Svoboda.

The Central Committee meeting, which opened today, is being watched as a test between Dr. Husak and ultra-conservative extremists. Dr. Husak, a 56-year-old Slovak, has tried to project the image of a centrist holding off the extremists of both sides.

The shuffles today provided no clear answer to whether Dr. Husak had gained or lost ground.

The elevation of Mr. Strougal removes him from an important power base within the party. He remains a Presidium member, but he gives up his job as the party chief in the Czech regions of Moravia and Bohemia and as a secretary of the Central Committee.

He is assuming the Premiership at a time when the country is struggling to solve problems of inflation and supply difficulties. The feeling is that his future now depends on his success in handling the murky economic situation.

Mr. Strougal, a former Minister of the Interior under the Stalinist party leadership of Antonin Novotny, served as a Deputy Premier under Mr. Dubcek. But he kept his distance from the reforms and reportedly warned against the weakening of party authority.

Besides Mr. Cernik, the committee approved the removal from its 11-man presidium of Karel Polacek, the labor leader, and Stefan Sadvovsky, the Slovak party chief. Mr. Polacek, who was also removed as head of the trade unions, once supported liberal programs but has lately professed adherence to party orthodoxy.

Some believe that Dr. Husak's hand may have been weakened in the reported struggle against the extremists on the ground that all three men removed from the Presidium had been among his strongest supporters.

Other sources report, however, that Dr. Husak succeeded in heading off the elevation to the Presidium of Alois Indra, an ultraconservative, who had been mentioned as a candidate to succeed Mr. Cernik. Mr. Indra, a secretary of the Central Committee in charge of party control of the Government, was named an alternate member of the Presidium.

The three new members of the Presidium are Antonin Kappek, an archconservative and head of the Prague municipal party committee; Josef Korcak, chairman of the National Front of the Czech lands; and Jozef Lenart, a former Premier who was replaced in April, 1968, by Mr. Cernik.

Mr. Lenart, who was a national party secretary, will become the new party chief in Slovakia. To succeed Mr. Polacek as trade union leader, the committee named Jan Piller, a Presidium member and an arch-conservative. As successor to Mr. Strougal as party chief in the Czech regions, it chose Josef Kempny, who has served as Deputy Premier and head of the Central Committee's Ideological Commission.

Among those removed from their state posts was Jan Pelnar, who was named Minister of the Interior after the invasion. He is succeeded by Radko Kaska, an unknown figure. Frantisek Hamos, Minister of Foreign Trade, will be replaced by Andrej Barcak, but will remain a Deputy Premier.

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WASHINGTON POST
30 January 1970

Behind the Veil in Prague

The resignation of Premier Cernik, once a hero of Prague's liberal "spring" and later—after the Soviet occupation—a reluctant adjuster to its fall, moves Czechoslovakia yet closer to the condition of "normalization" that is the Soviet goal. His replacement, Mr. Strougal, was Interior Minister (head cop) in the discredited Novotny regime and has devoted himself more recently to attacking Dubcek liberals. Yet the change has its subtleties. Behind a veil, Communist Party chief Husak continues his tough, deft effort to thread the line between popular desires and pressures. Even as Strougal moved "up" to the premiership, for instance, Husak maneuvered him out of his most powerful party positions. As premier, moreover, he has the thankless responsibility for running the economy. Cernik's failure at the task gave his foes their opening to do him in.

In the single area of Czechoslovak public life which permits of some relief, former party leader

Alexander Dubcek has cleared the hurdle of conservative opposition and made it safely to Turkey as his country's ambassador. Mr. Husak managed this move courageously. Its significance is that Dubcek and other liberals, while they have lost power and position, are not to be treated as criminals, as the losers in so many other Communist power struggles have been treated.

Otherwise, Prague is grim. The common attitude of "why work for the Russians?" has made productivity plummet. Radio Prague declares absenteeism is the "invisible enemy"; Cernik has caused the nation of "working in effect a 3 1/2-day week." The government lacks the means to provide incentives and the will to tighten up discipline. In the life of the mind, where the Dubcek period glimmed, "suitable conditions for calm creative work" have been officially reserved to those who "conform with the requirements of normalization." In other words: get in line.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
4 February 1970

Husak faces task

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**Czech regime out to crush Dubcek influence
while hard liners seek free rein**

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By Eric Bourne

Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

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Vienna

The Czechoslovak reform movement has been demolished as a present political force. But the Husak regime admits its influence lingers.

The purge broom has swept deep and fine though it is not yet finished and "consolidation" manifestly not yet complete. The absent Alexander Dubcek still is not forgotten.

In nine months since the "realist" Dr. Gustav Husak won control more than a third of the party committee has been eliminated, either by dismissal or forced resignation.

At its peak, the committee—enlarged by deliberate co-optation of reformers to stiffen resistance in the invasion period—counted 195. It now stands at 148, after the purge of about 70 progressives.

'Hope and optimism' voiced

So far as the committee itself is concerned, the long-deferred party congress might safely be held next week. It is the situation lower down, in the lesser, local organizations and in the labor unions—as Dr. Husak admitted—which continues to make that impossible.

The best he could tell last week's session was that he entered 1970 with "hope and optimism." This year, he said, "We shall complete the process of consolidation which will lead us from our abnormal situation."

Between now and then, he conceded, there was a hard haul ahead to overcome the disaffection and the apathy of the party rank and file and of the workers and the general population at large.

Since his accession, the "rebellious right

wing" had been defeated politically. But many people were still under the influence of the "false and fraudulent propaganda" of the reform period.

A party congress is tentatively set for next year. But before it is seriously contemplated, every party member from Mr. Dubcek down to the humblest cardholder is to be screened, above all on attitudes to the reform movement. It will be the most thorough sifting of a party in the postwar Communist period. Not a single member is to escape scrutiny under the inquiry into the events of January, '68.

Despite Dr. Husak's insistence that nothing savoring of a return to the malpractices of the '50's will be tolerated, it is clear that the "ultras" are still pursuing the vendetta against his predecessor Mr. Dubcek.

Sabotage try failed

The further last-minute effort to force a recantation from Mr. Dubcek and to sabotage his diplomatic appointment failed. But, with his whole party record before and after the invasion to be "assessed," some new downgrading may lie in store.

Since Mr. Dubcek's dismissal last year denigration of his leadership by the extreme "conservative" has been commonplace. It seems now, however, that though Dr. Husak has ruled out revenge seeking, he has been compelled to take some heed of the clamor for a scapegoat.

Briefing the foreign press on last week's events, which included Mr. Dubcek's "resignation" from the central committee, an official spokesman said Mr. Dubcek had not only "lost the confidence of the party and failed," he had also "brought the party into bankruptcy."

Somewhat more ominously, the spokesman said the party would have also to take into account "the big influence which Mr.

Dubcek's leadership had on the international Communist movement."

Party impact immense

From the Soviet leaders' point of view, his cardinal offense was the immense impact he had on other Communist parties, disturbing even some leaders and many of the Communist rank and file in Eastern Europe and winning open acclaim from the heretic Yugoslavs and from the West Europeans.

"Dubcekism" almost wrecked the Russians' world conference and, when it was finally held, put Czechoslovakia on its agenda despite their own and the new Prague leaders' opposition.

Some of these parties—including the Italian, the biggest in the West—still have not withdrawn their condemnation of Russia's invasion.

For the same reasons which prompted their support at the start, further severe sanctions against Mr. Dubcek would at once rekindle sympathy for him and opposition to the Soviet claim to behave as it pleases within the international movement.

"Verification," in his case, therefore remains a sensitive process.

Saturday's spokesman sought to convey an official view that despite Mr. Dubcek's faults, he "has qualities for which he must still be given credit."

The major feature of Dr. Husak's speech was his categorical reiteration of his original pledges that only political means—persuasion and, if it failed, only then the party purge and no more—will be employed against unrepentant reformers.

"In 1968" he said, "they had brought the party to the brink of catastrophe." He added that the party would fight against their "pernicious ideas" but that "we are not concerned with destroying people or in asking for their heads."

WASHINGTON POST
5 February 1970

Neo-Stalinists Closing In on Czechs' Husak

By Robert Bulst
Reuters

PRAGUE — Czechoslovakia

took another step back toward Stalinist principles of economic management and political control last week with a shakeup in party and government leadership.

Communist Party leader Gustav Husak retained his personal supremacy but only at the cost of admitting ultra-conservatives both into the party policy-making group, the presidium, and the party executive, the secretariat.

These moves suggest that the power struggle in Prague is far from over and that it may be only a matter of months before the pro-Moscow hard-liners make a challenge for supreme power.

This struggle will decide whether the party will consider it necessary to stage political trials of leading reformers, who are regarded by the ultraconservatives as traitors and counterrevolutionaries.

The issue in Prague now is whether Husak, a moderate, made a carefully calculated retreat before the advance of the ultra-conservatives.

If so, it would indicate

that he hopes to contain them, and to emerge later as a moderate reformer like Hungarian leader Janos Kadar, raising the nation's living standards in return for a moratorium on political controversy and liberalization.

But the key to Czechoslovakia's political future still rests with the Kremlin. During the most recent party struggles in Prague, the position of Moscow has been ambiguous.

One word from Moscow would have been enough to settle the issue in Husak's favor, since he has been officially welcomed by the Kremlin as party leader and highly decorated for his services to the Communist movement.

But Moscow remained cool, formally approving Husak while cultivating the ultraconservatives, as if to guarantee that he abides by orthodoxy.

With 70,000 Red Army troops inside Czechoslovakia, Moscow can afford to wait and see.

After their original misjudgment of Alexander Dubcek, the 1968 reformist leader now in virtual exile as ambassador to Turkey,

the Russians are clearly in no mood to repeat that kind of error.

Lubomir Strougal, once regarded as a rival to Husak, has been removed from the hub of power in the extensive leadership changes announced at last week's session of the party Central Committee.

But, as premier of the Czechoslovak federal government, he now faces the daunting task of overhauling the administration. Even Strougal's talent for administration and party planning may be insufficient to rejuvenate the economy and to galvanize a resentful labor force.

Antonin Kapek, a leading member of the ultraconservative group and a friend of the disgraced former president, Antonin Novotny, moved up into the party presidium—something that would hardly have happened if the moderate wing of the party had been strong enough to prevent it.

Party debates in Prague mirrored the leadership's conviction—particularly among the ultraconservative wing—that the country must revert to a Stalinist-type economy with central planning.

As a further symptom of the new move back to rigid centralism, the principle of federalization of the Czech and Slovak nations received a blow. The party's economic report stated that, where a conflict arises with central authority, the proposals of the Czech and Slovak administrations must be revoked or suspended.

Federalization was the least controversial of all the 1968 reforms since it appeased Slovak resentment

over Prague's domination and helped reduce tension. Novotny, by ignoring the Slovaks' prickly national pride, contributed to his own downfall early in 1968.

The Slovaks united to help overthrow him, and paved the way for the young Slovak reformer, Dubcek, to emerge as party leader.

By some standards—as in the Italian or British Communist Parties—Dubcek's successor, Husak, would rank as a conservative. But by comparison with the neo-Stalinist wing of the Czechoslovak party he ranks as a moderate.

It is therefore convenient to draw a distinction in Czechoslovakia between the moderates headed by Husak and the ultraconservatives—hard-liners, dogmatists, neo-Stalinists, friends of Novotny, whatever you want to call them.

But alliances are still shifting and in Prague today men still move across this dividing line on specific issues.

Central to the ultraconservatives' philosophy is an emphasis on strong police and security control, and a sharpening of the class struggle. The ultraconservatives' economic program provides no loophole for any operation of the market supply-and-demand principle.

Czechoslovakia now mirrors in acute form the dilemma that confronts the whole Communist bloc. This is the clash between economic realism and the claims of orthodox ideology.

In all Communist states in Europe, technocrats concerned with production and profits tend to favor reform, but they are checked by theoreticians who fear a dilution of the party's leading role.

CPYRGHT

WASHINGTON POST
8 February 1970

Czech Politics

PRAGUE — Jozef Lenart,

the new Slovak Communist Party leader, has rebuffed a group of Slovak hardliners who have demanded the expulsion of Alexander Dubcek from the Czechoslovak

Communist Party.

Lenart, a former prime minister, delivered a speech this week before the Slovak Central Committee. Its full contents, which became available yesterday, indicated he spoke of a meeting in Kovarce, southern Slovakia, "of party members who

remained loyal to the party in 1968 and 1969 and stood firmly on international positions."

Their intentions were good, Lenart said, "however, the meeting was abused by some participants from elsewhere" (not identified) "to create an atmosphere which

ended in a resolution at variance to the party line."

His reference, observers said, was clearly to a resolution before the Slovak party Central Committee calling for the expulsion of Dubcek, the party chief who led the 1968 liberalization program, and thanking the Soviet Union for its August, 1968, intervention.

CPYRGHT NEW YORK TIMES
8 February 1970

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Someone Else Might Be Even Worse Than Husak

PRAGUE—When Gustav Husak succeeded Alexander Dubcek as the Communist party chief here nine months ago, a leading liberal told a visitor: "We know Husak is an old-line Communist, cunning and pragmatic. He'll dismantle the reform movement. Just how far he will go remains to be seen. After all, he is an enigma to us."

Like many other progressives, the speaker has since disappeared somewhere in the countryside. The reform movement, that taste of freedom, has been dismantled to the joy of the Soviet invaders. But the 56-year-old Dr. Husak remains an enigma to most people even at this point in the sad history of this country.

The people know well what he has done to return the country to Moscow-directed orthodoxy; they are still not sure what he really thinks. True to the national character, Czechs are still rationalizing that Dr. Husak is a man who is holding off worse yet, a man who is resisting the demands of ultraconservatives for the final stage in the reformist defeat—show trials and political arrests.

Imprisoned in 1960's

Accordingly, Dr. Husak, him-

self imprisoned in the Stalinist 1960's, has taken on the political coloring of a leader less conservative than the hard-liners who have emerged at the top of the power structure of the party battling for revenge. And every decision is viewed as a test between Dr. Husak the "Centrist" and the clearly evident dogmatists.

And so it was again when the Central Committee recently met to continue the mopping up operation against those in the party still tainted by the "Prague spring" of democratic Socialism.

Three apparent Husak supporters were replaced in the ruling Presidium by more extreme men, including Antonin Kapek, who was once ousted from the management of a huge Prague plant for supporting the Soviet invasion. Oldrich Cernik, the Premier during the 1968 euphoria and who later traded principle for realism, was supplanted by Lubomir Strougal, a hard-liner who has led the purge of many liberals.

Though not too many Czechs follow the political tide with much attention any more, those who still do saw at least some advantage to Dr. Husak in the

new posts for Mr. Strougal, who as party chief in the populous Czech regions had been regarded as a Husak rival and Moscow's first choice to succeed Mr. Dubcek. Mr. Strougal, for four years the Interior Minister under the Stalinist rule of Antonin Novotny, has now exchanged his party power base for the potentially thankless job of trying to solve the country's economic crisis.

Extent of Purges

The committee meeting itself reflected the extent of the purges sweeping the country. Sixteen more members were forced to resign, including Mr. Dubcek, now Ambassador to Turkey. A party official later disclosed that since Dr. Husak came to power, between 70 and 80 Central Committee liberals had been ousted and that the case against Mr. Dubcek was not closed.

With the top ranks cleansed of the liberals and the process under way to give loyalty tests to each of the 1.5-million members in the rank and file, Dr. Husak is taking on the appearance of a man about to seek some reconciliation with the people who are showing their disaffection by a reluctance to work.

Dr. Husak, moreover, has man-

aged to persuade many here that he means it when he says there will be no return to the police terror of the 1950's which he knows so well. Even so, there is growing concern here that a gap may well develop under extremist pressure between such pronouncements and practice. The arrest, disclosed last week, of Jiri Lederer, one of the leading liberal writers in 1968, has caused some persons to worry whether revenge seekers were beginning to write the last chapter.

Such internal issues as show trials, the ultimate fate of Mr. Dubcek, the extent of the purge of the rank and file are all apparently among those that divide Dr. Husak from the ultraconservatives. Given continued support from Moscow, and his own abilities as an ambitious and skilled politician, Dr. Husak may well continue to hold them off.

"We don't like Husak," said one Czech here last week, "But we do have to admit that he is our only possible salvation in view of what could come next. We like to think that some of 1968 rubbed off on him. It's difficult to see it now, and we just won't know for a long while."

—ALVIN SHUSTER

WASHINGTON POST 6 February 1970 Party Talks Of Ousting Dubcek

CPYRGHT Reuters
PRAGUE, Feb. 5 — A reso-

lution to oust fallen leader Alexander Dubcek from the party reportedly was on the agenda at a Slovak Communist Party Central Committee meeting today in Bratislava.

A copy of the resolution published in a Slovak journal also contained a proposal that the word "temporary" be deleted from published references to the stay of Soviet

troops who marched into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 to crush Dubcek's attempts at liberalization.

Dubcek was progressively stripped of all his powers after the Warsaw Pact invasion. Last week he arrived in Ankara to become ambassador to Turkey. After he left the country he was ousted from his last important post—membership on the national Czechoslovak Central Committee.

The resolution introduced at

the Bratislava meeting referred to the "rightist, opportunist and revisionist Dubcek leadership."

After a shakeup in the central committee here last week, a government spokesman said Dubcek's position would be "reassessed."

"We therefore ask that Comrade Dubcek be expelled from the party," the resolution concluded.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES

18 January 1970

Czechs Hound Liberal Newsmen Out of Jobs

Even Menial Posts Lost as Old Guard of
Pro-Russian Leaders Applies Pressure

CPYRGHT

BY EARL W. FOELL

Times Staff Writer

CPYRGHT

UNITED NATIONS —

even here. . . . It cannot

Liberal Czech journalists and broadcasters are being hounded out of even the menial jobs some of them were forced to take when old guard pro-Russian leaders began to gain ascendancy in Prague.

News of this second round of job purging has reached here in letters sent to Czechs who left the country after the Alexander Dubcek liberalization period ended.

One case reported in a Dec. 27 letter from a former commentator on world affairs provided details. This Prague newsmen, widely known in Czechoslovakia because of television appearances as well as magazine writing, lost his job the first time when his magazine was banned in April, 1969, eight months after the Soviet invasion.

He then moved to a village in the Bohemian farm country. He found a menial job in a tractor repair station. His wife and two children were with him and he was relatively happy.

Blow Falls

Then, in late December of 1969, a new blow came from the conservative Communist authorities in Prague. The former journalist mentions it almost casually in his December letter: "After the new year," he wrote, "I shall have to change my job again because the local mayor has notified my foreman that I am not supposed to be employed

be worse, except perhaps in jail."

It is typical of the current mixed period in Czechoslovakia, according to specialists here, that jail is not, in fact, an immediate threat for men like this liberal Communist writer. Of 250 writers, broadcasters and magazine commentators who have lost their jobs in the post-Dubcek purge, only four are known to be in prison.

One of these is a writer who is also a well-known chess player. Another is a historian who helped compile "The Czech Black Book" which recorded the basic facts of the short-lived Dubcek era of "humanistic socialism." The latter was convicted of slander.

Radio Man's Case

Another account is set down in a Jan. 1 letter from a radio journalist that has just arrived here. He reports that "mass dismissals from our news offices have just started. The decision has already been made . . . but nobody (among the executives) wants to assume the role of the great purger. So perhaps some of us will be able to stay on in insignificant jobs away from the news."

This writer also mentions the waning efforts of other sections of the Czechoslovak public to rescue the purged journalists. "In the journalists' club every day we meet. Most of us are now out of a

job. But often a gentleman turns up there and offers a job for perhaps 3,000 crowns (a handsome salary) to be a kind of public relations man for a big company. He promises there will be relatively little work . . . time to read."

This, the radio journalist explains, is the way some business leaders have tried to soften the effects of the purging of journalists.

An added touch of ingenuity: if old-guard pressure rises against a journalist thus hired by industry, he is fired. He then gets the official severance pay of several months salary to live on while another unemployed liberal journalist is hired in his place.

But this practice is dwindling under the relentless pressure of the old-guard bureaucrats. And observers fear it is soon to end completely.

The main fear for men like the former TV and magazine journalist who wrote the letter quoted above is that they will be hounded out of jobs persistently enough to cause them to remain unemployed. This would make them liable eventually to prosecution under the charge of being "parasites"—a crime under the repressive emergency laws that the Gustav Husak regime propounded and that are increasingly being applied by old-guard Communists.

Then there is the case of still another journalist, who before the Dubcek era was more orthodox than V. I. Lenin, and as the Dubcek era unfolded was one of the most outspoken and active liberals.

When the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact forces invaded, this writer left journalism, took his wife and two children into the countryside and sat down to write a book. He lived, in effect, on his retirement or un-

employment compensation pay.

Income Cut Off

Not long ago, Czech officials cut off his pay. Next, they said he could not lie around not working, and assigned him to a rock-crushing gang on a road-building project. About the same time, his wife took a job similar to that of a nurse's aide in a sanatorium.

Subsequently, Czech officials fired this man from his road-gang job and it is not clear if he can get other work. They also told him that his children will never get anything but an elementary school education.

If the twice-discharged commentator should fall under this law, the regime could claim it was not jailing a political offender but an economic laggard.

Czech liberal resources indicate that the discharged journalists and other intellectuals have sometimes been ordered dropped a second time on grounds that they are security risks. With this charge printed on their record they are expected to have difficulty in finding new jobs.

The commentator's letter is almost laconic in mentioning other cases he knows of:

One friend, he says, is still working on a trade union magazine but "he won't last long because his editor, who was a fairly decent fellow, was just fired."

Others Fired

Two others, the letter continues, have been fired but "have now applied to an agricultural cooperative where they will be soldering pots and pans."

The crazy-quilt pattern of lingering Dubcek reforms and new repression from the old guard appears to pervade life for the intellectuals. Habcas corpus provisions from the Dubcek era still exist. But

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they have been gradually subverted by extension of time limits. The number of days an accused person may be held without trial has gradually been extended.

Some intellectuals remain untouched still, while others are hounded. Prof. Edward Goldstuck,

at times a target of the old-liners, is still in his post in the Writers Union and the union itself has so far resisted attacks. But information reaching Czechs here indicates it may soon be dissolved, as was FITES (The union of film and TV workers).

The latter union was broken up after it refused

to answer a call by the culture ministry to get rid of anti-social elements and revoke its liberal resolutions of the Dubcek period.

Playwright Unscathed

The internationally noted playwright Vaclav Havel has remained unscathed despite his some-

times impish criticism of the new regime. Some analysts think the playwright has been spared longer than other less bothersome intellectuals mainly because he was never a member of the Communist Party, and therefore never a revisionist.

WASHINGTON POST 3 February 1970 *Czechs Jail Reformist Journalist*

CPYRGHT

Reuters

PRAGUE, Feb. 2—Jiri Lederer, a leading journalist in

Czechoslovakia's 1968 reform era, has been arrested in connection with an alleged anti-state emigre center, reliable sources said today.

Lederer was arrested at his home by police Thursday, the sources said. They said he was one of three persons the Interior Ministry announced last

week it arrested for alleged ties with the center.

The ministry said the emigre center was working out of a capitalist state—it did not mention which—and was financed by American intelligence.

The center was accused of "dangerous alien activity."

Lederer's name was familiar to readers of the Writers' Union weekly *Listy* and of *Reporter*, the weekly of the Journalists' Union, before they were banned last spring.

He was also one of several reformist journalists expelled from the Communist Party. Recently, according to friends, he was without a job and was working on a book at home.

NEW YORK TIMES 10 February 1970 *Students in Prague Now Know Their 'Beautiful Dream' Is Over*

By ALVIN SHUSTER

Special to The New York Times

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PRAGUE, Feb. 9—The record was Louis Armstrong singing "Hello, Dolly" as the students gathered after classes in a vinarna not far from Charles University. And the former student leader, now only intent on finishing his studies, summed up the mood today:

"We often sit and wonder: Maybe we could have done more for freedom. Then you realize the chance has gone. There's nothing more to do now. What we did was courageous at the time. But it had no effect, no lasting impact.

"Now it's over so you have to say to yourself that things could be worse today. Here I am talking to you about my thoughts in the open. I'm free to go about. I go to school. There's a good chance I'll

finish. I can still buy a good book. I can still meet my girlfriend.

"But we no longer kid ourselves. It's over. It was a beautiful dream, but it's over. We feel demoralized. And honest people have stopped being honest."

Other students wandered in, and ordered red and white wine, tartar steak and beer, and recalled the days when they spearheaded the short-lived liberalization movement of 1968. Their views were essentially the same—students have turned inward, they are drinking more; they are going to more parties and doing their best to stay out of trouble and finish their studies. The message of the present authoritarian regime—any trouble and out you go—

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has been clearly heard.

"What would you do?" asked one young man in a turtleneck shirt. "Before, we could go out and demonstrate, hang those posters on the windows of the school, and try to organize something. Now we could do all those things again, but we'd be out of school tomorrow. Our lives would be ruined."

With its top ranks now purged of liberals, the Communist party is turning more of its attention to the students and university life. Professors are being dismissed and others are being asked to recant and to rescind resolutions they signed backing the reform movement. New rectors and deans have been appointed here. It was disclosed over the weekend that two teachers had even been expelled from the Communist party college for liberal leanings.

Passive Opposition

Dr. Gustav Husak, who succeeded the popular Alexander Dubcek as Communist party chief nearly 10 months ago, knows he has a long way to go to persuade the students that their future lies in Moscow-directed orthodoxy. Students

have responded not with active support but with passive opposition.

Recognizing the need to win over "the confused, misinformed younger generation," Dr. Husak said a few days ago that it was time to place the question of youth on the agenda of a future central committee session. So far, he said, only "some degree of success" has been achieved in persuading youth of the need for "socialist ideas."

"We must involve the young people more, talk with them and, at times, talk with them with greater patience," Dr. Husak said.

Accordingly, the students report they expect intensified pressures now to join the new union of Czech university students, set up to replace the old student group dominated by liberals. So far, the membership in the union has been at best disappointing to the party.

A number of students from various departments at Charles University said that even those among them who detested the present party line would eventually have to end their boycott of the stanchly pro-Moscow student union.

As one blond youth put it: "We do have problems as students—the question of grants, the desire to travel to the West, now stopped, the need for better and more student housing. It will be made clear to us that if we want these things there will be only one path—joining that collaborationist organization. A few will speak for us all."

"Right now," said a 21-year-old, "I would say that about 99 per cent of the students are against the present policies. Maybe Husak is holding off worse, such as trials and mass arrests. But no matter."

"I would say that about 5 per cent of the students may be somewhat active, that is, they may still try to drop an occasional leaflet in a mailbox and things like that. Others, deeply pained, try to follow events, and search every petty change for some significance. But larger numbers have just fallen into apathy."

Retreat Came Late

The student retreat from open politics has come about in just a few months. Even after the Soviet-led invasion of the country in August, 1968, stu-

dents kept up their pressures to save some of the reforms. Posters hung on windows at the school. There were demonstrations and sit-ins. Even as late as last year at this time, 2,000 students met and drew up a "Prague Manifesto" denouncing the Soviet occupation as humiliating. And many took part in the anti-Soviet protests on the anniversary of the invasion last August.

A number of new laws have since helped the leadership bring surface calm to the schools, although officials have publicly complained that there are still "hostile acts" by some students and teachers against others "involved in the policy of the party and interested in sincere friendship" with Moscow.

Emergency laws became part of the penal code last month, increasing sentences for disturbing the peace and defaming the country. Now the police can hold a suspect as long as three weeks without trial. And students can be summarily dismissed for any activity tending to disturb the peace, which could include almost anything.

Now teachers were briefed

last week on the correct way to conduct the courses in Marxism-Leninism now suspended. The death mask of Jan Palach, the young student who burned himself to death a year ago in protest, has just been removed from the philosophy department on the second floor, although students continue to throw flowers in the niche where it had been.

Some courses in philosophy and sociology have been suspended, and the age of the retirement of professors has been set at 65 to help in the "political consolidation" effort. At the school of social sciences and journalism, Miloslav Hladky, who produced a recent television program denouncing student liberals, was named dean a week ago. And the school reportedly plans to set up a special course to teach "party journalists."

Some students have recently been arrested—reportedly about a dozen each from the philosophy department and from nature and sciences, among others. But students are inclined to believe the arrests have arisen from some recent activity because none of those

detained is known to have played any prominent role in the days of strikes and open student protests.

Much Quieter Now

"For the most part," a student reported, "the student leaders of those days are either out of the country or very quiet now. We hardly see them."

"But I don't agree it was all for nothing," said a dark-haired girl. "Before 1968 there was a real gap between intellectuals and students on the one hand, and the workers on the other."

"The workers didn't really understand all those concepts of freedom. They didn't know what freedom of the press was all about, what freedom in factory elections meant, what worker participation implied. They know now. That was an achievement."

"And for us," said a young man, "we don't have to look to the West for the best system of life, for the meaning of freedom. We don't have to look anywhere but here. We know what it can be like, even under this system. We can look back at those eight months in 1968 for what might have been. It tells us something."

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THE ECONOMIST FEBRUARY 7, 1970

Czechoslovakia

Get the answers right or get out

FROM OUR EAST EUROPE CPYRGHT CORRESPONDENT

It was Mr Brezhnev who suggested, just after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, that the Czechs would have to reduce the size of their unwieldy party. His view was that the party should be reduced to rather less than half of its 1,600,000 members. The long "letter" issued this week by the central committee to all party members is clearly a step in this direction. The document analyses party-political developments during the past ten years and, not surprisingly, places the blame for the present disorder squarely at the door of the Dubcek reformers and the "revisionist wing" and describes Mr Dubcek himself as "the principal obstacle to consolidation." Members are then given precise details as to how they should evaluate their own behaviour during the past two years when called to a reckoning before party committees.

To retain their party membership it will be necessary to convince the investigating committees that they gave no support to the "revisionist" policies, did not criticise the Russian invasion, and today stand 100 per cent loyally behind the current party line. This, of course, will depend on whether the current line a few months hence is that of the centrists under Mr Husak, or the ultras led by the new prime minister, Mr Lubomir Strougal, and others even more extreme than him.

Shortly after Mr Husak gained control of the party last April he denied rumours that Mr Strougal was himself after the top party post. Since then, however, Mr Strougal has been busily broadening his power base, particularly in the industrial areas of Bohemia and Moravia, at the cost not only of the progressives but of Mr Husak himself and those who have been advocating treading softly over party reorganisation and a policy of no reprisals against the followers of Mr Dubcek. Mr Husak appears to have done little to prevent the infiltration of key positions by the dogmatists and their supporters who are now strongly in evidence in all branches of national life.

Although Mr Husak managed to bundle Mr Dubcek off to Ankara last week before

the central committee meeting, remarks made last weekend by a party spokesman, Mr Havlin, to western journalists suggest that the case against Mr Dubcek is by no means closed. Mr Husak repeatedly insists that there will be no show trials, but his voice is becoming increasingly isolated. Last week's central committee meeting can have left him precious little reason to feel satisfied about his present position and future prospects. If he continues to give way to the conservatives the likelihood of any modified reforms, particularly in the economic field, will be slight and this could prove disastrous for his own position.

Originally, last week's central committee meeting was advertised as intended to deal with the economy, but after repeated postponements since last October the reorganisation and purging of the party turned out to be the dominant issue. On the economic front, as Mr Hula, the minister of planning, explained, it is back to full centralisation: "A radical centralisation is the only means of combating economic disaster." Mr Hula blamed both Novotny and Dubcek for allowing the disintegration of the system of centralised planning "which shattered and destroyed the economy." Federal bodies are to take over the direction of planning and

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economic development from various national and regional departments; investment and production are to be geared more closely to the requirements of the other Communist countries.

This is certainly not what Professor Sik and Mr Dubeck had in mind for Czechoslovakia's brighter future, and the prescription is unlikely to do much good now without a powerful injection of con-

vertible credit for the replacement of obsolescent capital. But in lieu of such a credit the Czechs are to get increased deliveries of raw materials, machinery and cars from the Soviet Union, plus quantities of meat which, as one political leader explained, "the Russians are very kindly sending us despite the fact that our consumption is higher than the Soviet average."

NEW YORK TIMES

31 January 1970

CPYRGHT

No Show Trials, Czech Leader Says

By ALVIN SHUSTER

Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, Jan. 30 — Dr. Gus-

tav Husak, the Communist party chief, assured Czechoslovaks today that the party would not "degrade itself" by staging show trials of progressives.

In a 7,000-word speech to the party's Central Committee, Dr. Husak declared political victory over the leaders of the liberalization effort here in 1968. He said the purges of the reformists were necessary, and he indicated that more were on the way.

He declared, however, that the removal of "antisocialists" from their jobs and from the party would not be followed by the return to the police terror of the Stalinist nineteen-fifties. He pledged that the party "will not degrade itself to framing show trials, filing trumped-up charges, not even against political opponents."

Dr. Husak, did not, however, rule out trials entirely, saying that "administrative measures will be used only where the law has been evidently and probably violated and nowhere else." Every citizen, he said, "may sleep peacefully, may live peacefully with his family," unless he violates the law.

Husak Seen as Centrist

Dr. Husak, himself jailed from 1951 to 1960 on charges of antistate activities, is reported to have been under pressure from arch conservatives to bring political liberals to trial. Since succeeding Alexander Dubcek as the party's First Secretary last April, Dr. Husak has ruled with an authoritarian hand, as desired by Moscow, but has projected the image of a centrist in the current political spectrum.

Mass arrests and political trials have been feared by liberals since the Soviet-led invasion in August, 1968, short the democratic movement led by Mr. Dubcek, who has been removed from his party posts but allowed to serve as Ambassador to Turkey.

In his speech, delivered in the Spanish Hall of Hradecny Castle yesterday and made public today, Dr. Husak denied that "some ultraconservative forces are pressing me to introduce some sort of a police regime or terror." He insisted the party would rely on political work to win the masses rather than create a mood of fear.

"Administrative methods are sometimes tempting and may seem to lead to the aim more easily," he said. "They may

seem to restore discipline more easily. However, their very negative consequences consist in the fact that they provoke an atmosphere of fear. Fear breeds hatred and suppresses initiative."

Renewal of Party Cards Due

Dr. Husak sought to calm fears among the nation's estimated one and a half million party members that the forthcoming renewal of membership cards would result in a broad new purge of liberals in the rank and file. Enemies will grow, he said, but the party will try to be "tolerant to misled people."

"It is necessary that every member who remains in the party be active," he said, "that he may know why he is in the party. And it is also necessary that a member be again proud of being in the party. This has been somehow forgotten in this country."

The precise yardstick to be used by local organizations to differentiate the enemies, the midlead and the loyal remains unknown. The Central Committee, which ended a three-day meeting today after discussing party membership and economic planning, said a letter of party instructions would be made public next week.

Although proclaiming victory for the party, Dr. Husak indicated that much remained to be done to return the country to Moscow-directed orthodoxy. He talked of continuing problems with two elements in the liberal movement — trade unions and students.

Factory Managers Replaced

In some factories, he said, the managers had forgotten that they had been appointed to their posts as party members. Some have been replaced by "more stable comrades," he said, others will have to go, and political education among workers will have to be increased.

As for the "confused, misinformed younger generation," Dr. Husak said the party must show patience in the effort to win them to socialism. He said the students were "easily aroused to passion" in 1968 because they had no knowledge of the old bourgeois world.

In foreign affairs, Dr. Husak said that tensions had eased with the Soviet Union, which still has an estimated 75,000 troops in this country. He said Czechoslovakia was now firmly in the international Communist camp despite the 1968 efforts to "defame basic socialist ideals."

NEW YORK TIMES
4 February 1970 CPYRGHT

PRAGUE VERIFYING ROLLS OF PARTY

Liberals to Be Weeded Out
in Card-Renewal Drive

By ALVIN SHUSTER

Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE, Feb. 3—The Czech

Slovak Communist party today opened a drive to weed out unrepentant liberals from its rank and file.

With the top levels of the party already purged of leading reformists, the party's Central Committee sent a 6,000-word letter to all lower units ordering interviews with each of the 1.5 million party members. They will be asked, among other questions, where they stood during the 1968 democratic reform movement and whether they accept the official justification of the Soviet-led invasion that year.

It will not be enough merely

to recant to win renewal of the small red membership card. The members must accept Communist beliefs with deep conviction and agree to total submission to party discipline with "selflessness and inner enthusiasm."

Mere Statements Inadequate

"In the interviews," the party said, "we cannot be satisfied with mere statements. If so, the whole important political action would lose its meaning, for many of those who are at variance with the party in their inner ideology would remain in it."

The process is expected to reduce the membership to a total of 500,000 to 750,000, which would be in line with the reported belief in Moscow that the present size is too unwieldy. The membership now represents 10 per cent of Czechoslovakia's population. The Soviet Union has 13.5 million party members, or about 5 per cent of the population.

One aim of the new criteria is to create a hard core of members willing to support

without protest the present conservative leadership at the 14th party congress now scheduled for next year. The party has already shrunk somewhat because an undisclosed number of disheartened members either turned in their cards or stopped paying dues after the invasion and the ouster last April of Alexander Dubcek, the reform leader.

Total Record Weighed

In denying that the new drive would be a purge, party officials have said that a member's entire record would be considered rather than 1968 alone. But the emphasis in the letter was clearly on the role of the members during the democratic movement and since.

It said that the passivity of many members stemmed from "mistakes in the party leadership in the last decade," which would include not only the Dubcek era but also that of Antonin Novotny, who ruled in Stalinist style in the fifties. The letter added, however, that "the most important thing" at the interview would be the attitudes and actions of each

party member in the last two years.

"There is no doubt that we must part with those for whom Aug. 21 [the invasion date] and the events connected therewith were in fact the culmination of their entire disruptive, anti-party and anti-Soviet activity," the party declared.

The letter said there were a number of rules for a good party member. A member should observe principles of Communist morals by being a good family man, work hard at his job and take active part in local party activities. He should also fight "against immorality, ostentation, megalomania and self-complacency," the letter added.

It coupled an attack on reformists and "counterrevolutionaries" for weakening the role of the party with a justification for the invasion. It said Czechoslovakia's allies could not wait for political chaos and sent in their troops as "an act of international assistance" to save "our country from bloodshed and from an open offensive by the counterrevolutionary forces."

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Monday, February 9, 1970

New Slovak purges Actions of Czech hard liners loosen Husak's hold on party

By Eric Bourne

Special correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

CPYRGHT

Vienna

Dr. Gustav Husak's attempt to shape a moderate course in Czechoslovakia has been challenged anew by hard-line radicals.

This is apparent in the publication of an extreme left-wing resolution, adopted by ultraconservatives under clandestine circumstances more than a month ago, and from the just-completed purge of even mildly reformist officials in the Slovak wing of the party.

Major changes in the Slovak leadership were announced Feb. 5 from Bratislava

where its Central Committee met to follow up the main policy decisions already made by the parent Czechoslovak party committee the previous week.

The changes included the "resignations" of a group of key senior officials including Slovakia's best known economist, Dr. Viktor Pavlenda, a member and a secretary of both the Central Committee and the Slovak party's 12-man ruling Presidium. He lost all his posts.

Dr. Pavlenda was not identified with the short-lived reforms of economic management initiated by Prof. Ota Sik, planning chief of the preinvasion period in 1968. But he was counted among those able economists who recognized the overriding need for reforms, albeit of a slower-paced mid-

dle-of-the-road character.

Last year he emerged as spokesman of a group which had survived the Soviet intervention and which wished to prevent an excessive return to centralized control and the domination of the party in economic affairs. Both have in fact now been adopted.

His removal, together with that of other relative progressives such as Slovak Deputy Premier and party Presidium member Jozef Zrak, followed last week's dismissal of Slovak party leader Stefan Sadovsky and the appointment of Jozef Lenart — Prime Minister in the prereform Novotny period — in his place.

The temper of this conservative movement in Slovakia is implicit in a resolution designed to bring the hard liner's views

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on to the floor of the Slovak committee meeting.

The resolution was adopted by a gathering of several hundred persons held in hush-hush circumstances in a small central Slovak town more than a month ago.

No proceedings were not publicized at the time. But last month, shortly before the convening of the two Central Committees, its resolution was printed in one of the Slovak party's official district newspapers.

The resolution contained demands, radical even in the context of the extreme positions taken by the hard liners in all spheres in the past year.

It presented the first official public demand for the expulsion of Alexander Dubcek from membership of the party. It also contained two almost startling demands relating to the Soviet invasion and the continued presence in Czechoslovakia of large occupation forces.

The resolution both thanked the Russians for timely intervention against the "counter-revolution," and also praised the notorious Soviet Army news sheet Zpravy distributed illegally after the invasion despite repeated protests by the Prague leaders. The resolution even urged that the editorial "collective" be recognized with a "high state decoration."

Proposals as extravagant as this are not likely to become party policy. But the making of them is a sinister pointer to the kind of forces offering increasing resistance to

the restraints which Dr. Husak has sought to erect against the party purge degenerating into revenge-seeking against the reformers.

Husak rival supported

It was significant that these hard liners insisted that one of the most dogmatist members of the Czechoslovak Presidium, Vasil Bilak, be placed in full control of the screening and "cleansing" of the party membership in Slovakia.

Mr. Bilak, long-time rival to Dr. Husak, lost all his party posts in Slovakia as a result of his behavior during the invasion days in August, 1968. He was elected to the Czechoslovak Presidium when the leadership was reconstructed under Soviet pressure.

He was a principal author of the draft for the party letter now being sent as a check-up to all members.

The letter seeks to throw the whole responsibility for the Czechoslovak crisis on the former party leadership's "revisionist wing."

It lists "guilty" party organizations and a number of personalities ranging from Mr. Dubcek and other since deposed leaders to most of the intellectual literary and journalistic figures prominent in the reform movement.

Mr. Dubcek himself was branded as "the chief obstacle to the consolidation process"

until his replacement by Dr. Husak.

Each of the 1.5 million party members is to be screened and judged on the basis of his activities at important "milestones" of the past two years.

Milestones enumerated

Starting from the inception of Mr. Dubcek's leadership in January, 1968, these "milestones" include:

- The subsequent "action program" of reforms;
- The famous "two thousand words"—the intellectual appeal of June for national unity in the face of the growing Soviet menace;
- The invasion itself and the agreement after the event of the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops in the country.

Members' attitudes to later events—the anti-Soviet demonstrations, the change of leadership, and subsequent party policy decisions and purges—are also to be tested before the new party membership cards are granted.

The issue now is how far the purge shall go. The hard liners would have several hundred thousand members rooted out.

Dr. Husak's and the official party line is to give "honest" Communists, temporarily "misled" by the "revisionists," a chance.

Dropouts already have reduced the party by something approaching 200,000. But many more seem likely to go before the purge is finished.

NEW YORK TIMES

2 February 1970

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Party Bids Czechs Work Harder

By ALVIN SHUSTER

Special to The New York Times

PRAGUE Feb. 1—The official

Czechoslovak television reported the other day that some of the World Cup soccer matches in Mexico might not be seen here this year. Because of the time difference, too many workers would stay up late to watch and this might affect work discipline.

Work discipline is the cry of the Communist party these days, though certainly not of the workers. At one time, Czechoslovaks had a reputation for hard work, but now with worker morale sapped by the political atmosphere, the national reluctance to produce continues to aggravate this country's sagging economy.

The party's Central Committee, which ended a three-day session Friday after solidifying conservative control, published a 6,000-word decree on the ec-

onomy this weekend, but whatever chance of success it may have depends on ending what officials call a three-and-a-half-day week by the workers.

The party document denounced "self-indulgence and indifference" among the workers. Gustav Husak, the party's first secretary, said in his speech to the committee that "you would be astounded what is going on in this country and how many abuses exist."

Exhortation to Work

Throughout the speeches and the decree are references to increasing worker initiative, to make workers proud of socialism, to stimulate their desire to help their country recover from the current "disruption."

Apart from loafing and absenteeism, suffering from low productivity, inflation and shortages of fuel, consumer goods and housing. A price freeze went into effect last month to check the mounting cost of living.

The economic decree had the

effect of reimposing the central planning of the days before the 1968 liberal movement. The reform features of decentralization and work incentives with some degree of independence for managers of various enterprises were rejected.

But at the same time the party indicated that it would try to adopt some positive features of the reforms without specifying which ones.

As part of its "planned management," the party said, it intended to link up with "past positive experiences and elements which prove to be successful in practice." And in the return to orthodoxy, it made clear, nothing will be left to chance by allowing trade unions and factory managers the kind of latitude that was evolving in 1968 before the Soviet-led invasion.

Reformers Criticized

It accused the economic reformers of disrupting the unity

of the trade union movement, using the movement for political aims, damaging the economy, undermining the leading role of the party and reducing party and state control at every level. And, the decree said, the liberals tried to place the blame for economic mistakes "on the substance of socialism itself."

Moreover, it said the liberals—now purged from the top party ranks—tried to loosen economic ties with the other socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union. The party, however, did not place all the blame for the present economic chaos on the reformers. It noted that the economy was in trouble before they came to power but added that they made the situation worse.

"The rightist forces," the decree said, referring to the liberals, "launched an open attack on the whole system of planned management of the socialist national economy. The role of the state was weakened under their pressure."

LOS ANGELES TIMES

25 January 1970

Czechoslovakia?

Oh-er-Well...

CPYRGHT
BY ERNEST CONINE

Out of mind, out of sight. That is the story of Czechoslovakia, less than 18 months after that country's dream of building "socialism with a human face" was crushed by Russian forces of occupation.

For a time the Czech experiment and its suppression by the Soviet Union was big news. But as it became clear that the good soldier Schweik was outmatched, that the Soviets would use whatever force was required to reassert their imperial control, the world lost interest.

Unfortunately, the ordeal is as real as ever for the Czechs themselves—and even more painful.

The "liberal" Communist leaders—those who presided over the ill-fated attempt to create a new, more democratic form of Communism—have long since been removed and replaced by men who can be depended upon to take orders from Moscow.

The same kind of purge is proceeding in the trade unions, the universities and the press—all of which were bastions of support for the reform movement, and of resistance to its Soviet-ordered abandonment.

*

Czech journalists who supported the earlier reforms are being hounded out of the editorial offices and, in many cases, left with no choice but to accept menial jobs or risk imprisonment as "parasites."

Lest they fail to comprehend the nature of their crime, the errant newsmen—most of them party members—are scolded for imagining that freedom of expression can exist in a Communist country.

"Do not let us harbor illusions," a spokesman for the anti-reformist Husak regime wrote recently in the journal Tribuna. "It was the function of the journalistic profession, and it will continue to be its function, to manipulate information and, thus, to manipulate the public."

Teachers, for their part, are accused of indoctrinating children with hatred of the

Soviet invaders. A neo-Stalinist writer complains, for example, that in one summer camp the children were taught to sing that "Ivan ought to go home where Natasha is waiting for him, because in our country the girls do not love him."

Up with this sort of thing the Kremlin does not intend to put. The screws are being tightened, day by day, to see that it doesn't.

World opinion, especially liberal American opinion, does not show the same concern over the sad events in Czechoslovakia as it does over the suppression of democracy in places like Greece and South Vietnam, which are within the American sphere of influence.

Perhaps this is because everybody knows deep down that protest is futile—that the men in the Kremlin don't give two hoots in hell whether Bertrand Russell, David Dellinger and other assorted pacifists and anti-imperialists like what Russia is doing in Czechoslovakia or not.

The ostrich posture is unfortunate, in any event, because the unhappy fate of Czechoslovakia is a matter of great and continuing relevance to us all.

In the long run, hopes for a more peaceful world lean heavily on the reconciliation of communism and Western democracy—on the absorption of democratic principles, in other words, into the Communist system.

This is what the Prague "spring" was all about, and Russian refusal to let the experiment proceed casts a foreboding light on the prospects for beneficial evolution within the Soviet bloc.

It is for this reason that people both inside and outside the Communist movement continue to debate why the Russians did it.

Was the main consideration strategic, involving their desire to station troops on the Czech-West German frontier and the refusal of the now ousted Dubcek regime to acquiesce? Or did they act from fear that the virus of "democratic Communism" would filter into the Soviet Union itself?

In his recent book, "Intervention," veteran American expert Isaac Don Levine argues persuasively for the first case, and cites conversations with Czech and Yugoslav sources to back his point.

But Komunist, organ of the Yugoslav Communist Party, insists that "The Soviet Union is afraid of democracy at home, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia is a sign of crisis in the Soviet structure and system."

Either way, the implications are disturbing.

(Radio Commentary) Zagreb (Croatia), Yugoslavia
31 January 1970

CPYRGHT

Soviet Concept of Limited Sovereignty Attacked

The Soviet press is again refuting the existence of the doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist countries, but with arguments saying exactly the opposite. Here is a report by our Belgrade editor Milika Sundic:

For over a year and a half the Soviet press has been accusing Western propaganda and the so-called revisionists in the communist and workers movement of having invented the doctrine of the limited sovereignty of socialist countries and, as the organ of the office of the CPSU Central Committee in the RSFSR, SOVIET RUSSIA, maintains, of attributing it to the Soviet Union. The facts, however, say exactly the opposite.

The doctrine of limited sovereignty or socialist community was not invented either by Western propaganda or the so-called revisionists, but by theoreticians and responsible statesmen of the countries whose troops intervened in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The article we mentioned in SOVIET RUSSIA clearly confirms this. It says, among other things, that the sovereignty of a state not only is a concept of international law but it also has a class character. This reference to class character actually represents the arrogation by one or more countries of the right to intervene in every socialist country which, by their criteria, is building socialism in accordance with its own specific conditions and not on the basis of foreign models.

The article in the army paper RED STAR which, like SOVIET RUSSIA, is dealing with the same problems, is also characteristic. According to that paper, varying models of socialism are not acceptable and deserve only to be condemned because the Soviet experience has allegedly shown that there is only one road to socialism.

These theories, naturally, are unacceptable and very dangerous, and the LCY rejects them as dangerous for the unity of socialist countries and the communist and workers movement. It is all the same to Yugoslavia whether the right to intervene in a country is part of the doctrine of limited sovereignty or whatever other name this doctrine might have. What is at stake here is not the name but the essence of the policy. References to the Czechoslovak case, for instance, do not enhance the validity of assertions that Western propaganda and the so-called revisionists in the communist and workers movement have fabricated the doctrine of limited sovereignty and the socialist community. On the contrary, the very fact that the sovereignty of a state is being questioned or the aspect of sovereignty according to international law not recognized refutes the words of the camp press that the doctrine of limited sovereignty was invented by revisionists and imperialists.

This does not, of course, mean that Western imperialism is less dangerous and, even less, that it should appear as some kind of guardian of the independence of small countries. To dispute the concept of the sovereignty of a country under international law or to make this sovereignty conditional upon the class character of the state represents, in our view, nothing but a modified doctrine of limited sovereignty, the authorship of which is now being denied by the countries of the camp, but so far only by words and not by deeds.

Anyway, what does the assertion that proletarian internationalism has been transformed into socialist internationalism mean? Does it not mean insistence on unity in inequality or on unity of the privileged and the unblemished and of those who are predestined to sin

and who have, therefore, to be taught a lesson? The LCY does not recognize such internationalism, which demands the renunciation of national sovereignty, because this is not internationalism. Such concepts are no less dangerous when they appear inside a country embracing several nations as, for instance, the Soviet Union or, let us say, our country.

With regard to the repeated insistence that the intervention in Czechoslovakia represented the fulfillment of internationalist duty, it should be noted that this insistence in present circumstances is something other than an expression of a need to repressedly criticize those who were not in agreement with the intervention. The case of Czechoslovakia, in our view, is being revived as a continuous threat to others, because, otherwise, why should it be talked about in such a manner, when even those who are doing this know full well that this is not at all popular?

COMMUNIST MILITARY PROBLEMS SNOWBALLING IN VIETNAM

25X1C10b

1. The question of how long the Vietnam war is going to last has been endlessly debated at every step along the political spectrum. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. As a matter of fact there is a good possibility that Hanoi's "master strategy for winning the Vietnam war in 1970" may have come unstuck before the year has fairly begun. A year ago Hanoi was promising that by the end of 1970, Saigon would be collapsing as Allied combat forces were withdrawing; six months ago Hanoi was openly announcing plans to spike the Vietnamization program by discrediting Saigon's military and political effectiveness in the eyes of the Vietnamese people and the world. The story does not seem to be coming out as planned by Hanoi, possibly because it rested on the assumption that Communist military strength could prove Hanoi's point.

[REDACTED]

a. With a population of about 19 million, the Communists have already lost, in sheer numbers killed, almost 600,000 men since January 1961 (proportionally, this would be comparable to a U.S. loss of *six million* men -- draw a parallel for your host country). The Viet Cong has now lowered the draft age to 9; II Corps observers report that many new NVN arrivals are between 30 and 40 years of age; the total manpower drain into South Vietnam last year from North Vietnam was over 100,000 and although it is estimated that 130,000 17-year old North Vietnamese males are declared physically fit each year, the remaining numbers leave a very small labor force reserve if Hanoi upgrades domestic production or if Sino-Soviet assistance is diminished.

b. The Viet Cong is hard pressed to maintain its manpower levels -- in 1969 Viet Cong fighting men defected to the GVN in unprecedented numbers*; military units in several provinces are estimated to be from 45-100

*Total Communist defections to the GVN in 1969 were 39,502.

~~SECRET~~

percent below their authorized strengths because of manpower shortages at the district, village and hamlet levels; Viet Cong recruiting officers in South Vietnam have been reporting lack of enthusiasm, failure to cooperate and outright efforts to circumvent recruitment.

c. North Vietnam is now supplying at least 70 percent of the guerrilla manpower for the war (a responsibility which the Viet Cong allegedly handles without assistance since there are "no North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam") -- in military terms this means a double hardship with Hanoi receiving even less support from local guerrilla forces in South Vietnam, while at the same time deploying troops from its own dwindling reservoir of manpower to fill out decimated Viet Cong units.

d. Animosity is increasing between North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops -- there have been numerous defector reports of wrangling over rations of food, ammunition, medical supplies, clothing and cigarettes; there has been rivalry over promotions within mixed NVN/VC units and bitter suspicion on both sides that *their* men or units are invariably chosen for the most dangerous missions.

e. The morale among the remaining Viet Cong fighting men is sagging -- because their units are understrength; because NVN personnel are moving in and taking over in many situations; because their share of supplies from the North is smaller than was once the case; because such young VC recruits are being used to plug some of the gaps; because they are not receiving the support from the countryside they were receiving in 1965. And just recently there have been hints that Viet Cong personnel are discussing the possibility that they and Hanoi have been duped by the USSR and China into continuing the war.


f. The Viet Cong supporters are increasingly disillusioned regarding the "inevitability of victory" for the Communists and the guerrillas are forced to swim in an increasingly hostile sea. Viet Cong supporters are defecting to the GVN in great numbers*; Viet Cong food and tax collectors are experiencing difficulty, even open hostility; NVN troops are even having difficulty *buying* food from the populace; locals have refused to give Hanoi's troops shelter, medical treatment, even directions; the number of Viet Cong suspects pointed out to GVN officials by the populace is growing.

g. The "winter-spring" offensive has slowed to a crawl and the Communist forces failed to bring off any significant military action during the Vietnamese Lunar New Year (Tet), this despite the "predictions" of Communist media about the impending offensive with particular emphasis on the period around Tet. [REDACTED] 1968 Tet offensive, a *psychological* victory abroad but a resounding military defeat for the Communists which resulted in battlefield deaths of 40,000 Communist troops.)

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*Total Communist defections to the GVN in 1969 were 39,502.

h. North Vietnam's Defense Minister, General Nguyen Vo Giap, who should best know Hanoi's real military position, has come about 180 degrees since 1961 when he promised "swift and decisive victory" to his people (in his book *People's War, People's Army*). Today the General is still assuring his followers that "our people will surely win," but now he is adding the warning that "we must have time" because North Vietnam is "fighting many with few, fighting strength with weakness." Just a year ago this month, Giap admitted to Oriana Fallaci, Italian correspondent for the Milanese magazine *L'Europeo*, that he had lost half a million men.



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THE MAIL, Madras
9 January 1970

WAR STRAIN TIGHTENS Communist Tension in Vietnam

CPYRGHT

By A Special Correspondent

INCREASING strain is being felt in the relations between North Vietnamese troops and Viet Cong guerrilla forces in South Vietnam, according to North Vietnam soldiers who recently came over to the South Vietnamese side.

Accounts claim that this has been noticeable since last spring and particularly so since the death of Ho Chi Minh who had been an influence for unity between Northerners and Southerners. A "marked deterioration" in relations set in then, it is reported.

Part of the trouble stems from critical shortages of food and ammunition which have led to complaints of inequitable distribution between the regular troops and the guerrillas.

Local units are responsible for victualling troops from the North stationed in their areas; but with the shortages and constant harassment from allied troops this is becoming increasingly difficult.

One result is that the local Viet Cong are becoming resentful of the presence of North Vietnamese soldiers. There has been at least one instance when they refused to obey orders to assist North Vietnamese troops.

The North Vietnamese soldiers have apparently complained that they were discriminated against when in mixed units under Viet Cong commanders they were sent on missions that were more dangerous than those given the Viet Cong members.

Because of this it was not uncommon for North Vietnamese soldiers to try to obtain information demanded of them from local inhabitants, or feeling that

by merely turning in false reports.

Another source of resentment is that sympathisers among the local population are more ready to help Viet Cong members, by selling them extra food, than they were helping North Vietnamese troops.

Several times in the last six months a battalion mentioned by one source had run out of its rice supplies and its troops were given money with which to buy rice from the locals. The Viet Cong soldiers found this easy, but those from North Vietnam did not. The same applied to clothing, medical supplies and cigarettes.

Yet another North Vietnamese complaint was that they were not getting the promotion they felt they deserved. In two battalions mentioned by the sources, no North Vietnamese soldier held higher rank than that of section leader. For this reason many of them had sought to be transferred to units made up entirely of their fellow northerners, where promotion was easier.

The sources reported that many incidents have arisen from this unequal treatment. For instance, in June, a North Vietnamese soldier, complaining of unequal treatment, attempted to shoot his Viet Cong platoon commander but was prevented from doing so by his friends.

In July a Viet Cong platoon commander ordered a North Vietnamese soldier to man a guard post. An argument over unfair treatment developed. When the commander entered a nearby bunker, the soldier followed him and sprayed the interior with bullets killing the commander and 20 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers. He then killed himself.

THE VIETNAM GUARDIAN, Saigon
1 January 1970

CPYRGHT

Serious problems plague Viet Cong

by Franklin Sawyer
IPS correspondent
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SAIGON — The Viet Cong,

by its own admission, faces serious problems in its military and political efforts to win control of South Vietnam.

In Resolution Number nine a key communist document captured by the allies and released recently by the Republic of Vietnam, the Viet Cong leadership candidly presented this list of deficiencies in their operations. They have failed to promote a strong political high tide and to draft sufficient soldiers guerrilla warfare «has developed slowly and unevenly» and communist forces' «combat efficiency is still low».

The communist document confirmed a fact that was evident to allied observers in the Republic of Vietnam. As government protection extended to more than 92 percent of the South Vietnamese population during 1969, it became increasingly difficult for the Viet Cong to recruit new guerrillas.

Resolution nine went so far as to say that the three types of communist military units — local forces, guerrilla forces and main forces are all understrength and out of correct proportion to one another.

There's more: «the implementation of plans is still slow, the military guidance in a number of places has not become a good routine, the assessment of the subordinate state of mind is not RPT not reliable and the reports to superior authorities are not rpt not timely the command apparatus at various levels is clumsy and not effective».

Weak logistics and inadequate food supplies also plague the communists, according to Resolution Nine. Allied military authorities point out that in the northernmost portions of South Vietnam and other areas the Viet Cong was pushed so far back in 1969 that it lost major base, camps, supply depots and caches.

«We must be resolute in expanding and perfecting our Highland bases in order to build up a strong position for both our immediate and long-range struggles» the communists said in Resolution Nine.

Food apparently is a special problem. In Resolution Nine, the communists insist-

ted that Viet Cong-controlled people must «strive by all means to step up the production of food... not allowing it to be on the decrease as in the present situation.»

A key weakness on the political front, according to the resolution, has been that the communist leaders themselves «did not thoroughly comprehend the basic problems of the general offensive and uprising...» In other words, they failed to foresee the success of the South Vietnamese government's pacification program in rural areas.

Resolution Nine chides region and province-level party officers for losing interest in attacking, which is the highest principle of the general offensive and uprising.»

Further, Communist Party organizations everywhere — even in so-called «liberated (communist-controlled) areas» — were said to be «generally speaking, very weak.» The solution given was «tidying up of the working machinery» of the Viet Cong.

According to the latest party directives captured by the Allies, such a «tidy up» process is underway now. Indctrination, and efforts to recruit new followers have been stepped up. That, according to the communists was their own state of affairs in the second half of 1969. They are seeking to recoup in order to turn back pacification and to test the rapidly improving South Vietnamese military strength.

YOMIURI SHIMBUN, Tokyo
27 January 1970

Hanoi Facing Military Problems

By Edward Neilan

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Washington (CNS) — North Vietnamese leaders have officially admitted that they face some severe military problems.

Mixed in with the problems of how to wage the war is a fresh emphasis on the ideological debate that has been simmering in the background for years.

A main thread of interest running through all of the current discussion and jockeying in Hanoi concerns who will eventually succeed the late Ho Chi Minh as actual ruler of the country.

In Washington, government analysts believe the concentration on the military problems and the political maneuvering in North Vietnam are key factors in Hanoi's failure to budge at the Paris talks.

Lack of progress at Paris is not only due to communist intransigence, these analysts say, but partly because the North Vietnamese have not agreed on a policy line.

Some of the clues to the problems perplexing North Vietnam's leadership were culled from a lengthy series of articles published recently by Defense Minister General Vo Nguyen Giap.

Giap is the architect of the communist victory over the French at Dienbienphu and is credited with planning the Tet offensive of 1968.

He is generally in favor of hard-hitting battlefield attacks that inflict heavy physical and morale losses on the enemy.

Giap's position is supported by Lao Dong (Communist) Party Secretary-General Le Duan, and both are usually regarded as leaning toward more moderate Soviet policies.

Their main opposition comes from Truong Chinh, the National Assembly chairman and senior Politburo member, whose policies have been strongly influenced by the Communist Chinese model. (Truong Chinh's name—a nom de guerre—means "Long March.")

Truong Chinh has been speaking out in favor of protracted war that emphasizes the political side of the struggle.

In his articles, written to coincide with the 25th anniversary of the "Vietnamese People's Army" on last December 22, Gen Giap said a new recruiting drive was under way for Hanoi's armed forces.

He said the military was emphasizing ideological education and training in the use of the most modern weapons.

He wrote: "Army-building and combat realities have clearly shown that a high-quality army is one that possesses a high combat morale; an intense determination to attack the enemy; satisfactory technical and tactical levels; skillful fighting methods; neat, light and scattered organizational patterns; good equipment; and a cadre corps and command units possessing firm organizational capabilities; discipline; a staunch perseverance and high mobility in all terrain and under all weather conditions and one whose material, and technical requirements are adequately and satisfactorily met."

A key passage in Gen Giap's third article, published on last December 16, is regarded as the crux of his latest doctrine.

"If all our units possess a high quality and are capable of fighting the enemy with high combat efficiency, we can greatly increase the combat strength of our limited armed forces and, at the same time, reduce organizational and leadership problems, replenish our forces, meet our armed forces' material requirements and use our forces economically.

"This represents a major problem of strategic importance," Giap said.

In that passage, the North Vietnamese military leader summarized Hanoi's military problems.

The 1968 offensive alone may have cost the North Vietnamese as many as 40,000 dead.

This manpower problem is reflected in the defense minister's announcement of a recruiting drive.

There are broad hints that morale is sagging among the troops.

The emphasis on flexible, hard-hitting units suggests to Washington analysts that Giap may have made some concessions to the proponents of protracted war and is making plans for further offensives.

The reduction in infiltration figures, by this reasoning, could be interpreted to coincide with the new doctrine of smaller numbers of forces.

Thus, the year 1970 could see a new outbreak of smaller unit actions.

Gen Giap, in the articles, says nothing about the war ending and in fact talks about victory over the US on the battlefield.

The formula for such victory, Gen Giap says, "is the skillful use of the high quality mobile units."

Meanwhile, in another series of articles by Lt-Gen Song Hao, chief of the army's general political department, calls for the placement of more competent political commissars in army ranks.

Gen Giap has resisted party control over the army in the past while Truong Chinh has favored it.

Another problem facing the North Vietnamese is the "Vietnamization" policy of President Richard Nixon.

On the surface it would seem that Hanoi would like to see an American pullout, leaving the military job to the South Vietnamese whom the communists figure they can handle.

But in reality, Hanoi seems to be aware that the gradual American withdrawal can indeed cause problems if the South Vietnamese army is beefed up.

Remembering the Geneva Accords of the last Indochina war, the North Vietnamese want to have a foothold in a coalition government before the Americans pull out.

The last time around the signatories promised elections in both north and south but then South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem refused to go along with the election idea.

Washington analysts insist that Giap is still Hanoi's leading strategist and that his belief in the importance of a decisive battle could lead to a heating up of the fighting in 1970.

Whenever Truong Chinh starts breathing too heavily down Giap's neck, the general comes forward with statements reminding the nation of its "unyielding resistance to foreign aggressors of all denominations in the thousands of years of history."

That could only be a reference to the Chinese occupation of Vietnam which lasted from the 1st Century to the middle of the 10th Century.

It is also a slap at Truong Chinh who repeats the Peking line and is patted on the back verbally by Communist China at every opportunity.

NEW YORK TIMES
28 December 1969

CPYRGHT

Giap Indicates a Change In Hanoi's Battle Tactics

**Defense Minister, in Series of Articles,
Stresses Development of Small and
Well-Armed Mobile Strike Units**

CPYRGHT

By TAD SZULC

CPYRGHT

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON—Dec. 26—

Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, North Vietnam's Defense Minister, has declared that Hanoi is concentrating on the development of "high quality" and highly mobile strike units—instead of massed forces as in the past—to solve major strategic problems in the present stage of the Vietnam war.

He listed manpower shortages and a "balance of force" numerically favorable to the United States among the strategic problems still facing Hanoi at this time.

General Giap, the architect of the Vietnamese victory over France in 1954, extensively reviewed North Vietnamese strategy and tactics in seven articles published earlier this month in Hanoi. The theme of the articles, which were obtained here this week, was "high combat efficiency" by compact and superbly armed detachments.

"Virtue of Necessity"

United States military and intelligence experts who have studied the articles believe that in the light of the failure of the big enemy offensives in 1968, the 57-year-old Defense Minister has evolved a new strategic concept, making a "virtue out of necessity," in the words of a Washington specialist.

The North Vietnamese have largely avoided big-scale engagements with United States and South Vietnamese forces during 1969, and the impression here is that during this time General Giap has moved to streamline his strategy and that the publication of the articles between Dec. 14 and 20 in the Communist party's newspaper Nhan Dan and the army newspaper Quan Doi Nhan Dan marked its formal unveiling.

Another conclusion drawn by United States experts is that

Hanoi's new tactics—to rely on the mobile "crack units" with high fire power in conjunction with "regional forces" and with guerrilla teams—may mean a reduction in the number of troops North Vietnam plans to engage in what General Giap calls the "protracted war."

If this is the case, United States specialists are inclined to think that the North Vietnamese tactics will diminish the importance of the rate of infiltrations into South Vietnam as an indication of Hanoi's battlefield intentions.

Infiltration Watched Closely

President Nixon and other high Administration officials have been closely watching the rate of North Vietnamese infiltration since late October, when the trails dried up after the monsoon season, for clues as to whether Hanoi is preparing a major offensive in 1970. The infiltration has been a factor, among others, in the President's decisions on the withdrawals of United States troops from Vietnam.

Although the infiltration rate rose during November—Mr. Nixon called it "disturbing" in his speech on Dec. 15—the rate has surprisingly dropped in the last three weeks. Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced last Tuesday infiltration had "tapered off" to 60 per cent of what it was a year ago.

Against the background of General Giap's articles, however, United States experts suggested that the drop in infiltration might indicate that Hanoi had moved South the limited number of the "crack units" it considered necessary for "protracted-war" operations and had no immediate need for further reinforcements.

New Recruiting Drive

In his articles, written to coincide with the 25th anniversary of the "Vietnamese People's Army" on Dec. 22, General Giap disclosed that a new recruiting drive was under way for Hanoi's armed forces. He said the military was emphasizing ideological education and training in the use of the most modern weapons.

He said: "Army-building and combat realities have clearly shown that a high-quality army is one that possesses a high combat morale; an intense determination to attack the enemy; satisfactory technical and tactical levels; skilful fighting methods; neat, light and scattered organizational patterns; good equipment; and a cadre corps and command units possessing firm organizational capabilities; discipline; a staunch perseverance and high mobility in all terrains and under all weather conditions; and one whose material and technical requirements are adequately and satisfactorily met."

Passage Viewed as Important

A passage in General Giap's third article, published on Dec. 16, is regarded as the crux of his latest doctrine. It said that "If all our units possess a high quality and are capable of fighting the enemy with high combat efficiency, we can greatly increase the combat strength of our limited armed forces and, at the same time, reduce organizational and leadership problems, replenish our forces, meet our armed forces' material requirements and use our forces economically."

"This represents a major problem of strategic importance," General Giap added.

American military specialists said that in this passage General Giap had summed up the North Vietnamese problems and shortcomings.

They said that the 1968 offensive alone may have cost North Vietnam as many as 50,000 dead, that Hanoi was facing a military manpower problem, as reflected in the Defense Minister's disclosure of the new recruiting drive, and that Hanoi was suffering from morale problems.

While the first two articles recounted in detail the progress

of the Vietnamese military doctrine, as evolved by General Giap since 1945—from guerrillas to locally built combat forces without fixed battle lines and finally to large "main-force" detachments used in massive assaults and positional warfare—United States analysts doubted that the Defense Minister was engaged in scaling down his concept to any of the earlier stages. They were inclined to view his ideas as a synthesis of his earlier views.

His articles reflected his view that his army must go on learning from experience.

"We must pay attention to the development of forms of war," he wrote. "So that they can respond to the requirements of each period. When it is necessary, we must change in time outdated forms of warfare, taking up new ones which are more appropriate."

"We must know how to apply already obtained experiences and always consider the practical aspects of the battlefield in order to improve constantly our strategic, operative and tactical guidance," he continued. "We should not apply old experiences mechanically, or reapply outmoded forms of warfare."

His recipe for victory against the United States in this "protracted war" is the skilful use of the "high quality" mobile units. The Defense Minister appeared, however, not to exclude the possibility that his forces might find themselves in a situation in which a large-scale engagement is unavoidable.

"In general, in every battle we must use our forces rationally and have superior fighting methods so that we can destroy many enemy troops and suffer as little as possible," he wrote. "However, sometimes in war there are important battles which, whatever the difficulty may be, we must be determined to overcome at all costs to destroy the enemy."

While General Giap emphasized the importance of Soviet and Communist Chinese military assistance to North Vietnam, his fifth article, on Dec. 20, of a warning—which United States analysts considered to be of unusual interest—against taking foreign aid for granted.

Vietcong now recruiting boys of nine to fill ranks

CPYRGHT

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BY OUR FOREIGN STAFF

The Vietcong command has lowered its age for conscription to include 9-year-olds in an attempt to refill its decimated ranks, allied sources said in Saigon yesterday. The children were believed to be the youngest to be armed and recruited in the war, although there have been several instances of boys of 12 and 13 fighting alongside guerrillas.

The sources, quoting a captured document, said that the Communist command in the Northern provinces

had ordered all boys between 9 and 15 years to join the Vietcong to serve with guerrilla forces in rural areas and with political action groups in urban centres.

The document referred to the organising of "suicide squads" to assassinate local government officials, presumably meaning that the children would participate in such programmes, the sources said. The report was seen as another indication of the Vietcong's shortage of manpower after nearly ten years of war.

Most of the allied commanders no longer considered the Vietcong to be an effective force. Except for local actions, most of the fighting was now controlled by North Vietnamese regulars.

WASHINGTON POST
10 May 1969

CPYRGHT

VC Document Admits Offensive Failed

By David Hoffman

CPYRGHT Post Foreign Service

SAIGON, May 9

"Our military activities in the cities and suburban areas were not very successful. There was not a single mass destruction of enemy forces. The guerrilla warfare movement was still poor"

So states a captured Communist directive which appraises the enemy's February-March offensive in South Vietnam and sets goals for the next one. The directive's full text was published today by the U.S. Mission.

While criticizing several aspects of the 1969 spring offensive, the directive nevertheless hailed it as "a significant (tactical) success and a great strategic victory."

Worried About Drive

Promulgated by the Communist Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), the directive claims that 45,000 allied soldiers were killed during the

offensive that began Feb. 22 and terminated in early April. The comparable U.S. figure is less than 5000.

Of great significance to U.S. analysts is the sentence: "We concentrated on attacks of the enemy's pacification forces and harassment of the Civil Defense forces." This was interpreted to mean that the Communists—concerned by successes claimed for the Accelerated Pacification Program—the drive to extend government control in rural areas, had targeted their offensive not only against U.S. military installations but also against remote hamlets occupied recently by government militia and pacification cadre.

There is a consensus among U.S. and South Vietnamese officials that if the Vietcong sought to roll back the pacification program this spring, they failed.

The COSVN directive ac-

knowledges that Hanoi terminated the spring offensive. It also concedes that Communist forces failed to achieve the "decisive victory" that Hanoi had predicted.

"TW [Communist shorthand for North Vietnam's Politburo] also anticipated that we would achieve the decisive victory during the 1968-69 winter-spring. If each individual, each unit, and each locality had made a subjective effort, no one can deny that we would have been capable of achieving the decisive victory during the [1968-69] winter-spring [campaign]," the directive said.

Summer Offensive

Announcing without equivocation a planned, summer offensive, COSVN listed its goals as follows:

To compel concessions at the Paris peace talks, to force the withdrawal of U.S. troops, to induce recognition of the

Vietcong's National Liberation Front, and to produce a coalition government in South Vietnam, the directive stated that none of these goals should be considered final or decisive, implying that Hanoi retained larger ambitions.

June 30 was given as the deadline for the next offensive.

Assessing allied intentions, the directive states that Washington and Saigon realize the war cannot be won militarily. According to the directive, "he [the allies] must now make a decision: to end the war or to expand it."

"The American people want to end the war and withdraw U.S. troops... The reason which causes the United States to seek settlement to the war in a short period of time also constitutes a motive for us to develop our already scored successes and conduct a continuous offensive," the directive says.

Los Angeles Times
Tues., Jan. 20, 1970

Clouds Lighten Over Vietnam

CPYRGHT BY ROBERT S. ELEGANT
Times Hong Kong Bureau Chief

Neo tribesmen in breech-clouts—and little else—sit in hillside blinds in Laos methodically clicking off men and vehicles moving down the tortuous Ho Chi Minh Trail to conquer South Vietnam in the name of the dead Communist leader.

The numbers they count are today far less significant than the nature of the reinforcements which keep the Viet Cong alive. No longer are massed infantry formations moving south to fight big battles. Instead, Hanoi is dispatching political and military specialists to conduct a protracted guerrilla war.

The startling change in the character of Communist replacements conveys a clear message to even those analysts not noted for optimism. Hanoi's master strategy for winning the Vietnam war in 1970 is obviously coming unstuck before it is fairly begun.

Only six months ago, the Communists were planning to spoil Vietnamization by discrediting Saigon's military and political effectiveness before both South Vietnamese and American public opinion. The chief tactics projected major military operations in the populous and rice-rich Mekong Delta and selective attacks on weak points in Saigon's urban and rural administrative structure.

★

By the end of 1970, Hanoi promised, Saigon would be so weak it would collapse with American combat forces withdrawn.

But traffic on the Trail indicates that the Communists are preparing to fall back on their secondary strategy. That "long-haul, low-cost" guerrilla struggle had virtually won victory in 1965—until American intervention reversed the tide of battle.

Many of approximately 110,000 northern

replacements in 1965 were "sa pers," skilled in small-unit terrorism and hit-and-run shock attacks. Almost as many were political "cadres" trained to organize and indoctrinate the civilian population. But most were Hanoi's equivalent of management consultants—men dispatched to improve the performance of the Viet Cong leadership.

Reversion to long-term training hardly characterizes an insurgency approaching victory. Hanoi obviously has little confidence that it can spoil Vietnamization.

The Communists still hope to force precipitate American withdrawal and destruction of the Saigon government. But Hanoi's realists no longer bet on thus forcing a "coalition government" that would soon become Communist.

★

Hanoi cannot win the war rapidly. Hanoi cannot call off the war without imperiling its control of the north—after demanding 10 years of heroic sacrifice to "liberate our southern brethren."

Therefore, the new strategy, which attempts to insure against collapse by stiffening the Viet Cong with northern political "cadres."

The corroborating evidence is impressive.

Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who planned the massive assaults that failed, recently ordered the Viet Cong to fight "protracted war" from rural bases. "Protracted war" has been consistently advocated by Chinese-oriented Truong Chinh, who is now dominant in Hanoi.

The long-haul strategy is, obviously, necessary because the Armageddon of the Tet offensive of 1968, a Communist military disaster, can not be repeated.

Since the means often determine the end, the hard-pressed Communists have already been forced close to a vital decision. They could well end by fighting a holding action, really waiting for a new opportunity while pretending to drive for conquest.

Hanoi's new posture is the sincerest tribute to Saigon's growing strength in both cities and countryside. The feeble Saigon government which almost toppled in 1965 was quite different from the government which faces the renewed guerrilla challenge today.

Saigon could still snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.

Accelerated American withdrawal could precipitate a crippling crisis of confidence. The remarkable successes of the last year could, on the other hand, encourage the latent South Vietnamese inclination to relax complacently—and indulge in congenial political in-fighting.

Otherwise, the prospects are bright indeed—given a pinch of luck.

TIME,
26 January 1970

CPYRGHT

North Viet Nam: Year of the Dog

A rare treat is in store for North Viet Nam's citizens when the lunar year 4668 begins next month—a 11-day holiday. Even so, there is a hitch. To compensate for time lost, all workers have been ordered to report for duty the following Sunday, which is normally a day off. In the end, the *Tet* "holiday" will amount to no more than half a day. The curtailed celebration may be symbolic of Hanoi's troubles as it prepares to wind up the Year of the Rooster and begin the Year of the Dog. Nevertheless, North Viet Nam's leaders appear as grimly determined as ever to press the war in the South. Hanoi's mounting problems are not likely to keep it from marking *Tet* with a military offensive similar to those that have disrupted South Viet Nam in varying degrees on past lunar new years. Allied intelligence experts point to a tenfold increase in truck traffic through eastern Laos in recent months as proof that some action is planned. Neither at home nor on the battlefield have pressures grown to the point where the North's leaders feel compelled to negotiate a settlement. The 50th session of the Paris peace talks was held last week and produced no progress.

Cold Snap. Still, there are signs in Hanoi of worn morale, reduced capabilities and painful reassessment. Aside from the war, North Viet Nam has borne more than its share of nature's blows in the past year—a summer drought and a fall flood, an epidemic of deadly hemorrhagic fever, an earthquake, and last week a cold snap that plunged temperatures in Hanoi to freezing. There was the loss of Ho Chi Minh—and, with him, the vision of Uncle Ho entering Saigon in triumph and presiding over a united country.

An indication that Hanoi is thinking more than ever of a protracted struggle rather than a quick victory came recently from Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, hero of the victory over the French at Dienbienphu. Writing in two North Vietnamese political journals, Giap offered no hope for the swift, decisive victory he had promised in his 1961 book, *People's War, People's Army*. "Our people will certainly win," he wrote, but he cautioned that "we must have time." North Viet Nam, he

said, was fighting under severe disadvantages and would have to settle for a strategy of "fighting many with few" and "fighting strength with weakness."

Strange Accent. Giap's biggest headache is manpower. The Communists have lost nearly 600,000 men since January 1961—comparable to a U.S. loss of more than 6,000,000 troops. Viet Cong units are so depleted that Giap must furnish at least 70% of the guerrillas despite his dwindling reservoir of manpower. Increasingly, both North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units are composed of teen-agers. What is more, many of the Northerners are being sent to the southernmost Mekong Delta, a sector that is unfamiliar to them but is rapidly becoming one of the most crucial areas of the war. To bolster South Viet Nam's defenses there, President Nguyen Van Thieu last week replaced two top military commanders in the Delta. The North, determined to discredit President Nixon's Vietnamization plan, has ordered two full regiments and possibly parts of three others into the area to confront Saigon's forces. The result has indeed posed a problem for Vietnamization—but for Hanoi's brand as well as Washington's.

Viet Cong fighters resent the intrusion of the Northerners, who often assume command positions despite their youth and inexperience. Delta peasants mock their strange accent, and resent their condescending manner. Captured Communist documents tell of locals who refuse to give shelter, medical treatment and even directions to Hanoi's soldiers. One document mentioned a shop owner who raised food prices 15% whenever a Northerner walked in. A defector interviewed by TIME Saigon Bureau Chief Marsh Clark said: "Not only was my unit not welcomed by the peasants; we weren't even allowed near them."

North Viet Nam has not yet recovered from the effects of the four-year U.S. bombing that ended 14 months ago. Military target areas in Hanoi's suburbs are still strewn with rubble. Industrial production in 1969, which was supposed to increase by 16.4%, actually rose only 6.6%. One reason: bombing strikes have left North Viet Nam with only one-third the electrical capacity it possessed in 1965.

Woman Power. The government has managed to meet the monthly rice ration of 30 pounds for the average worker, but the staple is now mixed with large amounts of Soviet wheat. Many find the result unpalatable. Domestic rice production takes about 40 times the number of man-hours per pound that it does in Russia or Japan—partly because women workers, who now constitute more than 80% of the labor force, tire quickly in the paddies. According to *Hanoi Moi*, the capital's main daily, food lines have grown so long that some stores pass out "appointment numbers," assigning the customer a specific time to shop.

The annual ration of cloth is enough for two everyday outfits, but not enough for an *ao-dai*, the ladies' flowing tunic-cum-trousers, or for a winter coat. There is little local transportation except for bicycles. One recent visitor to Hanoi reported that the only nonessential goods he saw for sale were some Chinese-made pingpong balls. Hanoi's beer gardens frequently sell out before closing time. *Hanoi Moi* recently carried one letter from a cigarette-factory worker who apologized for the number of cigarettes that were "only half full of tobacco," and another from a smoker who complained: "You have to strike more than ten matches before one will light."

Nothing summarized the North's woes as graphically as a letter written by a 14-year-old schoolboy to his father, a soldier fighting in the South; it was reprinted in *Nhan Dan*. "I eat rice mixed with wheat. The shirt I wear is full of patches. The paper I write on has many lumps. I have only rubber sandals to ward off the winter cold. Grandmother is still working in the fields. Mother still digs irrigation ditches."

With every account of hardship, there is an exhortation to greater work and sacrifice. Nowhere has there appeared an official suggestion that Hanoi should alleviate the suffering by calling a halt to the fighting. The power to make that decision rests with the triumvirate that succeeded Ho—Premier Pham Van Dong, Party Secretary Le Duan and Assembly Chairman Truong Chinh. Analysts in the South and elsewhere are convinced that Truong now ranks first among equals. Those with hopes of a quick end to the war can hardly take comfort from the fact that his name translates as "Long March."

Joseph Alsop

Hanoi's Infiltration 'Drop' Reflects Manpower Losses

CPYRGHT

IMAGINE the United States shipping off to a foreign war, in a single year, and with only a minimal chance of ever coming home again, all the able-bodied young men who reached draft age in 1965, 1966 and 1967.

It is something this country has never done, thank God, so it is pretty hard to imagine. Yet it is almost the exact equivalent of what Hanoi did in the year 1968, when the exports of North Vietnamese military manpower were enormously increased to sustain the Tet and subsequent offensives—all of which were military disasters.

To cite the underlying facts very briefly, North Vietnam, with its much smaller population than ours, is officially estimated to produce an annual "year-class" of about 125,000 able-bodied young men. Thus three year classes are 375,000 men.

Throughout 1968, North Vietnam's manpower exports to the war in the South (usually mislabeled "infiltration") ran at the average rate of around 29,000 men per month. Thus that year's total export of manpower by Hanoi was just under 350,000 men, or hardly close to three entire year-classes, as stated above.

This is the essential context in which to judge all the current double-talk about "reduced infiltration," and peaceable "signals" from Hanoi, and so on and on. Any government that was not wholly inhuman and irrational, would be inclined to stop, look and listen after throwing almost three entire year-classes of its young men down the drain, to no good military purpose.

This is, in fact, what Hanoi has done this year. In the first six months of 1969, the North's manpower exports were cut back to around 10,000 men per month. Since then, they have been again cut back, so that they have recently been fluctuating between 3,500 and 4,000 men per month.

Hanoi's theory, justifying the cutbacks, was the famous reversion to "protracted war," waged by small units with low losses. This was advocated by the Chinese, and quite probably by Gen. Vo Nguyen Glap, at the time of the U.S. intervention in 1965. Unfortunately, for Hanoi, the theory of reversion to "protracted war," which might well have worked very well in 1965, seems to be working very badly indeed in 1969.

IN THE WAYS described in the last report in this space, the Vietcong structure, in South Vietnam, Hanoi's most precious asset,

is everywhere being eroded at a serious rate. In a few provinces and districts, this V.C. structure has in fact been just about destroyed already.

In all provinces, continuance of the present rate of erosion will leave the V.C. structure crippled, or even in danger of final collapse, by some time next spring. Yet the Vietcong structure in the South, is, by definition, the essential, indispensable apparatus that Hanoi must depend upon to wage "protracted war." You can hardly carry on a guerrilla war without guerrillas.

There is a rather direct link, moreover, between the erosion of the V.C. structure and the reduced rate of North Vietnamese manpower exports. Because exports are so far down, the enemy's big units in South Vietnam are in general cruelly depleted. Battalions with no more strength than a reinforced company, regiments with no more strength than a reinforced battalion, have become all too common. No wonder, since so few replacements have been coming in!

Because the big units are so depleted, too, they are generally in refuge in remote base areas, or they have broken down into small groups of men with no mission except survival. Hence they are no longer performing one of their

main functions. This is to take the brunt of the fighting, and thereby to give some protection to the V.C. structure.

Such, then, in simplest terms, is the problem that now faces Ho Chi Minh's quarrelling heirs in Hanoi. If they do not greatly increase their manpower exports, the V.C. structure in the South will have no protection at all, and will continue to be eroded as at present. But if they do increase their manpower exports to mount another offensive effort, they are pretty sure to expend still another year-class—and once more to no purpose.

It is anyone's guess what Hanoi will do. There is only a single fragment of solid evidence to date: the return from North Vietnam of the 559 Transport Group, which used to be in the Ashau Valley. The 559 group has been heavily augmented, and has been sent down to Chepone, on the Laos trail.

This points to what can only be called another February-March spasm of effort by the North. But with any luck at all—unless President Nixon's troop withdrawals are over-hasty—the new spasm should produce even fewer results than the spasm in February-March of this year. If so, Hanoi will again confront the same old dilemma after the spasm is over.

ANNUAL FIGURES FOR RALLIERS:

12,248	-	1963	27,178	-	1967
5,417	-	1964	18,171	-	1968
11,124	-	1965	39,502	-	1969
20,242	-	1966			

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CUBA AS AN ESTABLISHED POLICE STATE

a. The tyrannical and totalitarian characteristics of the Cuban regime completely overshadow whatever socialist characteristics it may have.

b. Castro's regime is no different from other, older Communist regimes in that essentially it must rely on its military and security forces in order to exist and to function.

c. By imposing massive worker mobilizations, as is the current Cuban practice, the regime has gained a maximum degree of control over an increasingly discontented population while at the same time it is meeting critical labor shortages.

d. Although Castro repeatedly exhorts the Cubans to work on the basis of "moral incentives," in fact he must rely on intimidation and coercion of the workers to achieve results.

e. There might be speculation on the possibility of a great "purge" of party and government ranks of all who failed to do their part, in the event -- which we expect -- of Castro's failing to make the ten-million-ton sugar harvest.

2. Attached is a brief outline of the growth of Cuba as a police state, current news items from Cuba which reveal the weaknesses of the system, and an excerpt from a book by Eric Hoffer on "The Readiness to Work" in a totalitarian versus a democratic state. We wish to call your attention also to the related short subject and five articles on current conditions in Cuba.

CPYRGHT

~~SECRET~~

March 1970

CUBA AS AN ESTABLISHED POLICE STATE

Cuba's massive worker mobilizations illustrate the degree to which the regime has gained control over the Cuban people, while at the same time it alleviates severe shortages of labor. This total agricultural mobilization, as well as mobilized work forces in other sectors, is under the direction of Raul Castro's Ministry of Armed Forces which has also supplied military personnel to serve directly as cane cutters, truck drivers and mill hands during sugar harvesting.

To lessen this drain on military manpower, the Ministry, together with the Communist Youth Union (UJC) has set up the "Centennial Youth Column" to work in agriculture and animal husbandry, especially in Camaguey Province where the labor shortage has been most acute. The strength of this force has been estimated from 50,000 to 100,000. Both men and women have been recruited and they serve for a minimum of three years: Years which count toward obligatory military service. They receive regular combat training, are subject to military discipline and live in camps operated jointly by the military and the Communist Youth Union.

A severe traditional shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers in the construction industry has led to a military system of work brigades for certain sectors of this industry. The "Che Guevara Brigade," organized in late 1967 with great fanfare, is a labor unit organized on a military basis, with several thousand men and several hundred pieces of equipment. It is used primarily in land clearing, dam building and road construction. Many similar brigades have since been established by the Ministry of Armed Forces, with the emphasis mainly on construction of roads, dams and canals.

Castro's police state had its beginnings in the earliest years of the regime when the government set out to eliminate what opposition remained to its increasingly radical posture. It took over the newspapers and magazines which had not closed down earlier. Castro himself intervened in the elections held by the national student and labor organizations to ensure that the Communist "unity" slate of each organization was elected over the more independent, anti-Communist candidates. In the case of the students, persistent opposition at the University of Havana brought about a thorough purge in both the faculty and student body.

In dealing with opposition from the Church, Castro first publicly denounced the anti-Communist activities of some Catholic priests. These activities continued, however, and led to the government's closing many of the parochial schools and expelling most of the priests as well as most of the nuns and monks engaged in teaching or working in hospitals. Likewise some of the Protestant sects suffered repression and persecution from the Castro regime. Thus, two years after seizing power, Castro had established firm

control and had eliminated or at least negated any threats to his position and power. He then set about to eliminate underground opposition.

In September 1960 he created a network of neighborhood spies and informers which were called Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs). Members were recruited from every apartment house, city block and work center, and this fast-growing force supplemented the militia, which had been organized right after Castro took over the government. Although the role of the militia eventually became less important, the Committees have expanded to the point they now have a claimed membership of over three million -- of a total population of eight million -- with some one and one-half million belonging to civil guard groups. The ninth anniversary of the founding of the Committees was marked in September 1969 with a huge mobilization of agricultural workers, and a call for greater "revolutionary vigilance" on the part of all the CDR members.

Because of Soviet aid, the Cuban armed forces are both well trained and well equipped. In addition, the Border Guard Force and the Department of State Security (DSE), which come under the Ministry of Interior, are effective in controlling the people and in suppressing subversive activities. In short, the armed forces and the Ministry of Interior, supplemented by the Committees, have now become so proficient that internal security is tight, any infiltration attempts have little chance of success and Castro is able to maintain himself in power by force, if necessary.

LE MONDE, PARIS

21 January 1970

Cuba

CPYRGHT

**LES SABOTEURS
DE LA CAMPAGNE SUCRIERE
SERONT FUSILLÉS**

La Havane (A.F.P.). — « Les éléments contre-révolutionnaires tentent de saboter la campagne sucrière. Ils seront fusillés, c'est un ordre de Fidel Castro », a déclaré le lieutenant Jesus Calvo, secrétaire à l'organisation du parti communiste cubain de la province de Pinar-del-Rio.

Le lieutenant Calvo prononçait un discours à Bahia-Honda lors d'une cérémonie marquant le début dans cette localité de la campagne sucrière, qui doit atteindre cette année 10 millions de tonnes pour l'ensemble de Cuba. Il a déclaré que l'une des méthodes préférées des saboteurs était « de jeter des morceaux de fer dans les machines des raffineries pour les détraquer », et a lancé un appel à la vigilance de tous les travailleurs. La seule chose qui attende les saboteurs, a-t-il indiqué, c'est le peloton d'exécution. « Personne ne pourra les sauver, personne. C'est un ordre donné directement par le commandant en chef. »

Cuba a déjà produit 2 millions de tonnes de canne à sucre sur les 10 millions de tonnes prévues pour la récolte de cette année, a annoncé lundi la radio cubaine. Le troisième million de tonnes devrait être atteint le 9 février prochain, selon le programme de production.

HAVANA RADIO

21 January 1970

CPYRGHT

DISCIPLINE AND WORK NEEDED IN SUGAR HARVEST

"We just cannot get the sugar harvest done with will power alone. As we have said before, we cannot get the sugar harvest done exclusively with will power," said Cuban Communist party Central Committee Organization Secretary and Politburo member Armando Hart Dávalos in a speech closing a meeting of the technical brigade of the Jesus Suarez Gayol Workers Column in Camaguey.

"Without will power and enthusiasm," Hart pointed out, "there is no harvest, but will power and enthusiasm must go hand in hand with organization and technology -- we must take maximum advantage of our available technical personnel." He singled out the fact that one of the most important problems that must be explained in the middle of the battle of the sugar harvest is the union, in a disciplined manner, between machinery and man to achieve maximum benefit from each workday.

Concerning equipment, Hart stressed that effective repairs must be made, maximum use must be made of it, and above all, greater efficiency must

be achieved in the operation of equipment. "We cannot get the sugar harvest done with praise and soft words. The sugar harvest is a battle waged minute by minute and it is not as worthwhile to talk about the attitude and willingness, which all of us already have, as it is to insist, underscore, and single out weaknesses and shortcomings, and to hammer on them ceaselessly, continuously," said Hart at the Amancio-Santa Cruz Regional division meeting in Camaguey with the Jesus Suarez Gayol Workers Column.

The political bureau member added: "Praise and soft words do not make the 10-million-ton sugar harvest. Better headway can be made by hammering on weaknesses, harping on shortcomings, and feeling shame over them."

Concluding, Hart pointed out: "Not to mill 10 million arrobas of cane every day must shame each one of the men and women in Camaguey Province."

HAVANA RADIO

31 January 1970

CPYRGHT

DOCUMENT URGES FASTER SUGAR HARVEST PACE

The Party Central Committee Revolutionary Orientation Commission has completed a document which enumerates the most important tasks to be done in order to increase the productivity of harvest work to the pace required in order to beat the 10-Million-Ton calendar.

One of the sections of the document points out that -- just as stated by our commanding chief -- we achieved the second million of the 10-million-ton harvest with a few hours delay. "This is most important as the cane that we do not grind now, we will have to grind later with less yield and in the rain." The document adds that this is the time to increase the grinding to the maximum. "The grinding cannot be increased to the maximum by merely increasing the speed of the mills. The increase in grinding starts at the furrow, by the sprout, continues on to the lifting device and the wagon, continues on to the collection and preprocessing centers or cranes, and on to the railroad track to the tip-platform."

"That is why when we talk about increasing to the maximum the grinding in our mills, we have to keep in mind this chain which without one of its links, the cane would never make it to the mill. This is the time to step up the pace at all points.

"We are not asking anyone to kill themselves cutting cane, or by lifting it, or transporting it, or that they remain longer periods of time at the canefields, or to declare themselves guerrillas and live in the canefields. If this was necessary we would request you to do it, but this is not the case. The trouble is that we must organize, foresee, and encourage."

The document states that a harvest comprises millions of small details, and adds: "technical cutting norms must be strictly followed; that each stack weighs 40 arrobas and that the area for stacking must be clear. It is not a matter of cutting the cane alone, for after that is done we really have to care for the cane. Let us keep in mind that as soon as the cane is cut it starts to decay and die, so we have to see to it that this cane is lifted

immediately. The spare lifting equipment, if we have any, should be at the canefield in case it is needed. The lifting equipment should not stop due to poor transportation arrangements. We must avoid queues at the field or collection centers, and we should never forget that it is a great encouragement to the canecutter to have the lifting equipment right behind him. The transportation equipment should be in the field on time, next to the lifting equipment, as an assurance that the cane will arrive fresh at the collection centers. We must use both pieces of equipment properly."

ABSENTEEISM IS MAJOR PROBLEM OF SUGAR HARVEST

CPYRGHT

Jorge Maciques Interview

(from Matanzas Radio Broadcast, 18 February 1970)

[Excerpts] This broadcast will present an interview with provincial MICONS director Jorge Maciques recorded by Comrade Nelson Notario Castro which will give us a more current picture of the Colon harvest situation. Maciques will refer to the initial results of the steps taken to surmount the problem of the weak participation of MICONS work forces' poor participation in canecutting work.

Notario: Maciques, what steps were taken by the Matanzas MICONS enterprise to offset its poor participation in the 10-million ton sugar harvest in Matanzas Province.

Maciques: Nelson, our principal critical problem is the high rate of absenteeism. In this connection, a plan was worked out which called for our workcamp command cadres to review the situation in each camp. Later we discussed absenteeism at the camps in a meeting with all the workers. The plan has two objectices: to form a camp committee to discuss absenteeism with the guilty parties and to control camp exit permits. In other words, this committee will deal directly with those absentees. A committee in our work units will assist them, and visit absentees at their homes. All of these matters are being organized and the meeting have taken place at the camps.

In case of chronic absentees, we are taking exemplary action. We are publicly reporting their names. [list of names follows] These comrades were dishonorably expelled from our camps, and their identification cards as permanent canecutters withdrawn from them. Also, this action was recorded in each man's work record as a demerit.

Notario: What have been the results of these measures?

Maciques: Since the meetings last week, the results are as follows. During the week of 1 to 7 February we had a 23 percent absent, and during the week of 8 to 14 February we had 17 percent absent. As you can see, there has been a decrease in absenteeism. Which is our worst problem.

Notario: Maciques, what can you tell us about the productivity results?

Maciques: We are getting the expected results from the mobilized forces. During the week of 1 to 7 February the productivity average was 161 arrobas per worker, and the week of 8 to 14 February it was 140 arrobas per worker. As you can see productivity is on the increase and we are making great advances in this respect.

The absenteeism rate is very high at 17 percent. We expect to reduce it to a tolerable level of 7 percent maximum. We believe that through an all-out-effort it could easily be lowered to about four or five percent.

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There are some camps that are falling behind, and we want to mention one--the San Jose camp which handles construction material. This camp is located in Jovellanos. This camp has been having problems since the beginning of our mobilization, and both absenteeism and productivity rates have had adverse results. We expect that a serious effort will be made there to eliminate all these problems.

[Excerpts] Ruiz: As far as the Jose Smith Comas sugar mill is concerned, we have some problems. One of the problems we are confronting, which has been discussed directly with the peasants of this area, is the peasant's work attendance on Saturdays and Sundays.

Reporter: Roberto, as second secretary of the regional bureau of the Cuban Communist Party in Cardenas, do you think that the work that the party has done with the peasants thus far is good?

Ruiz: I think so. I understand that we must continue doing more than what has been done so far. We have had discussions with the peasants. Each one of the reasons which makes their participation in the harvest necessary has been explained to them: the collective problems we are confronting regarding the harvest, what their absence from work in the fields means to each one of the sugar centrals.

Reporter: However, these discussions have not been too fruitful?

Ruiz: As I told you before, I think that the place where the best results have been obtained from the discussions is at the Espana sugar central, where we truly have the worst problem with the peasants. We have had discussions not just at the leadership level, that is, with the comrades of the National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) in the area or with the township comrades. We have discussed the question directly with the peasants.

Reporter: What is the party's opinion of the ANAP harvest work thus far in the area. What is the party's opinion of the ANAP's work as an organization.

Ruiz: We must reach the conclusion that the work of the ANAP in the area has not yielded the results expected.

CPYRGHT

Las Villas Situation

(From Santa Clara Radio Broadcast, 18 February 1970)

According to the statistical report of the 10-10 Movement which appears on the last page of today's newspaper VANGUARDIA, the situation of some units in the province the week of 9-15 February is the following: Las Villas Provincial agricultural command post: from a commitment of 196 comrades to be enlisted for the sugar harvest, only 38 were recruited; Basic Industry Ministry: from 78, eight were recruited; Public Health Ministry: 132, 34 recruited; Central University at Santa Clara: from 421, 297 recruited; Construction Ministry: from 141, only 74 recruited;

National Agricultural Development Department: from 134, only 46 were recruited; Sugar Industry Ministry: from 208, only 96 were recruited; Cuban Broadcasting Institute: from 34, only 20 were recruited. The National Association of Small Farmers and Light Industry Ministry did not report on the 10-10 movement during the week in question.

Falcon Township Problem

(from Santa Clara Radio Broadcast, 17 February 1970)

CPYRGHT [From the Las Villas sugar harvest program section "Behind Schedule"]

Only 50 peasants out of 200 from Falcon township acutally went to the Placetatas area to cut cane. This is the fault of the presidents of the co-operatives and the [party] activists. The cooperatives which did not come through are the Cuba Nueva, whose president is Francisco Martinez and whose activist is Alberto la Rosa. Another cooperative which did not fulfill its commitment was the Cuba Libre, whose president is Felix Jimenez. The Camilo Cienfuegos and Clemente Cardenas cooperatives also did not live up to their commitments.

As you can see, the presidents of the cooperatives and the activists are to blame for failing to supply 100 Falcon township canecutters.

FROM THE ORDEAL OF CHANGE

by Eric Hoffer

New York, 1963

CPYRGHT

CHAPTER 5

The Readiness to Work

THE OTHER DAY I happened to ask myself a routine question and stumbled on a surprising answer. The question was: What is the uppermost problem which confronts the leadership in a Communist regime? The answer: The chief preoccupation of every government between the Elbe and the China Sea is how to make people work—how to induce them to plow, sow, harvest, build, manufacture, work in the mines, and so forth. It is the most vital problem which confronts them day in day out, and it shapes not only their domestic policies but their relations with the outside world.

One is struck by the strangeness of it: that a movement which set out to achieve a miraculous transformation of man and society should have succeeded in transforming it into a miracle something which to us is entirely natural and matter-of-fact. In the Occident the chief problem is not how to induce people to work but how to find enough jobs for people who want to work. We seem to take the readiness to work almost as much for granted as the readiness to breathe. Yet the goings on inside the Communist world serve to remind us that the Occident's attitude toward work, so far from being natural and normal, is strange and unprecedented. It was the relatively recent emergence of this attitude which, as much as anything else, gave modern Western civilization its unique character and marked it off from all its predecessors.

In practically all civilizations we know of, and in the Occident too for many centuries, work was viewed as a curse, a mark of bondage, or, at best, a necessary evil. That free men should be willing to work day after day, even after their vital needs are satisfied, and that work should be seen as a mark of uprightness and manly worth, is not only unparalleled in history but remains more or less incomprehensible to many people outside the Occident.

The Occident's novel attitude toward work is traced by some to the rules of St. Benedict (*circa* A.D. 530) which prescribed manual labor (six hours a day in winter and seven hours in summer) for every monk in the Benedictine monasteries. Hereby the contemptuous attitude of the

classical world toward work, as fit only for slaves, was turned into reverence. The new attitude penetrated into the towns which usually grew around the monasteries, and from there was diffused farther afield. Still, the fact remains that in the Middle Ages people did not show any marked inclination to work more than was necessary to maintain a fairly low standard of living. It was only in the sixteenth century that we see emerging a strange addiction to work.

According to Max Weber and others it was Luther's idea of the sacredness of man's calling, and particularly Calvin's doctrine of predestination, which infused a new seriousness into man's daily doings. According to Calvin salvation and eternal damnation are predestined from the foundation of the world. No one can know whether he is of the few predestined to everlasting life or of the many foreordained to everlasting death. But since it is natural to assume that the chosen would succeed in whatever they undertake while the damned would fail, one was spurred to strive with all one's might for worldly success as proof of one's salvation. Erich Fromm complements this theory by pointing out that the unbearable uncertainty induced by this doctrine would by itself drive people to "frantic activity and a striving to do something."

Still, it is highly doubtful whether the tremendous dynamism displayed by the Occident during the past four hundred years was fueled mainly by religious elements or derivatives. The decisive factor in the development of modern Western civilization was not the psychological effect of some religious idea or doctrine but the mass emergence of the autonomous individual. And it is plausible that the Reformation itself was a by-product of the process of individualization.

We are not concerned here with the manner in which the individual was released from the compact corporate pattern of the Middle Ages. A fortuitous combination of circumstances, not the least of which was the spread of literacy by the introduction of paper and printing, brought about a cracking and crumbling of the feudal economy and a loosening of the grip of an all-embracing Catholic

Church. Whether he willed it or not, the Western European individual, toward the end of the fifteenth century, found himself more or less on his own. Now the separation of the individual from a collective body, even when it is ardently striven for, is a painful experience. The newly emerging individual is an unstable and explosive entity. This is true of the young who cut loose from the family and venture forth on their own; of persons who break away or are separated from a compact tribe, clan, community, party, or clique; of discharged soldiers separated from the corporate life of an army; and even of freed slaves removed from the intimate corporate life of slave quarters. An autonomous existence is heavily burdened and beset with fears, and can be endured only when bolstered by confidence and self-esteem. The individual's most vital need is to prove his worth, and this usually means an insatiable hunger for action. For it is only the few who can acquire a sense of worth by developing and employing their capacities and talents. The majority prove their worth by keeping busy. A busy life is the nearest thing to a purposeful life. But whether the individual takes the path of self-realization or the easier one of self-justification by action he remains unbalanced and restless. For he has to prove his worth anew each day. It does not require the uncertainties of an outlandish doctrine of predestination to drive him to "frantic effort and a striving to do something."

The burst of activity and creativeness we know as the Renaissance was in full swing before Luther and Calvin entered the field. It was the individualization of a once corporate society which manifested itself as an awakening and a renascence. The Reformation itself was a by-product of this individualization—a reaction against it. For there are many who find the burdens, the anxiety, and the isolation of an individual existence unbearable. This is particularly true when the opportunities for self-advancement are relatively meager, and one's individual interests and prospects do not seem worth living for. Such persons sooner or later turn their backs on an individual existence and strive to acquire a sense of worth and of purpose by an identification with a holy cause, a leader, or a movement. The faith and pride they derive from such an identification serve them as substitutes for the unattainable self-confidence and self-respect. The movement of the Reformation was to begin with such an escape from the burden of an autonomous existence.

Luther and Calvin did not come to liberate the individual from the control of an authoritarian church. "The Reformation," says Max Weber, "meant not the elimination of the church's control over everyday life, but rather the substitution of a new form of control for the previous one. It meant the repudiation of a control which was very lax, at that time barely perceptible in practice, and hardly more than formal, in favor of a regulation of the whole conduct which, penetrating to all departments of private and public life, was infinitely burdensome and earnestly enforced."* The rule of Calvinism as enforced in Geneva and elsewhere was inimical to individual autonomy not only in religious matters but in all departments of life. Had Luther and Calvin had at their disposal the fearful instruments of coercion of a Hitler or a Stalin they would have perhaps herded back the emerging individual into the communal corral, and would have stifled the new Occident at its birth. As it was, the European individual mastered the Reformation and used it for his own ends. He used faith to lubricate his machine of action and legitimize his success. He rushed headlong into the thousand new paths to action and fortune opened by the discovery of new continents and trade routes, and the development of new sciences and techniques. He reached out to the four corners of the earth, carrying his restlessness with him and infecting the whole world with it.

To an outside observer an individualist society seems in the grip of some strange obsession. Its ceaseless agitation strikes him as a kind of madness. And, indeed, action is basically a reaction against loss of balance—a flailing of the arms to regain one's balance. To dispose a soul to action we must upset its equilibrium. And if, as Napoleon wrote to Carnot, "the art of government is not to let men go stale," then it is essentially an art of unbalancing. This is particularly true in an industrialized society which requires a population disposed to continued exertion and alertness. The crucial difference between the Communist regimes and the individualist Occident is thus perhaps in the methods of unbalancing by which their masses are kept active and striving.

The Communists started out as miracle workers. Not only were they to bring about a miraculous transformation of man and society but the material tasks, too, which they set themselves—the industrialization and modernization of

* Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1930), pp. 36-37.

vast territories—were to partake of the miraculous. These tasks were to be realized by the energies released by a creed, and they were to demonstrate the validity and superiority of this creed. To proceed soberly, after a careful mobilization of skill, equipment, and material, would be to act in the manner of men of little faith. One had to plunge headlong into one grandiose project after another, heedless of the waste and suffering involved. Faith, dedication, and self-sacrifice were to accomplish the impossible.

Much has been said by all manner of people in praise of enthusiasm. The important point is that enthusiasm is ephemeral, and hence unserviceable for the long haul. One can hardly conceive of a more unhealthy and wasteful state of affairs than where faith and dedication are requisite for the performance of unmiraculous everyday activities. The attempt to keep people enthusiastic once they have ceased to believe is productive of the most pernicious consequences. An enormous effort has to be expended to maintain the revivalist spirit and, inevitably, with the passage of time, the fuels used to generate enthusiasm become more crude and poisonous. The Communists started out with faith and extravagant hope, then passed to pride and hatred, and finally settled on fear. The use of Terror to evoke enthusiasm was one of Stalin's most pernicious inventions. For he did succeed in extracting strength from crushed souls.

The Communists did not withhold their hand from other modes of unbalancing. The transportation of vast populations from one end of the land to another; the shifting of muzhiks to towns and of townspeople to farms; the periodic purges; the sudden changes in the party line—such were some of the crude jolts by which they tried to keep the masses from going stale.

There is no doubt that the Communists can point to tremendous industrial achievements during the past forty years. But even while Stalin was alive it must have dawned on some of the leaders that the techniques of generating enthusiasm, despite their impressive potentialities, cannot achieve the smooth effortlessness which is the outstanding characteristic of a genuine machine age. If in order to keep the wheels turning you have to deafen ears with propaganda, crack the whip of Terror, and keep pushing people around, then you haven't got a machine civilization no matter how numerous and ingenious your machines.

In an individualist society the mode of unbalancing is far more subtle, and requires relatively little prompting from without. For the autonomous individual constitutes a chronically unbalanced entity. The confidence and sense of worth which alone can keep him on an even keel are extremely perishable, and must be generated anew each day. An achievement today is but a challenge for tomorrow. And since it is mainly by work that the majority of individuals prove their worth and regain their balance, they must keep at it continuously. Hence the ceaseless hustling of an individualist society.

No one will claim that the majority of people in the Western world, be they workers or managers, find fulfillment in their work. But they do find in it a justification of their existence. The ability to do a day's work and get paid for it gives one a sense of usefulness and worth. The pay check and the profitable balance sheet are certificates of value. Where the job requires exceptional skill or tests a person's capacities there is an additional sense of exhilaration. But even a job of the sheerest routine yields the individual something besides the wherewithal of a living.

The significance of a job in the life of the Occidental individual is made particularly clear by the state of mind of the unemployed. There is little doubt that the frustration engendered by unemployment is due more to a corrosive sense of worthlessness than to economic hardship. Unemployment pay, however adequate, cannot mitigate it. In the Occident it is inaction rather than actual hardship which breeds discontent and disaffection. In America even the legitimate retirement after a lifetime of work constitutes a fearsome crisis. In the longshoremen's union in San Francisco the award of a \$200-a-month pension to men over sixty-five, who had twenty-five years of service on the waterfront, brought in its wake a sudden rise in the rate of death among the retired. It is now recognized that men must be conditioned for retirement so as to endow them with a specific kind of endurance. Herbert Hoover on his eighty-second birthday echoed a widespread feeling when he said that "a man who retires from work 'shrivels up into a nuisance to all mankind.'"

It is to be expected that where a sense of worth is attainable without effort, when one is born with it so to speak, the readiness to work is not likely to be pronounced. Thus in societies where the Negro race is officially des-

ignated as inferior, and every white person can feel himself a member of a superior race, the pressure of individual self-assertion by work is considerably reduced. The presence of indolent "white trash" is usually a characteristic of such societies. A somewhat similar situation is to be observed in class- or caste-bound societies.

The remarkable thing is that the Occident's addiction to work is by no means synonymous with a love of work. The Western workingman actually has the illusion that he can kill work and be done with it. He "attacks" every job he undertakes and feels the ending of a task as a victory. Those who, like the Negro, know that work is eternal tend to take it easy.

The individualist society which manifests a marked readiness to work is one in which individualism is widely diffused. It is the individual in the mass who turns to work as a means of proving his worth and usefulness. Things are different where individualism is exclusive, as it was in Greece. The exclusive individual will tend to prove his worth and usefulness by managing and leading others or by developing and exercising his capacities and talents. Work, though it be hard and unceasing, is actually an easy solution of the problems which confront the autonomous individual, and it is not surprising that the individual in the mass should take this easy way out.

It hardly needs emphasizing that the individualist society we are talking about is not one in which every individual is unique—with judgments, tastes, and attitudes distinctly his own. All that one can claim for the individual in such a society is that he is more or less on his own; that he chooses his course through life, proves himself by his own efforts, and has to shoulder the responsibility for what he makes of his life. It is obvious, therefore, that it is individual freedom which generates the readiness to work. On the face of it this is rather startling. It means that when the mass of people are free to work or not to work they usually act as if they are driven to work. Freedom releases the energies of the masses not by exhilarating but by unbalancing, irritating, and goading. You do not go to a free society to find carefree people. When we leave people on their own, we are delivering them into the hands of a ruthless taskmaster from whose bondage there is no escape. The individual who has to justify his existence by his own efforts is in eternal bondage to himself.

There is a remarkable statement made in 1958 by the director of industry and commerce in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. "It is harder," he said, "to provide the

members of a community with shelter, clothing and food than to launch an artificial satellite." The words sound odd in our ears, but they underline a now familiar paradox: The revolutionary governments which have sprung up in recent decades in all parts of the world see themselves as the embodiment of the popular will, yet they do not know how to make the masses work. They know how to generate popular enthusiasm and how to induce in the masses a readiness to fight, but they seem helpless in anything which requires an automatic readiness on the part of the masses to work day in day out. On the other hand, the same governments do not find it hard to create conditions favorable for the performance of scientists, professors, top technicians, and intellectuals in general. They know how to foster the exceptional skills requisite for the manufacture of complex machinery and instruments, even the harnessing of the atom and launching of satellites.

There is little likelihood that the intellectuals who constitute the leading element in these new governments would be receptive to the idea that, in the case of the masses, there is a connection between individual freedom and the readiness to work; that individual freedom is a potent factor in energizing and activating the masses. To an intelligentsia preoccupied with planning, managing, and guiding, no idea will seem so patently absurd as that the masses, if left wholly to themselves, would labor and strive of their own accord.

The interesting thing is that the energizing effect of freedom seems confined to the masses. There is no unequivocal evidence that the intellectual is at his creative best when left wholly on his own. It is not at all certain that individual freedom is a vital factor in the release of creative energies in literature, art, music, and science. Many of the outstanding achievements in these fields were not realized in an atmosphere of absolute freedom. Certainly in this country cultural creativeness has not been proportionate to our degree of individual freedom. There is a chronic insecurity at the core of the creative person, and he needs a milieu that will nourish his confidence and sense of uniqueness. Discerning appreciation and a modicum of deference and acclaim are probably more vital for his creative flow than freedom to fend for himself. Thus a despotism that recognizes and subsidizes excellence might be more favorable for the performance of the intellectual than a free society that does not take him seriously. Coleridge protested that "the darkest despotisms on the continent have done more for the growth and elevation of the fine arts than the English government. A great musical

composer in Germany and Italy is a great man in society and a real dignity and rank are conceded him. So it is with the sculptor or painter or architect. . . . In this country there is no general reverence for the fine arts." It is of course conceivable that a wholly free society might become imbued with a reverence for the fine arts; but up to now the indications have been that where common folk have room enough there is not much room for the dignity and rank of the typical writer, artist, and intellectual in general.

The paradox is, then, that although the intellectual has been in the forefront of the struggle for individual freedom he can never feel wholly at home in a free society. He finds there neither an unquestioned sense of usefulness nor favorable conditions for the realization of his talents. Hence the contradiction between what the intellectual professes while he battles the status quo, and what he practices once he comes to power. At present, in every part of the world, we see how revolutionary movements initiated by idealistic intellectuals and preserved in their keeping tend to crystallize into hierarchical social orders in which an aristocratic intelligentsia commands, and the masses are expected to obey. Such social orders, as we have seen, are ideal for the performance of the intellectual but not for that of the masses. It is this circumstance rather than the corruption of power which has been turning idealistic intellectuals into strident, ruthless slavedrivers.

The vital question is of course whether the masses, energized and activated by freedom, can create aught worthwhile on their own. Though the masses have been with us from the beginning of time we know little about their creative potentialities. In all the fifty centuries of history the masses had apparently only one chance to show what they could do on their own, without masters to push them around, and it needed the discovery of a new world to give them that chance. In his *Last Essays*, Georges Bernanos remarks that the French Empire was not an achievement of the masses but of a small band of heroes. It is equally true that the masses did not make the British, German, Russian, Chinese, or Japanese empires. But the masses made America. They were the vanguard: they infiltrated, shoved, stole, fought, incorporated, founded, and raised the flag—

And all the disavouched, hard-bitten pack
Shipped overseas to steal a continent
With neither shirts nor honor to their back.*

It is this fact which gives America its utter newness. All civilizations we know of were shaped by exclusive minori-

* Stephen Vincent Benét, *John Brown's Body* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1928).

ties of kings, nobles, priests, and the equivalents of the intellectual. It was they who formulated the ideals, aspirations, and values, and it was they who set the tone. America is the only instance of a civilization shaped and colored by the tastes and values of common folk. No elite of whatever nature can feel truly at home in America. This is true not only of the aristocrat proper, but also of the intellectual, the military leader, the business tycoon, and even the labor leader.

The deprecators of America usually point to its defects as being those of a business civilization. Actually they are the defects of the mass: worship of success, the cult of the practical, the identification of quality with quantity, the addiction to sheer action, the fascination with the trivial. We also know the virtues: a superb dynamism, an unprecedented diffusion of skills, a genius for organization and teamwork, a flexibility which makes possible an easy adjustment to the most drastic change, an ability to get things done with a minimum of tutelage and supervision, an unbounded capacity for fraternization.

So much for the defects and the virtues. What of the creative potentialities? My feeling has always been that the people I work and live with are lumpy with talents. We do not know enough of the nature of the creative process to maintain that a sense of uniqueness is crucial to the creative flow. Certainly, the American's wariness of people with a claim to uniqueness is not synonymous with an aversion to excellence. The American perfects and polishes his way of doing things, whether in work or in play, the way the French of the seventeenth century polished their maxims and aphorisms. The realization of the creative potentialities of the masses hinges on the possibility of a diffusion of expertise in literature, art, music, and science comparable with the existing wide diffusion of expertise in mechanics and sports.

We know of one instance in the past where the masses entered the field of cultural creativeness not as mere on-lookers but as participators. We are told that Florence at the time of the Renaissance had more artists than citizens. Where did these artists come from? Craftsmen and their workshops played a vital role in the unfolding of the new painting and sculpture. The Renaissance was born in the marketplace. Almost all the great artists were apprenticed when children to craftsmen. They were mostly the sons of artisans, shopkeepers, peasants, and petty officials. The sixteenth-century historian Benedetto Varchi says of the Florentines: "I have always been very much surprised to see that in these men who have been accustomed from

childhood to carry heavy bales of wool and baskets of silk and who spend all day and a large part of the night glued to their looms and spindles there should dwell so great a spirit and such high and noble thoughts." Everyday life was permeated by an interest in the procedures and techniques of the arts. One can hardly imagine a Florentine painter of that time making the remark, attributed to Marcel Duchamp, that "when painting becomes so low that laymen talk about it, it doesn't interest me." Even the greatest of the Florentine painters and sculptors had an intimate contact with everyday life, and lacked the disdain of the practical characteristic of the artists of ancient Greece and of our time. Verocchio, Alberti, and Leonardo da Vinci had a passionate interest in practical devices, machines and gadgets. They were no more fastidious and no less "materialistic" than artisans and merchants. There is no evidence that cultural creativeness is incompatible with relatively gross bents, drives, and incentives.

Though it may be questioned whether the lesson of Florence is applicable to a country of millions, it does suggest that the businesslike atmosphere of the workshop is more favorable for the awakening and unfolding of the creative talents of the masses than the precious atmosphere of artistic cliques. As we shall see, the increase in leisure due to the spread of automation makes the participation of the masses in cultural creativeness an element of social health and stability. Such a participation seems more feasible when we think of turning the masses into creative craftsmen rather than into artists and literati.